Opinion
MMXCV186021016S
09-25-2018
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF MIDDLETOWN v. Cassandra READY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
AARON, J.
This is a summary process action for nonpayment of rent. The plaintiff, Housing Authority of Middletown, seeks immediate possession of 27 Schaefer Road, Middletown, Connecticut (premises). The defendant, Cassandra Ready, alleges that equitable considerations bar forfeiture. For the following reasons the court finds in favor of the defendant.
The premises is a two-bedroom apartment owned by the plaintiff and is part of a moderate housing project known as Rockwood Acres.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The plaintiff, as lessor, and the defendant, as lessee, entered into a written renewable lease agreement on February 6, 2009. As of April 1, 2018, the rent for the premises was $400 a month, which is the minimum base rent for a two-bedroom apartment in the moderate income portfolio. The defendant lives with her son, who is eleven years old and, according to the defendant, experiences emotional and psychological issues associated with Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The defendant’s son currently attends the Wilbert Snow Elementary School where he receives psychiatric therapy and special education, even during the summer when schools are not in session. Prior to her disability, the defendant worked for approximately thirty years as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA). The defendant suffers from degenerative disc disease and neuropathy. As a result, her main source of income is social security disability (SSD), amounting to $1,074 a month. The defendant also receives approximately $360 a month in child support.
There was an updated lease; see Pl.’s Ex. 2; that was tendered to the defendant and had an effective date of April 1, 2018. The defendant, however, never signed the updated lease. The parties do not dispute this nor is it at issue here.
Rent is calculated at 31 percent of the tenant’s income, and recalculated every year based on certification of income. The fair market rental value for an apartment such as the one occupied by the defendant is approximately $890 a month but the base minimum rent is $400 or 31 percent of the defendant’s income, whichever is higher. A notice of rent adjustment was sent to the defendant on February 26, 2018, and the rent went from $390 to $400 a month. The increase of $10 a month was effective April 1, 2018. The parties do not dispute the increase in rent.
The defendant’s total annual income, including her SSD benefits and child support, is approximately $17,200. The Plaintiff’s witness, Lori Vasi, is the property manager and testified at trial that the required family income threshold for eligibility for moderate income housing is currently approximately $25,000 annually. In 2009, when the plaintiff submitted an application for moderate income housing, she met the then minimum income requirements. Vasi testified that if the defendant were applying for the first time now, however, she would not be eligible as she does not meet the minimum annual household income threshold. Vasi further testified that if the defendant were current in her rent, her present ineligibility would not affect her tenancy and she would be permitted to remain in the premises.
The plaintiff employs Vasi as their public housing manager. Vasi is responsible for overseeing tenant accounts and collecting rents. More specifically, Vasi is authorized to pursue summary process actions against tenants for nonpayment of rent.
On April 11, 2018, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit seeking that the defendant quit possession of the leased premises on or before April 16, 2018, based on nonpayment of rent for the month of April 2018. On May 7, 2018, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses to the plaintiff’s complaint. Using the JD-HM-5 form, the defendant admitted the allegations of the complaint and indicated, by way of a special defense, that "[she] lived in a building or complex with 5 units or more ..." and that "[she has] a physical or mental disability." See Def.’s Answer Compl. As additional information, the defendant wrote: "My son has a mental disability. My rent is late for April because ... half [was] paid with cashier check of $200 and] the other half was [paid] with [a] personal check [that] bounced. I have [May’s] rent and should have rest of [April’s rent]." See Def.’s Answer Compl. On May 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant’s special defenses asserting that it had insufficient information upon which to form a belief and left the defendant to her proof of each and every allegation in her special defense dated May 7, 2018.
The case was tried to the court on August 6, 2018. The plaintiff appeared with counsel. The defendant was self-represented. Despite defaulting on her rental obligation, the defendant maintained during trial that she would be able to meet her rental obligation moving forward. The principal issue in this case is whether the doctrine of equitable nonforteiture should be applied to the defendant’s special defense.
DISCUSSION
NONPAYMENT OF RENT
"In a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent, the landlord must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all the elements of the [cause of action]. The essential elements are: (1) On or about a certain date, the landlord and the tenant entered into an oral or written, lease/rental agreement for a weekly/monthly/yearly term for use and occupancy of a certain premises; (2) The tenant agreed to pay an agreed-upon rent by a certain date; (3) The tenant took possession of the premises pursuant to the lease; (4) The tenant failed to pay the rent due under the lease by a certain date; (5) The landlord caused a proper Notice to Quit Possession to be served on the tenant to vacate the premises on or before a certain termination date; and (6) Although the time given in the Notice to Quit Possession of the premises has passed, the tenant remains in possession of the premises. See § 47a-23(a)(1)(D) ... Failure of the landlord to establish any of the necessary elements, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, results in judgment for the defendant. Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., [ 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087 (1992) ]." East Hartford Housing Authority v. Hurt, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket. No. HDSP-137311 (January 8, 2007, Bentivegna, J.) (42 Conn.L.Rptr. 615, 616); see also 231 Ellington, LLC v. McQuade, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HDSP-148322 (November 14, 2008, Gilligan, J.).
In the present case, the court finds that the plaintiff satisfied its burden of establishing, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the essential elements of its summary process case. The defendant failed to pay the full amount of rent for April, in violation of the lease agreement entered into between the parties on February 6, 2009. Additionally, even after the defendant was served with a valid notice to quit, she remained in possession and did not tender any further rent.
During trial, it was undisputed that the defendant paid $200 (one-half) of April’s rent by a money order. The balance of $200 was tendered by a personal check written by the defendant from a closed account, which check was returned for insufficient funds. The defendant testified at trial that she mistakenly wrote the check from the wrong account.
II
EQUITABLE DEFENSES
A
Pleading Equitable Defenses
In the defendant’s answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, she stated: "My son has a mental disability. My rent is late for April because ... half [was] paid with cashier check of [$200 and] the other half was [paid] with [a] personal check [that] bounced. I have [May’s] rent and should have rest of [April’s rent]." See Def.’s Answer Compl. In its post-trial memorandum, the plaintiff argues that the defendant failed to specifically plead an equitable defense against forfeiture, and that it would be an abuse of discretion for the court to consider such a defense at the time of trial because to do so would violate the pleading requirement of notice to the plaintiff. For the following reasons, the court disagrees with the plaintiff’s claim.
A defendant’s answer and special defense can be submitted on the standard form, JD-HM-5, promulgated by the State of Connecticut and provided by the Judicial Branch. See Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips, 325 Conn. 394, 416, 158 A.3d 772 (2017). "The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is under-way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Almada v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 449, 456, 876 A.2d 535 (2005). "Furthermore, we long have eschewed the notion that pleadings should be read in a hypertechnical manner. Rather, [t]he modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ... [T]he complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties ... Our reading of pleadings in a manner that advances substantial justice means that a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with it the related proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension ... Although essential allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication ... the complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 536-37, 51 A.3d 367 (2012), In the present case, the court notes that the defendant is a self-represented party. See New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 497-98, 863 A.2d 680 (2005) ("[i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). In light of the defendant’s self-represented status, though inartfully pleaded, the court concludes that the plaintiff had reasonable notice that the defendant had the intention of raising equitable defenses in connection with this summary process action. Similar to Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips, supra, 325 Conn. 394 n.15, the defendant in this matter admitted she breached the terms of her lease but proffered equitable reasons why possession should not be taken away. See also Oakland Heights Mobile Park, Inc. v. Simon, 36 Conn.App. 432, 436, 651 A.2d 281 (1994) (noting that "[a] defendant asserting a defense of relief from forfeiture does not dispute that a lease has been terminated and that rent is owed and has not been paid ... [but alleges] that there are equitable reasons that establish that possession should not be taken away from the defendant").
Additionally, on May 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a reply brief to the defendant’s special defenses wherein it left the plaintiff to her proof of each and every allegation contained in her May 7, 2018 special defenses.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s reliance on Oakland Heights Mobile Park, Inc. v. Simon, supra, 36 Conn.App. 432, for the proposition that the defendant failed to plead equitable defenses is misplaced. In that case, the defendant’s answer admitted the allegations of the complaint but did not raise any special defenses. It was only during the trial that the defendant first raised special defenses. See id., 437. Unlike Oakland Heights Mobile Park, Inc., the defendant here raised her special defenses in her answer to the complaint. Cf. Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips, supra, 325 Conn. 394 n.15. Therefore, the court holds that the defendant’s admission of her violation of the lease and subsequent explanation, including the issues relating to her and her son’s disability, was sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice that equitable nonforfeiture grounds were likely to be raised at trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the defendant properly pleaded special defenses.
B
Applying Equitable Relief
Having concluded that the plaintiff established its summary process case, and that the defendant properly pleaded special defenses invoking the equitable powers of the court, the court now considers whether the equitable doctrine against forfeiture applies to this case and, if so, whether the court should employ its equitable powers to bar forfeiture and prevent the defendant from being dispossessed.
The court may employ equitable principles "to summary process actions for nonpayment of rent if: (1) the tenant’s breach was not willful or grossly negligent; (2) upon eviction the tenant will suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the injury to the landlord; and (3) the landlord’s injury is reparable." Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 225 Conn. 771, 778, 627 A.2d 386 (1993). In East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. SPH 9111-63027 (August 7, 1992, Holzberg, J.) (7 Conn.L.Rptr. 423-24), the court set forth a four-prong analytic framework to evaluate equitable claims. First, "whether the loss to be suffered by the tenant, if evicted, is disproportionate to the loss to the landlord if the tenant is not evicted." Id., 423. Second, "whether the injury to the other party is reparable." Id., 424. Third, "the reason for the nonpayment and the extent to which the tenant is ‘culpable.’ " Id. Fourth, "the extent to which the tenant has demonstrated good faith in curing the default." Id. See e.g., East Hartford Housing Authority v. Hurt, supra, 42 Conn.L.Rptr. 617 (adopting four-prong analytical framework to summary process actions); East Hartford Housing Authority v. Andrews, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. 105026 (November 15, 1999, Tanzer, J.) (same). In the present case, in weighing the equitable considerations at hand, the court finds that equity bars forfeiture.
Regarding the first factor, absent equitable relief, the defendant’s loss would be substantial if she were evicted. In reaching this conclusion, the court balanced the hardships to both parties. See East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, supra, 7 Conn.L.Rptr. 423 (Noting that first factor requires "the hardship to each party be identified and that one be balanced against the other. Only if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the tenant should equitable relief be considered"). First, the defendant is a single mother who has lived in the premises for over nine years and, if evicted, will unlikely find similar subsidized housing accommodations for her and her son. See e.g., East Hartford Housing Authority v. Andrews, supra, Superior Court, Docket No 105026 (noting that loss to defendant would be disproportionate to that of landlord if defendant lost moderate income housing); Winn Management Co. v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. SPWA-97-0818437 (October 16, 1997, Levin, J.) (considering whether defendant could obtain other housing accommodations). Although the defendant would likely satisfy the income requirements for federally subsidized low income housing, as Vasi testified, there currently is a four-year waiting list for such housing. Vasi further testified that the Housing Authority of Middletown considers whether an applicant has been in good standing relative to prior rental agreements. Here, the defendant has had difficulty over the years fulfilling the conditions of her current rental agreement. Thus, she would not qualify for low income housing and could potentially become homeless, unless her current housing accommodations are left in place. Second, the court finds the defendant’s testimony regarding her physical disability (i.e., degenerative disc disease and neuropathy) and her son’s mental disability (i.e., ADHD) credible. See Winn Management Co. v. Smith, supra . Third, the court is particularly mindful that an eviction will not only have an effect on the defendant but also to her son, who is dependent on her for support. According to the defendant’s testimony, her son attends Wilbert Snow Elementary School where he receives special services including therapy and other services. The defendant testified that if she is forced to relocate, there is the possibility that her son could be required to transfer schools and lose the support that he is currently receiving.
Against this backdrop, the court considers the loss to the plaintiff if the defendant is not evicted. The injury to the plaintiff amounts to a delay in the payment of one and a half month’s rent as well as costs associated with the present summary process action. While the plaintiff’s financial concerns are not insignificant, in weighing the losses to both the plaintiff and defendant; see East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, supra, 7 Conn.L.Rptr. 423; the court concludes that if the defendant is evicted, she will suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the plaintiff’s loss.
At trial, it was noted, and undisputed by the parties, that the monies owed to the plaintiff were as follows: $200 for April’s rent; $400 for May’s rent; $219 in Marshal and court fees; $41 for an outstanding water bill; $25 late fee; $25 for the notice to quit; and $10 for a return check charge.
With respect to the second factor- whether the injury to the landlord is reparable- the court finds that the plaintiff can be made whole. The plaintiff seemingly concedes that it can be made financially whole, but argues, without citing to any relevant authority, that continuing to force the plaintiff and defendant in a landlord-tenant relationship perpetuates the plaintiff’s injury. The court finds this argument unpersuasive. A review of the relevant case law involving summary process actions indicates that a plaintiff can be made whole when a defendant tenders any unpaid rent and any other costs associated to a summary process action. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Lighthouse Landings, Inc., 279 Conn. 90, 97 n.8, 900 A.2d 1242 (2006) ("[a] landlord’s injury is reparable if it can be remedied by money instead of forfeiture of the tenancy" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The fact that the parties will continue to have a landlord-tenant relationship does not militate against the notion that a breach is in fact reparable with money. See id. ; see also East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, supra, 7 Conn.L.Rptr. 424 (noting that landlord’s injury for nonpayment of rent can be remedied with money). In fact, on August 06, 2018, the court ordered that the defendant deposit $1,000 to the court by August 8, 2016. The defendant promptly complied with the order. Therefore, this is not a case in which the breach would be cured by payments over an extended period of time. Rather, by this court’s order, the plaintiff will be made whole immediately for any monies presently due. Regarding the third factor- the reason for the nonpayment and the extent to which the tenant is "culpable" the court finds, albeit with some reservations, that the tenant has proferred a reasonable justification for her nonpayment and that her culpability does not rise to the level of willful or grossly negligent. This third factor is "[o]ften expressed as the ‘clean hands doctrine’ ... [and] evaluates whether the tenant’s breach was willful or grossly negligent, on the one hand, or the product of mere neglect, on the other ..." East Hartford Housing Authority v. Hurt, supra, 42 Conn.L.Rptr. 617.
The court ordered that the $1,000 payment be applied towards the unpaid rent of April ($200) and use and occupancy for the month’s May and August ($800). Prior to this order, the plaintiff had remitted use and occupancy for the months of June and July. Therefore, the remaining balance owed is $320.
The plaintiff advances two main arguments in support of its position that the defendant does not have "clean hands" to invoke equitable relief. First, the plaintiff avers that there is a history of persistent nonpayment of rent by the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff points to three instances in the past nine years where it sought summary process actions against the defendant. The court, however, does not find that three nonpayments of rent over the course of nine years rises to the level of "persistent nonpayment." Given the nature of affordable housing, issues concerning nonpayment of rent are not unusual. The court, however, is in no way attempting to condone the nonpayment of rent; rather, the court recognizes that tenants in low/medium income housing often struggle financially to make ends meet, and that unforeseen circumstances- such as the ones present here- may affect a tenant’s ability to make timely payments of their rent. See East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, supra, 7 Conn.L.Rptr. 425 (noting that tenant/defendant was a "hard working, concerned and dedicated mother who, like many, struggles from day to day to make ends meet").
Second, the plaintiff contends that the defendant’s failure to pay rent and/or remedy the bounced check was willful because she admitted that once she had notice of it, she had already spent the money. The court finds this argument unpersuasive. During trial, the defendant indicated that she accidentally wrote the check on a closed account, and by the time she received notice of the deficiency, she had spent the money and could not tender the owed rent. The defendant’s actions, though arguably negligent, do not show that her nonpayment of the rent was a deliberate refusal on her part. The fact that the defendant no longer had the funds to cover for the rent owed does not ipso facto make her actions willful, as the plaintiff attempts to argue. The court concludes that the defendant, while certainly not free from culpability, has "clean hands," and therefore can request that the court employ its equitable powers to prevent forfeiture.
Finally, regarding the fourth factor- the extent to which the tenant has demonstrated good faith in curing the default- the court finds that the defendant has shown good faith and ability to cure the default. The court is well aware that the defendant has encountered occasional difficulties in meeting her rent obligations in the past; however, the court is also aware that the defendant has cured her prior defaults and, in connection with the present summary action, has shown good faith throughout the proceedings. As previously noted, upon order from this court, Aaron, J., the defendant readily deposited $1000 and indicated her willingness to promptly make the plaintiff whole for any unpaid rent. Moreover, the defendant admitted that she is solely responsible for failing to meet her rental obligations and never attempted to place any culpability on the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the court is satisfied that the defendant has conducted herself in good faith.
Based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the defendant has prevailed on her special defenses seeking equitable relief from forfeiture of the lease. The court is mindful that the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in ensuring that its tenants pay their rent in a timely fashion. Therefore, this decision is not intended to allow other similarly situated tenants to disregard their rental obligations. Rather, this decision was decided on the basis of a number of equitable factors, which are unique to the plaintiff, and allowed the court to fashion equitable relief.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court orders the following: Judgment shall enter in favor of the defendant on the grounds of equitable non-forfeiture. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff the sum of $320, which is the outstanding fees and out of pocket costs necessary to make the plaintiff whole. Said amount shall be paid by the defendant on or before December 1, 2018.