Opinion
No. HDSP-137311
January 8, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION SUMMARY PROCESS ACTION
I STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent. The plaintiff seeks immediate possession of the premises. As a special defense, the defendant has alleged equitable considerations bar forfeiture. The case was tried on October 6, 2006.
"Generally speaking, facts must be pleaded as a special defense when they are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Practice Book § 10-50." Almada v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 449, 456, 876 A.2d 535 (2005).
Practice Book § 10-50, entitled "Denials; Special Defenses," provides in relevant part: "No facts may be proved under either a general or special denial except such as show that the plaintiff's statements of fact are untrue. Facts which are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specially alleged."
II FINDINGS OF FACT
In her amended answer, as amended at trial, the defendant admitted the following material allegations of the complaint. On or about March 10, 2004, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a written lease agreement on an automatically renewable month-to-month basis for the use and occupancy of the premises located at 39 Columbus Circle, A-2, East Hartford, Connecticut, at a monthly rental of $352 payable on the first day of the month. The defendant took possession of the premises pursuant to the lease and still occupies the same. On or about March 16, 2006, the plaintiff caused a notice to be duly served on the defendant to quit possession of the lease premises on or before April 1, 2006, as required by the law. Although the time designated in the notice for the defendant to quit possession of the premises has passed, the defendant still continues in possession of the premises. Although the defendant had denied the allegation that she failed to pay the rent for the month of March 2006, at trial the parties stipulated to a prima facie case for nonpayment of rent.
"The admission of the truth of an allegation in a pleading is a judicial admission conclusive on the pleader. Jones Destruction, Inc. v. UpJohn, 161 Conn. 191, 199, 286 A.2d 308 (1971)." Rodearmel v. Rodearmel, 173 Conn. 273, 275, 377 A.2d 260, 262 (1977); "An admission in pleading dispenses with proof and is equivalent to proof." (Citation omitted.) Patchen v. Delohery Hat Co., 82 Conn. 592, 594, 74 A. 881 (1909).
The following evidence was presented at trial and was proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The defendant has lived in this subsidized housing since March 2004. When she moved into the apartment with her oldest child, her share of the rent was $72.
"The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005).
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). "[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977). "The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party." Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. 123. "That determination of credibility is a function of the trial court." Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61 Conn.App. 329, 333, 763 A.2d 199 (2001).
"[T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible . . . It is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses . . . The trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness . . . The trier can, as well, decide what — all, none, or some — of a witness' testimony to accept or reject." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osborn, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291, 676 A.2d 399 (1996).
The trial court's function as the fact finder "is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1986).
"While a plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it. Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211, 439 A.2d 949 (1981). The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential allegations of the complaint. Id." Gulycz v. Stop Shop Cos., 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087 (1992).
The standard of proof in summary process actions, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is "properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981).
The lease agreement required the defendant to notify the plaintiff as to any changes of income. The defendant was also notified of the plaintiff's rent collection policy, which limits the number of stipulated agreements.
On February 8, 2005, the parties entered into a stipulated agreement to resolve an eviction case based on nonpayment of rent. The defendant was subsequently reinstated pursuant to the agreement.
In January 2006, the defendant met with the plaintiff and provided the plaintiff with information regarding her employment income. As a result, her share of the rent increased to $352, effective March 1, 2006. The defendant was pregnant with her second child at the time.
The defendant did not pay the increased rent by March 10, 2006, and the plaintiff had the defendant served with a notice to quit on March 16, 2006. In mid-March 2006, the defendant took maternity leave from her job due to medical problems with her pregnancy. Her second child was born on April 13, 2006.
Over the next several months, the defendant's arrearage grew. As of October 31, 2006, the full arrearage was $1,199. During this period, the defendant sought rent assistance from third parties. In June 2006, the defendant applied for the Salvation Army renter's assistance program. She qualified for assistance under certain conditions. The defendant also received assistance from Interfaith. As a result of all her efforts, the defendant was able to make payments toward use and occupancy for the months of August 2006, September 2006 and October 2006. The plaintiff is currently holding checks in the amount of $571, which have not been deducted from the arrearage due to the plaintiff's rent collection policy.
At trial, the defendant disclosed that her state assistance had been increased starting in September 2006. Although she was recertified in October 2006, the plaintiff had based the recertification on the August 2006 amount. Based on the new information, the defendant's share of the rent would be increased.
III DISCUSSION (A) Plaintiff's Case (1) Nonpayment of Rent
In a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent, the landlord must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all the elements of the case. The essential elements are: (1) On or about a certain date, the landlord and the tenant entered into an oral or written, lease/rental agreement for a weekly/monthly/yearly term for use and occupancy of a certain premises; (2) The tenant agreed to pay an agreed-upon rent by a certain date; (3) The tenant took possession of the premises pursuant to the lease; (4) The tenant failed to pay the rent due under the lease by a certain date; (5) The landlord caused a proper Notice to Quit Possession to be served on the tenant to vacate the premises on or before a certain termination date; and (6) Although the time given in the Notice to Quit Possession of the premises has passed, the tenant remains in possession of the premises. See § 47a-23(a)(1)(D). Specifically, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant failed to pay rent for the month of March 2006. Failure of the landlord to establish any of the necessary elements, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, results in judgment for the defendant. Gulycz v. Stop Shop Cos., supra, 29 Conn.App. 523.The preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the defendant failed to pay the rent for March 2006 in violation of the lease, and even after the defendant was served with a valid notice to quit, she remained in possession of the premises.
(B) Defense Case (1) Equitable considerations bar forfeiture
The defendant has asked for relief from forfeiture based on equitable considerations. She has argued that the arrearage balance has been decreased due to her recent use and occupancy payments. When she made these payments, she understood that there was no guarantee that she would be reinstated. The defendant is committed to making her monthly rent payments and arrearage payments with third-party assistance. She argued that the plaintiff's rent collection policy is too rigid and should allow more than one repayment opportunity.
The plaintiff has contended that the rent collection policy is a reasonable business practice and that other agencies including the Salvation Army limit the number of opportunities for assistance during a given period. The plaintiff has also argued that the defendant does not have clean hands because when she took maternity leave in mid-March 2006, she had already failed to pay the increased rent. She also did not inform the plaintiff of changes in her income in a timely manner.
"[E]quitable defenses and counterclaims implicating the right to possession are available in a summary process proceeding . . . Equitable principles barring forfeitures may apply to summary process actions for nonpayment of rent if: (1) the tenant's breach was not willful or grossly negligent; (2) upon eviction the tenant will suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the injury to the landlord; and (3) the landlord's injury is reparable." Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 225 Conn. 771, 777-78, 627 A.2d 386 (1993); See Fellows v. Martin, 217 Conn. 57, 584 A.2d 458 (1991).
In East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. SPH 91 1163027 (August 7, 1992, Holzberg, J.) ( 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 422), the court set forth an analytic framework to evaluate equitable claims consisting of four elements: 1) in the absence of equitable relief, the defendant will suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the landlord; 2) the injury to the plaintiff is reparable; 3) the reason for the nonpayment and the defendant's responsibility; 4) the extent to which the tenant has demonstrated good faith in its dealing with the plaintiff.
"The first factor, as stated in Fellows, is whether the loss to be suffered by the tenant, if evicted, is disproportionate to the loss to the landlord if the tenant is not evicted. This requires, therefore, that the hardship to each party be identified and that one be balanced against the other. Only if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the tenant should equitable relief be considered.
"The second factor is whether the injury to the other party is reparable. The Fellows court noted that this involves consideration of whether the landlord's injury can be remedied by money instead of forfeiture of the tenancy. "The third factor, not always analytically distinct from the others, is the reason for the nonpayment and the extent to which the tenant is `culpable.' Often expressed as the `clean hands doctrine,' this factor evaluates whether the tenant's breach was willful or grossly negligent, on the one hand, or the product of mere neglect, on the other . . .
"Finally, the fourth factor identified by the courts is the extent to which the tenant has demonstrated good faith in curing the default. [T]he conduct of the plaintiff after he was informed of the non-payment is conclusive of the good faith of the plaintiff . . . and his desire to avoid a forfeiture." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, supra.
In evaluating the issue of clean hands, the court must consider "the equitable maxim that one who seeks to show that he is entitled to the benefit of equity must demonstrate that he comes to court with `clean hands.' " Cohen v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 193, 201, 438 A.2d 55 (1980). The clean hands doctrine "is a legal euphemism which expresses the principle that where a party comes into equity for relief he must show his conduct has been fair, equitable and honest as to the particular controversy in issue." Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 492, 234 A.2d 825 (1967). "The trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether the promotion of public policy and the preservation of the courts' integrity dictate that the clean hands doctrine be invoked." Polverari v. Peatt, 29 Conn.App. 191, 202, 614 A.2d 484 (1992). "Application of the doctrine of unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . The doctrine generally should not be employed to insulate the party who asserts it from the consequences of his own wrongdoing." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AB Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 189 Conn. 573, 578, 456 A.2d 1187 (1983). The party who seeks to invoke the clean hands doctrine to bar equitable relief must show that his opponent engaged in willful misconduct with regard to the matter in litigation. DeCecco v. Beach, 174 Conn. 29, 35, 381 A.2d 543 (1977).
In reaching a decision in this case, the court must weigh the following equitable considerations.
The court must determine whether, in the absence of equitable relief, the defendant will suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the plaintiff. It is undisputed that the defendant's loss would be substantial if she is evicted. She has lived in the apartment for nearly three years. She is a single mother with two young children. The loss of her subsidized housing would be a substantial hardship. The plaintiff has not received all the payments due under the lease and has had to bring this action. Even considering the plaintiff's rent collection policy, the defendant's loss would be substantially more harmful than the plaintiff's loss. See Housing Authority of Norwalk v. Whitaker, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Norwalk, Housing Session, Docket No. 941016560 (September 7, 1995, Tierney, J.) (rent collection policy considered as an equitable factor to be balanced between the parties). If the defendant is evicted under these circumstances, she would suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the plaintiff's loss.
Whether the injury to the plaintiff is reparable must be considered. Clearly, the default may be remedied by the payment of money rather than forfeiture. Over the last few months, the defendant has made use and occupancy payments that if applied toward the arrearage would significantly reduce the amount due. The defendant made these payments even though there was no guarantee she would be reinstated. By doing so, she proved her commitment to making future rent and arrearage payments.
The reason for the nonpayment and the defendant's responsibility must also be examined. The defendant is not without fault in this matter. The court is troubled by the circumstances surrounding the defendant's failure to pay rent. She should have been more proactive in providing updated financial information to the plaintiff. Nevertheless, her actions did not rise to the level of unclean hands. The defendant's difficult pregnancy and the birth of her second child were significant factors in her inability to make all her payments. Her conduct was not willful or grossly negligent. Rather, she was negligent and exercised poor judgment in not meeting her obligations.
Finally, the court must assess the extent to which the defendant has demonstrated good faith in its dealing with the plaintiff. The court finds that the defendant has demonstrated good faith in attempting to cure the default. Considering her circumstances, she has made sufficient efforts to make payments and seek third-party assistance. The evidence demonstrated that she is ready, willing and able to meet her financial obligations. See Housing Authority of Stamford v. Anthony, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Norwalk, Housing Session, Docket No. SNBR-397 (March 8, 1994, Melville, J.) (good reason to believe that the landlord will be made whole).
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds the equitable considerations do decidedly favor the defendant. Under the circumstances of this particular case, invocation of the equitable doctrine against forfeiture is appropriate to bar the plaintiff's request for immediate possession.
IV CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the above-stated reasons, the court enters judgment for the defendant. The defendant is ordered to meet with the plaintiff to establish a reasonable repayment plan. The defendant must continue to meet her monthly rent/use and occupancy obligations and make reasonable arrearage payments.