Opinion
CL-2023-0085
07-28-2023
Christopher HOLDEN v. Altrise Harris HOLDEN
Marcus Helstowski of McDaniel & McDaniel, L.L.C., Huntsville, for appellant.
Marcus Helstowski of McDaniel & McDaniel, L.L.C., Huntsville, for appellant.
Submitted on appellant’s brief only.
MOORE, Judge.
Christopher Holden ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Madison Circuit Court ("the trial court") in a contempt action. We affirm the judgment.
Background
On June 9, 2011, the trial court entered a judgment ("the divorce judgment") divorcing the former husband and Altrise Harris Holden ("the former wife"). At the time of the entry of the divorce judgment, the marital residence, which was encumbered by a mortgage with a balance of $64,000, had a fair market value of $110,000, leaving the parties with $46,000 in equity. The divorce judgment granted the former wife the option to purchase, within 120 days, the former husband’s interest in the marital residence for $20,000. If the former wife did not exercise her option, the former husband was granted the option to purchase the former wife’s interest in the marital residence within 30 days. If both parties failed to exercise their options, the marital residence was to be sold for fair market value and the net proceeds of the sale were to be divided equally between the parties.
The former wife did not exercise her option to purchase within 120 days of the entry of the divorce judgment, and the former husband did not exercise his option within the 30-day period following the expiration of the wife’s 120-day period. In 2014, the former husband filed a contempt petition alleging that the former wife was in violation of the provision of the divorce judgment requiring the parties to sell the marital residence. On June 3, 2014, the trial court entered a judgment ("the 2014 judgment") incorporating an agreement entered between the parties to settle and dismiss the contempt action. The 2014 judgment required the former husband to have the marital residence appraised and, dictated that following the appraisal, the marital residence was to be listed for sale through a designated listing agent. The parties agreed to cooperate with one another to effectuate the sale. Upon the sale, the net proceeds were to be divided equally between the parties.
On June 4, 2022, the former husband filed a second contempt petition alleging that the former wife had willfully and intentionally violated the terms of the divorce judgment and the 2014 judgment by refusing to place the marital residence for sale on the open market. The former husband requested that the former wife be sanctioned for contempt and that the trial court enforce the terms of the divorce judgment and the 2014 judgment. On August 22, 2022, the former wife appeared pro se and filed a handwritten answer denying the allegations in the contempt petition and asserting that she would be willing to pay the former husband $20,000 to purchase his interest in the marital residence once she obtained a loan to refinance the mortgage.
On December 5, 2022, the parties appeared before the trial court for trial. At the commencement of the proceedings, the trial court inquired as to whether the parties could settle the matter. The former wife indicated that she had secured a loan to refinance the mortgage and that, once she received the loan proceeds, she would have sufficient funds to pay the former husband $20,000 for his interest in the marital residence. The trial judge telephoned the loan officer, who stated that the loan could be closed before the end of the month, as the former wife had represented to the trial court. The trial judge suggested that the parties settle the case by agreeing that the former wife would pay $20,000 to the former husband before December 31, 2022, and stated that, in the event that that did not occur, the trial court would enter an order after that date directing that the marital residence be sold. After a short pause, counsel for the former husband responded as follows: "[I]f she can close and pay him the [$]20,000, you know, by the end of the year, he’s going to be happy with that. Otherwise, I mean … [the former husband asks] that [the marital residence] be ordered sold."
On December 6, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment requiring the former wife to close on the refinancing loan to enable her to pay the former husband the $20,000 by December 31, 2022. The judgment further provided that, if the former wife did not close on the loan by December 31, 2022, the trial court would place the marital residence for sale by a realtor of its choosing. The December 6, 2022, judgment was a final judgment resolving the claims made by the former husband in the contempt petition, although it contemplated further action by the parties or the court to dispose of the parties’ respective interests in the marital residence See generally Mayhan v. Mayhan, 395 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (reviewing judgment in postdivorce action establishing mode for sale of marital residence). On December 20, 2022, the former husband filed, pro se, a postjudgment motion in which he requested that the trial court enforce the 2014 judgment by ordering the sale of the marital residence and the equal division of the net proceeds derived from the sale. On December 21, 2022, the trial court denied the postjudgment motion. The trial court determined that the former husband was having a "change of heart" about the settlement the parties had entered into, but the trial court decided to hold the former husband to the agreement as stated in open court.
At the closing of the loan on December 30, 2022, the former husband refused to execute the necessary documents to complete the transaction. On January 3, 2023, the trial court entered an order directing the former husband to reschedule the closing before January 15, 2023, and to conclude the matter. The trial court indicated that, if the former husband did not cooperate, the court would either initiate contempt proceedings against him or order the issuance of a clerk’s deed conveying his interest in the marital residence to the former wife. That order did not affect the finality of the December 6, 2022, judgment because the order concerned only matters relating to the enforcement of that judgment. See Dunkin v. Bobby Schrimsher & Sons, Inc., 323 So. 3d 80, 86 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). On the same date the trial court entered that order, the former husband, through counsel, filed a second postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the December 6, 2022, judgment, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the parties’ property settlement in the divorce judgment. Because the second postjudgment motion raised a new ground for vacating the December 6, 2022, judgment, it was not an impermissible successive postjudgment motion. See McLendon v. Hepburn, 876 So. 2d 479, 483 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
The trial court conducted a hearing on the second postjudgment motion on January 13, 2023. During the hearing, the trial judge acknowledged that she could not modify the parties’ property settlement, but she determined that she could enforce the settlement agreement made in open court. On January 25, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying the former husband’s second postjudgment motion, determining that the former husband had agreed to resolve the matter by accepting $20,000 if the former wife refinanced the mortgage before December 31, 2022, and that the former husband "cannot now complain after agreeing to the settlement." On February 3, 2023, within 42 days of the denial of the second postjudgment motion, see Rule 4(a)(1) and (a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., the former husband timely appealed.
Issue
The former husband maintains that the trial court erred in modifying the property-settlement provisions of the divorce judgment regarding the marital residence.
Standard of Review
The facts of this case are undisputed and do not involve consideration of any ore tenus testimony; therefore, we review the judgment de novo to determine whether the trial court properly applied the law to the undisputed facts. See State v. Hill, 690 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1996).
Analysis
In DuBoise v. DuBoise, 275 Ala. 220, 228, 153 So. 2d 778, 785 (1963), our supreme court determined that a property settlement contained in a final judgment becomes fixed as to its terms and cannot be modified in subsequent proceedings based on changed conditions. "In this respect, there is no difference between a judgment of a court dividing the parties’ property and a judgment which approves an agreement of the parties providing for a division of property." Russell v. Russell, 386 So. 2d 758, 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). Based on DuBoise and Russell, the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the contempt proceedings to modify the property settlement, except to correct clerical errors. See Matthews v. Matthews, 608 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). The trial court did not violate that law in the proceedings below.
[1] Although a trial court lacks jurisdiction to unilaterally modify a property settlement, Alabama law recognizes that a court can enforce a valid bilateral contractual agreement entered into by the parties to a property settlement that modifies the terms of the settlement. See Ex parte Hoye, 324 So. 3d 1271, 1276 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020); Humber v. Bjornson, 8 So. 3d 995, 1002 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). In Oliver v. Oliver, 431 So. 2d 1271, 1274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983), this court recognized that the parties to a divorce judgment can validly waive or release the rights or benefits established in that judgment because "[a]ny right held by a party, whether by judgment or otherwise, may be the subject of contract to alter, exchange, waive, sell or satisfy. 15A C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement § 23; Winegardner v. Burns, 361 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1978); Watson v. McGee, 348 So. 2d 461 (Ala. 1977)." See also Lisenby v. Lisenby, 434 So. 2d 787, 789 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) ("We perceive no reasonable prohibition against the court, which has jurisdiction of the parties in all respects, accepting the agreement to release and modifying the rights and obligations previously given.").
In Humber, a divorce judgment contained a property settlement awarding an automobile to the wife and requiring her to pay any debt associated with the automobile. When the wife failed to make any payments on the debt, which remained under the name of the husband, the husband repossessed the automobile with the knowledge and acquiescence of the wife. The husband then used the automobile, kept it under his name, and paid the debt owed on the automobile, thereby tacitly accepting continuing ownership. Applying the reasoning in Oliver, this court determined that the husband and the wife had made a new, informal agreement regarding the ownership of the automobile and the payment of the debt owed on the automobile that could be properly enforced in a judicial action even if that agreement was contrary to the terms of the original property settlement.
In Ex parte Hoye, 324 So. 3d 1271, 1276 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), the parties divorced in 2019. Their divorce judgment contained a property settlement governing all the marital property. In 2020, the husband filed a contempt petition to enforce the property-settlement provisions of the judgment. The wife responded by filing a counterclaim for contempt against the husband for violating the same provisions. The parties mediated them dispute and reached a settlement, which they tendered to the judge overseeing the case for approval. The judge refused to approve the terms of the mediation agreement because, in his opinion, the agreement effectuated an impermissible modification of the property settlement. The husband filed a petition for the writ of mandamus to compel the judge to approve the mediation agreement. This court issued the writ of mandamus, determining that "the mediated settlement agreement is a valid contract between the parties that may be enforced." 324 So. 3d at 1277. This court said: "As implicitly concluded in Oliver and Humber, a trial court retains subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce an agreement between former spouses regarding the division or disposition of property awarded in a divorce judgment even if that agreement could be considered a modification of the award made by the court." Id.
[2] The record in this case shows that the former wife offered to purchase the former husband’s interest in the marital residence for $20,000 once she refinanced the mortgage. During the December 5, 2022, hearing, the former wife indicated that she could accomplish the refinancing by the end of the month. The former husband unambiguously agreed to accept that offer so long as the former wife closed on the refinancing loan and paid him the funds by December 31, 2022. Rule 47, Ala. R. App. P., specifically provides that "agreements made in open court or at pretrial conferences are binding, whether such agreements are oral or written." Pursuant to Rule 47, the parties made a valid, binding settlement agreement. See Porter v. Porter, 441 So. 2d 921, 923 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983). To the extent that that agreement modified the property settlement set forth in the divorce judgment and carried over into the 2014 judgment, that modification was wholly voluntary and within the power of the parties to make. Pursuant to Humber and Ex parte Hoye, the trial court had jurisdiction to accept the settlement, which it did by entering the December 6, 2022, judgment incorporating the terms of the settlement. Compare Junkin v. Junkin, 647 So. 2d 797 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (reversing judgment deviating from terms of settlement made in open court without evidentiary support). The trial court did not commit any error in entering the December 6, 2022, judgment enforcing the parties’ agreement.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Thompson, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.