Opinion
(SC 17897)
The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had been dissolved in 1994, appealed from a subsequent trial court order finding him in contempt for failure to make certain payments to the plaintiff pursuant to the court's financial orders in the dissolution action. The defendant had been ordered to pay a percentage of any partnership distributions, loan repayments or any other remuneration that he received from certain of his real estate partnerships, and in 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt for the defendant's refusal to comply with that order. The plaintiff sought an additional payment order relating to the partnership payments, as well as statutory interest, attorney's fees and costs. After a hearing on the contempt motion, the trial court, in November, 2006, ordered the defendant to make certain specified payments and explained to the parties that, in the absence of an agreement by the parties, the payments were subject to further audit for the years 2005 and 2006 because the data relating to those years was not fully available at the time of the contempt hearing. The parties' counsel also were ordered to calculate the interest due on the payments and to report the agreed upon amount to the court by a specific date. In the event that the parties did not agree on the amount of interest, the court would make the determination. In December, 2006, the defendant objected to the plaintiff's calculation of interest, and the court ordered the parties to submit additional information before issuing its decision. The Appellate Court dismissed the defendant's appeal from the contempt order for lack of a final judgment because at the time the appeal was filed, the trial court had not made a final determination of damages for the years 2005 and 2006, or of the amount of prejudgment interest on the damages already awarded to the plaintiff. From the judgment of dismissal, the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. While the appeal was pending, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in July, 2008, with regard to the contempt motion, which resolved the previously unresolved issues, including the calculation of interest on the plaintiff's award of damages. The defendant then amended his appeal to this court, challenging the trial court's July, 2008 decision. The defendant also filed a separate appeal in the Appellate Court, which raised the identical legal claims that had been raised in the amended certified appeal in this court. Held that the defendant's appeal to this court was dismissed as moot, there no longer having been an actual controversy between the parties regarding the certified question of whether there was an appealable final judgment in the case following the trial court's July, 2008 final determination of the previously unresolved issues on which the Appellate Court had based its determination of lack of a final judgment; moreover, even if this court were to conclude that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, this court could not grant the defendant any practical relief by deciding the amended certified appeal, there already having been a separate appeal pending in the Appellate Court in which the defendant could address all claims relating to the initial order finding him in contempt and all subsequent rulings, including the trial court's final ruling in July, 2008.
Argued November 19, 2008
Officially released April 28, 2009
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Barall, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief; thereafter, the court, Hon. Herbert Barall, judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt and ordered the defendant to make certain payments to the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Flynn, C. J., and Schaller and Lavine, Js., which dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court; subsequently, the court, Hon. Herbert Barall, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of decision in accordance with the parties' stipulation regarding the amount of certain payments to be made by the defendant, and the defendant filed an amended appeal to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Karen L. Dowd, with whom was Brendon P. Levesque, for the appellant (defendant).
Opinion
This certified appeal arises out of a postjudgment motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff, Elizabeth C. Harris, relating to the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the defendant, Dwight C. Harris. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed his appeal from the order of the trial court finding him in contempt for lack of a final judgment. After this appeal was certified, the trial court rendered a final decision resolving all issues relating to the motion for contempt, and the defendant appealed from that decision to the Appellate Court. Because there is no longer any controversy between the parties about the appealability of the finding of contempt, this appeal is moot.
The following facts and procedural history provide the necessary background for our decision. On July 29, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage and entered various financial orders, including an order that the defendant pay the plaintiff a percentage of any partnership distributions, loan repayments or any other remuneration received from certain real estate partnerships. In October, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the defendant had refused to pay certain amounts owed under this provision of the financial orders and seeking an additional payment order relating to these partnerships, plus statutory interest, attorney's fees and costs.
After a hearing, the trial court found the defendant in contempt for wilfully violating the financial order and ordered him to make certain specified payments to the plaintiff with regard to the partnerships. In its memorandum of decision dated November 21, 2006, the trial court explained that these payments, in the absence of an agreement by the parties, were subject to further audit for the years 2005 and 2006 because the data relating to those two years was not fully available at the time of the contempt hearing. The trial court also ordered that the defendant pay 10 percent interest on the amounts owed pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a (a). The trial court further ordered the parties' counsel to calculate the interest payment due and to report to the court by certain dates whether they had reached an agreement. In the event the parties were unable to reach an agreement by the court-ordered dates, the calculation would be made by the court.
General Statutes § 37-3a (a) provides in relevant part: "[I]nterest at the rate of ten percent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. . . ."
On December 11, 2006, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's calculation of interest. The trial court did not issue an immediate decision, but ordered the parties to submit additional information on the issue of compound interest.
On December 15, 2006, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the ruling of the trial court finding him in contempt. Thereafter, the Appellate Court ordered the parties to appear for a hearing as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final judgment. After oral argument on that issue, the Appellate Court dismissed the defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment "because, at the time this appeal was filed, there had not yet been a final determination of (1) damages for the years 2005 and 2006, and (2) the amount of prejudgment interest on the damages already awarded [to] the plaintiff."
Subsequently, the defendant petitioned for certification to appeal to this court. We granted the defendant's petition for certification, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment?" Harris v. Harris, 282 Conn. 911, 922 A.2d 1098 (2007).
While the defendant's appeal was pending in this court, but prior to oral argument in this court, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision with regard to the contempt motion, dated July 31, 2008, resolving the previously unresolved issues, including the calculation of interest on the plaintiff's award of damages. The defendant then amended this certified appeal in order to add a challenge to the July 31, 2008 decision of the trial court. Simultaneously, the defendant also filed a separate appeal in the Appellate Court. The defendant raises the identical legal claims in both the amended, certified appeal in this court and the new appeal in the Appellate Court.
Thereafter, sua sponte, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs to address why the certified appeal in this court should not be dismissed as moot.
Our order for supplemental briefing provides as follows: "The parties are hereby ordered to file simultaneous supplemental briefs addressing the issue why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot. The briefs, which may not exceed five (5) pages, must be filed on or before October 17, 2008."
"Mootness implicates [this] court's subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. . . . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 289 Conn. 362, 366, 957 A.2d 821 (2008). "In other words, where the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 282 Conn. 1, 14, 917 A.2d 966 (2007).
In the present case, the sole issue certified by this court is whether the Appellate Court properly dismissed the defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment. There is now no dispute between the parties that the trial court's July 31, 2008 ruling constituted a final determination of the previously unresolved issues on which the Appellate Court based its determination of lack of a final judgment. Accordingly, there is no longer an actual controversy between the parties regarding whether there is an appealable final judgment in this matter.
Moreover, as we previously have noted herein, the defendant already has filed a new appeal in the Appellate Court that raises the identical issues raised in the amended, certified appeal presently before us. Even if we were to conclude that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, this court would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court for consideration of his claims relating to the trial court's order finding the defendant in contempt. Because the defendant already has a new appeal pending before the Appellate Court in which he can address all claims related to the finding of contempt, including the initial ruling in November, 2006, and all subsequent rulings, including the final ruling on July 31, 2008, we would grant him no practical relief by deciding the certified appeal. The defendant's appeal, therefore, is moot.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.