Opinion
No. CV01-0003480
June 4, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On October 18, 2001, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was twice amended, with the Second Amended Petition (hereinafter "amended petition") being filed on April 22, 2003. The amended petition raises claims in four counts, namely that the petitioner's: 1) right to equal protection under the law is being violated because his incarceration has been lengthened by his inability to post bond; 2) right to due process is being violated by the state's failure to honor the plea bargain into which the petitioner entered, which allegedly resulted in illegally lengthening the term of the petitioner's confinement; 3) protection under the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions are being violated; and, finally 4) term of confinement has been illegally lengthened by the respondent's misinterpretation and misapplication of Connecticut General Statutes § 18-98d.
The respondent's returns to the amended petition deny the petitioner's claims and assert that the petitioner was never held in lieu of bond on his current controlling sentence. The respondent, via the return filed by the Attorney General's Office, also argues that the petitioner has been credited properly with all jail credit and that the Connecticut Supreme Court has upheld respondent's practice of crediting jail time only to that sentence to which it attaches. Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247 (1975). In a reply to the return filed by the Attorney General's Office, the petitioner asserts that the respondent's allegations are put in dispute by the petition and that no specific reply is necessary.
The Attorney General's Office filed a return as to counts one, three and four. The State's Attorneys Office filed a return as to count two. This reflects a practice that cannot continue for future cases. There is a single respondent in this matter, namely the warden of the prison. It is true that for administrative purposes, the attorney who represents the warden may be from the Attorney General's staff or the staff of the State's Attorney. The warden may have as many counsel as desired, but there is still only one respondent.
The matter came before this court on May 22, 2003, for a trial on the merits. The petitioner and Department of Correction Records Specialist II Michele Deveau testified at the trial. In addition, the court received a transcript, numerous judgment and continuance mittimi, court records and Department of Correction time sheets into evidence. CT Page 8185-k
The court has carefully and fully reviewed all of the testimony and evidence and makes the following findings of fact For the reasons set forth more fully below, the petition shall be granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. In docket numbers CR97-159252 and CR97-159254 (hereinafter "Manchester II"), the petitioner was held in lieu of bond for 780 days from December 15, 1997 to February 2, 2000, at which time he was sentenced for different offenses in other dockets.
This also includes one day of jail credit under Public Act 01-78.
2. In docket numbers CR98-516413 and MV97-373384 (hereinafter "Hartford II"), the petitioner was held in lieu of bond for 751 days from January 12, 1998 to February 2, 2000, at which time he was sentenced for different offenses in other dockets.
3. On February 2, 2000, the petitioner was sentenced in the Judicial District of Hartford at Manchester, Geographic Area 12, on docket numbers CR00-171869, CR00-171870, CR00-171871 and CR00-171872 (hereinafter "Manchester I") to a total effective sentence of two (2) years imprisonment. The petitioner was never held in lieu of bond on these dockets prior to sentencing. The petitioner discharged from the Manchester I sentence on or about February 1, 2002.
4. On June 16, 2000, the petitioner was sentenced in the Judicial District of Hartford at Manchester, Geographic Area 12, on the Manchester II offenses to a total effective sentence of four (4) years, to be served concurrent with the sentence the petitioner was then serving (i.e., the Manchester I sentence).
5. On June 27, 2000, the petitioner was sentenced in the Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford, Geographic Area 14, on the Hartford II offenses to a total effective sentence of four (4) years imprisonment to be served concurrent with all other sentences the petitioner was then serving.
6. On June 27, 2000, the petitioner also was sentenced in the Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford, Geographic Area 14, on docket numbers CR97-513469 and MV97-372359 (hereinafter "Hartford I") to a total effective sentence of one (1) year imprisonment, said sentence being fully executed, with or without taking into consideration any applicable presentence confinement credit, at the time the petitioner filed his pro se petition on October 18, 2001. CT Page 8185-l
7. The respondent has calculated the petitioner's discharge date from the Hartford II sentence as June 25, 2004, which results in the Hartford II sentence being the controlling sentence. The petitioner currently is incarcerated as a result of the Hartford II sentence and was in custody on that sentence at the time the present petition was filed.
DISCUSSION OF LAW
This matter involves the interrelationship of two statutes, General Statutes § 18-98d and § 53a-38 (b), and how the respondent has calculated the presentence confinement credit the petitioner has earned on his present controlling sentence. While this court believes that the personnel of the Department of Correction are operating in good faith in the manner in which they interpret and apply the presentence confinement calculations, there is error and the petitioner is entitled to receive the appropriate credit on each of his sentences. The outcome of this case is controlled by the seminal case regarding the interrelationship between C.G.S. §§ 18-98d and 53a-38 (b), namely Payton v. Albert, 209 Conn. 23 (1988).
General Statutes § 18-98d provides in relevant part: "(a) (1) Any person who is confined to a community correctional center or a correctional institution for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981, under a mittimus or because such person is unable to obtain bail or is denied bail shall, if subsequently imprisoned, earn a reduction of such person's sentence equal to the number of days which such person spent in such facility from the time such person was placed in presentence confinement to the time such person began serving the term of imprisonment imposed: provided (A) each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement; and (B) the provisions of this section shall only apply to a person for whom the existence of a CT Page 8185-u mittimus, an inability to obtain bail or the denial of bail is the sole reason for such person's presentence confinement[.]"
General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) provides: "A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term."
General Statutes § 18-98d (c) provides that: "The Commissioner of Correction shall be responsible for ensuring that each person to whom the provisions of this section apply receives the correct reduction in such person's sentence; provided in no event shall credit be allowed under subsection (a) of this section in excess of the sentence actually imposed."
While a sentenced inmate is not entitled to receive double credit for the same calendar day, it is a violation of double jeopardy to not adjust a docket sentence for all of its applicable presentence confinement credit. "[T]he purpose of the jail time statutes is to give recognition to the period of presentence time served and to permit the prisoner, in effect, to commence serving his sentence from the time he was compelled to remain in custody due to a mittimus . . . or because of the court's refusal to allow bail or the defendant's inability to raise bail." (Emphasis added.) Holmquist v. Manson, 168 Conn. 389, 393-94 (1975). "The refusal to credit the petitioner with jail time affects the period of his confinement and directly impinges on his fundamental right of liberty. Hence his lengthened confinement must be justified by a compelling state interest." Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. 33, quoting Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542 (1975).
"While 18-98d deals with the calculation of sentences in general, it does not specifically take up the matter of concurrent sentences. General Statutes 53a-38 (b) does." Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. 32. The Payton court concluded that the correct construction of these two statutes results in a calculation method in which each docket is first examined and "adjusted for its authorized credits." (Emphasis added.) Id. If the sentences at issue were "ordered to run concurrently, [C.G.S. §] 53a-38 (b) direct[s] that their merged terms [are] satisfied by the discharge of the term which has the longest term to run." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "The imposition of a concurrent sentence is CT Page 8185-m not an empty act[.] . . . Rather, it allows the court the flexibility of setting definite periods of imprisonment that fit the particular defendant's situation, despite the number of offenses to which the sentences apply; they remain, however, separate terms of imprisonment which the legislature has permitted to be served at one time." State v. Clemons, 168 Conn. 395, 409, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975).
The facts of Payton involved two dockets: the first docket with 113 days of presentence confinement credit and its respective presentence confinement good-time credits; the second docket with 76 days of presentence confinement credit and its respective presentence confinement good time credits. The 76 days of presentence confinement credit that Mr. Payton earned in the second docket overlapped and were included within the 113 days he earned on the first docket. At issue in Payton were the 37 days and their respective presentence confinement good-time credits that Mr. Payton earned on the first docket, but not the second. Stated differently, the petitioner in Payton was attempting to transfer all of the presentence confinement credit from the first docket to the second docket, even though the 37 days at issue were unique to only the first docket. The Supreme Court ultimately "conclude[d] that the public policy considerations inherent in discouraging criminal activity rise to the level of a compelling state interest"; Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. 34; and that the presentence confinement days unique to the first docket could not be transferred to the second docket. A key fact in Payton is that the sentences in both dockets were imposed on the same day.
In the instant case, the petitioner was not sentenced on the same day. On June 16, 2000 in Manchester II, the petitioner was sentenced to a term of four years. He had a total of 780 days of presentence confinement credit on this docket. On June 27, 2000, in Hartford II, the petitioner was also sentenced to four years to run concurrent with the Manchester I and II sentences. The petitioner had a total of 751 days of presentence confinement credit on the Hartford II docket. All 751 days creditable to the Hartford II sentence overlapped with the 780 days creditable to the Manchester II sentence. Had both sentencings taken place on the same day, the petitioner would clearly be able to earn pretrial confinement credit of 780 days and 751 respectively.
When it calculates an inmate's release date, the Department of Correction adds the sentence term to the sentencing date and then applies applicable credits. In Manchester II, with a four-year sentence adjudged on June 16, 2000, the petitioner's release date would have been initially determined as June 15, 2004. After application of the 780 days pretrial confinement credit, the release date would have been April 27, 2002. So, CT Page 8185-n as of June 16, 2000, the petitioner was due to be released from prison on April 27, 2002. The situation for this petitioner became cloudier when only eleven days later he was sentenced to a concurrent four-year term in Hartford II on June 27, 2000.
The Department of Correction applied the same methodology in calculating the release date on the Hartford II sentence. However, it is at this point where the Department of Corrections reasoning begins to break down. When a release date for the Hartford II sentence was calculated, the Department of Correction saw that all of the petitioner's 751 days of presentence confinement credit had been included within the 780 days previously credited to the Manchester II sentence. The Department of Correction incorrectly applied the rule that days of presentence confinement could only be counted once and reasoned that since all 751 days had been consumed in Manchester II, there were zero days to be applied to Hartford II. The release date for Hartford II was thereafter established as June 25, 2004.
The respondent argues that this is the proper interpretation because to do otherwise would permit presentence confinement days to be counted twice. This interpretation is wrong. The respondent relies on Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 253 (1975), for the proposition that the Connecticut Supreme Court has upheld the respondent's practice of crediting jail time only to that sentence to which it attaches. "The [petitioner in Houston] argue[d] that since he was unable to post bond on [one] charge, the benefit of his posting bond on [another] charge was effectively denied to him. While this assertion may in fact be true, the statute does not contemplate the effective denial of the benefits of bail but rather deals with the factual denial or inability to obtain bail itself. The facts as well as the language of § 18-98 are clear and undisputed and can lead to only one result. The [petitioner] was not `denied' nor was he `unable to obtain bail' on the [other] charge. He was never confined on that charge prior to sentencing; thus, he is not entitled to have his sentence from the [other charge] commuted for any period during which, in the language of the statute, he was `denied or was unable to obtain bail.' " Id., at 252-53. The facts of Houston clearly are different from the facts in the present matter. Additionally, the statute at issue in Houston was one of the predecessors to § 18-98d, namely § 18-98. See discussion, infra pp. 10-11. This court finds that Houston is not applicable to the facts of the present petition, nor that it involved the applicable statute at question here, § 18-98d.
It is clear that "[t]he refusal to credit the petitioner with jail time affects the period of his confinement and directly impinges on his fundamental right of liberty. Hence his lengthened confinement must be CT Page 8185-o justified by a compelling state interest. The compelling state interest in upholding the respondent's calculation here lies in the unacceptable ramifications of transferring jail time credit between different offenses . . . The principle that extra time served on a criminal sentence may not be `banked' is strongly rooted in the public policy that individuals should not be encouraged to commit crimes knowing they have a `line of credit' that can be applied against future sentences." Id., at 33-34.
Of particular concern to the Payton court was the avoidance of inmates receiving a double credit, which could occur under General Statutes §§ 18-97 and 18-98, the predecessor statutes to 18-98d. ". . . 18-98d differs from its predecessors in that it merged 18-97, which dealt with the presentence confinement of those held under a mittimus, and 18-98, which dealt with the presentence confinement of those unable to obtain bail. Further, 18-98d added the provision that `each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement.' As with its predecessors, there is no specific language in 18-98d dealing with the transferability of jail time credits.
Note the use of the plural here. Concurrent sentences merge into and become but a single term.
"Section 18-98d was enacted after [the Supreme Court's] ruling in Mancinone v. Warden, 162 Conn. 430 (1972), which concluded that the credits authorized by 18-97 and 18-98 were not mutually exclusive and could be earned simultaneously. The effect of Mancinone was that an alleged parole violator held under a mittimus could earn jail time credit under 18-97 and also accrue jail time credit under 18-98 for other charges pending for which he had been unable to obtain bail. Thus, in Mancinone the defendant received two days jail time credit against his sentence for each calendar day spent in presentence confinement as the result of the simultaneous application of the credits authorized under both 18-97 and 18-98.
"There is nothing in the scanty legislative history of 18-98d that indicates that its enactment was a specific legislative response to [the Supreme Court's] holding in Mancinone v. Warden. It is evident, however, that with the merger of the two statutes, there is now only a single jail time credit applicable to presentence confinements. The availability of but a single jail time credit, together with the new language specifically limiting sentence reductions to a single day for each calendar day of pretrial confinement, effectively deals with the arguably inequitable result that flowed from the concurrent application of 18-97 and 18-98." Id., at 30-31.
The prime concern to the Payton court was the double crediting of presentence confinement credit for a single calendar day. But the CT Page 8185-p calculation of the appropriate presentence confinement credit in the context of multiple concurrent sentences presented the Payton court with a dilemma, for while "18-98d deals with the calculation of sentences in general, it does not specifically take up the matter of concurrent sentences. General Statute 53a-38 (b) does. It provides in relevant part: If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run." (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 32.
The key to the resolution of the instant case and the proper calculation of multiple concurrent sentences lies in the concept of the merger of the terms. In Wilson v. Warden, 34 Conn. App. 503, 508, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 908 (1994), the respondent "obviously interpret[ed] `merge' to mean replace. Thus, an inmate serving a subsequent concurrent term is treated as if he had never served any prior sentence; the earlier term becomes irrelevant. Our Supreme Court, however, has twice rejected such an interpretation. See Payton v. Albert, supra, at 32 (suggesting that multiple merged terms coexist but are intermingled and satisfied by discharge of the longer); State v. Clemons, [ supra, 168 Conn. 409 . . .] (rejecting argument that subsequent concurrent sentences replace earlier sentences). Concurrent sentences remain separate terms of imprisonment which the legislature has permitted to be served at one time." (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
By merging or combining the terms, any overlapping days, either pre- or post-sentence, are only credited once. While it is clear that any presentence confinement days unique to a docket can only be used to adjust that particular docket; conversely, any days that overlap one or more dockets are merged and can properly be utilized on multiple dockets for calculation purposes, but can only be posted or credited but once. Under the facts of Payton, the defendant in that case could only utilize the 37 days presentence confinement credit on the first docket because they were unique to that docket. The remaining 76 days presentence confinement credit earned on the first docket that overlapped with the same 76 days of presentence confinement credit on the second docket were utilized on both dockets for adjustment purposes. Similarly, the days subsequent to sentencing served on both dockets that overlapped were utilized on both dockets to ultimately arrive at a discharge date from each docket, though any time spent on the controlling docket after discharge from the non-controlling docket was unique to that docket.
The calculation method endorsed in Payton requires the calculation of each docket's discharge date by examining each docket and adjusting it for its authorized credits. In accordance with Payton, the respondent must treat each concurrent docket's presentence confinement credit CT Page 8185-q separately and cannot transfer such credit to another docket. In calculating each docket's respective discharge date, however, the same time periods or calendar days can be utilized to calculate each docket's respective discharge date. Any presentence confinement credit that is unique to a docket can only be posted or applied to that docket. Conversely, any presentence confinement credit that is not unique to a docket can be posted or applied to each of the dockets where such credit was earned, with the limitation that each calendar day can only be posted or applied once. This methodology ensures both that the sentenced inmate receives proper credit on each docket's respective sentence and that each day of presentence confinement credit is only counted once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement. General Statutes § 18-98d (a) (1) (A).
In the present matter, the respondent has not credited the Hartford II docket sentence with the 751 days of presentence confinement credit earned by the petitioner on that docket between January 12, 1998 and February 2, 2000. Records Specialist II Deveau testified that these 751 days have not been credited to the Hartford II sentence, the petitioner's current controlling sentence, because they already have been applied to the Manchester II sentence and cannot be applied a second time without violating Payton. The sole distinguishing fact between the facts of the present petition from those in Payton is that while the latter involved concurrent sentences imposed on the same day, the former involves concurrent sentences imposed on different dates. This court disagrees with the respondent's reliance on the different sentencing dates as the basis for denying the petitioner the 751 days of presentence confinement credit earned on the Hartford II docket sentence.
It is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to have the additional 29 days of presentence confinement credit earned on Manchester II transferred to Hartford II. That would be an impermissible transfer of credit.
The petitioner has argued that he is being denied equal protection because he was unable to post a bond due to indigency. The court agrees that the manner in which the Department of Correction has been applying presentence confinement credits when there are concurrent sentences imposed on different days results in disparate treatment. However, this disparate treatment is not predicated upon the petitioner's indigency. Rather it is the fact that a person sentenced on the same day would receive all of the pretrial credits on each docket while the person sentenced on different days would not. It is clear that the compelling state interest that justifies the transfer of unique credits to other dockets is to prevent a person developing "a line of credit" for future crimes. Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. 33-34. There is no justification to prevent application of overlapping days of presentence credit to concurrent sentences, even though the person was sentenced on different days. CT Page 8185-r
When the petitioner was sentenced for the Manchester II offenses, the respondent examined that docket and adjusted it for its authorized credits, namely 780 days representing the time period of December 15, 1997 to February 2, 2000. On June 27, 2000, the petitioner was sentenced for both Hartford I and II. As to Hartford I, the petitioner had already been held in lieu of bond from October 31, 1997 to February 2, 2000, and would have discharged immediately from the one-year term upon sentencing. As to Hartford II, the respondent must examine that docket and adjust for its authorized credits, namely 751 days of presentence confinement credit representing the time period of January 12, 1998 to February 2, 2000.
Because Hartford II was ordered to be served concurrent with all other sentences then being served, the Hartford II term, subsequent to the calculation of the discharge date via adjustment for authorized credits, merges with the other adjusted sentences. While the facts of Payton involved two dockets for which the petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms on the same day, the facts of the present case involve concurrent terms imposed on different dates. General Statutes §§ 18-98d, 53a-38 (b) and Payton do not distinguish between concurrent sentences imposed on the same day versus those imposed on different days. The fact that the respondent in Payton was able to make the adjustments for the two dockets on the same day as a result of the sentencing occurring on the same day does not mean that double counting was prevented because the sentencing date was the same. There is simply no valid reason to apply a different rule.
As the Payton court noted, it is the application of 53a-38 (b) to the adjusted concurrent sentences that prevents any double counting of presentence confinement credits. While concurrent sentences remain separate terms of imprisonment that have been permitted to be served at one time, General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) directs that the merged terms are satisfied by the discharge of the term which has the longest term to run. Just as the double counting of days is prevented by the merging of the "to-serve" portions of the concurrent sentences, double counting of days is also prevented by the merging of the presentence confinement portions of concurrent sentences.
"The concept of equal protection under both the state and federal constitutions has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." (Internal citations omitted.) Franklin v. Berger, 211 Conn. 591, 594-95 (1989). CT Page 8185-s
"To implicate the equal protection clauses under the state and federal constitutions, therefore, it is necessary that the state statute in question either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently." Id., at 596. This court finds that the respondent's distinction between concurrent sentences imposed on the same day and concurrent sentences imposed on different days, a distinction not made in the relevant statutes and the case law interpreting the same, violates the petitioner's right to equal protection under the law.
This court also finds that by not adjusting the Hartford II sentence for its applicable presentence confinement credit, the respondent has violated the petitioner's right to be free from double jeopardy. "[T]he purpose of the jail time statutes is to give recognition to the period of presentence time served and to permit the prisoner, in effect, to commence serving his sentence from the time he was compelled to remain in custody due to a mittimus . . . or because of the court's refusal to allow bail or the defendant's inability to raise bail." (Emphasis added.) Holmquist v. Manson, supra, 168 Conn. 393-94. The respondent's calculation in the present case does not give the petitioner recognition for the time he was compelled to remain in custody on the Hartford II docket.
Records Specialist II Deveau testified during the trial that the petitioner's maximum release date from the Hartford II docket sentence, if adjusted for the presentence confinement credit represented by the time period of January 12, 1992 to February 2, 2000, would have been April 27, 2002. This court finds, based upon the foregoing application of the law to the facts of this case, that the petitioner, in fact, should have discharged from the Hartford II sentence more than one year ago. It therefore is the order of this court that the respondent immediately release the petitioner from custody.
This court notes that there may, at first, appear to be an inconsistency between its decision in Judd v. Warden, 2002 Ct. Sup. 14408, 33 Conn.L.Rptr. 451 (Fuger, Jr., J., November 12, 2002), and today's decision. In Judd, the petitioner argued but one basis for relief, namely that Valle v. Commissioner of Correction was good law and mandated relief. See Judd v. Warden, Id., at n. 4. Since Valle has no precedential value (discussed in greater detail in footnote 7), the petition was dismissed. The petitioner in the instant case has raised additional bases upon which relief may be granted.
As a final comment, this court invites attention to the dissenting opinion in Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 244 Conn. 634, 640 (1998), a case involving a remarkably similar factual scenario as the present petition. "[B]ecause the state presently calculates those [presentence confinement] credits in a manner adversely to prisoners, contrary to that directed by the [ Valle] trial court and the Appellate Court in [ Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 45 Conn. App. 566 (1997)], prisoners who would have been released, had [the Supreme Court] affirmed those courts, are being held wrongfully. Common decency and concern for the liberty rights of those prisoners requires [that the issue be decided]."
Mr. Alphonso Valle and his adventures in and out of the Department of Correction have long been a thorn in the side of people who deal with sentence calculations. The facts in the original Valle trial court decision, Valle v. Barbieri, 1996 Ct. Sup. 3362, 16 C.L.R. 478 (W. Sullivan, J., April 11, 1996) are nearly identical to the case at bar. In the trial court, Valle was afforded the relief afforded here. The warden appealed and the Appellate Court upheld the decision of the habeas court in Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 45 Conn. App. 566 (1997). Once CT Page 8185-v again, the Commissioner appealed and our Supreme Court "granted the respondent's petition for certification limited to the following issue: `Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that a prisoner serving multiple concurrent sentences imposed by different courts on different dates is entitled to have presentence confinement credit applied to each of those sentences when that credit represents the same period of presentence confinement?'" Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 243 Conn. 909 (1991). Unfortunately before the Supreme Court could resolve the issue, Mr. Valle became a fugitive from justice thereby leading the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case back to the trial court with direction to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus. Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 244 Conn. 634 (1998). This effectively wiped the Valle cases away as precedent.
"At oral argument before [the Supreme Court in Valle], the state represented in good faith that the best estimate was [numerous] other CT Page 8185-t prisoner's sentences could be affected by the merits of this appeal." Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 244 Conn. 638 n. 2. At that time, it was the Commissioner who urged the Supreme Court "to reach the merits of its appeal because of the vital interest to the state in determining the calculation of credits for prison sentences of [numerous] other prisoners." Id., at 638. Had the Supreme Court in Valle dealt with the appeal on its merits, the "decision would [have] establish[ed] a rule of law that has significance and application to [all] other prisoners." Id., at 638. The issue in this petition deserves consideration at the appellate level in order that there be a binding precedent on all similarly situated inmates.
Judgment is entered granting this petition. The respondent is ordered to immediately release the petitioner, as he has discharged from his current controlling sentence. Should the respondent pursue an appeal and ultimately prevail, the petitioner shall be remanded back into the custody of the Commissioner of Correction to serve the remainder of the unexecuted sentence.
S.T. FUGER, JR., JUDGE