Summary
granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct and instead made a general assertion that defendant inflicted mental distress
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4:01-CV-0327-E.
July 12, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Melanie Sue Davies in the above-numbered case. Plaintiff James M. Hanners has responded in opposition, and Davies has submitted reply briefing. After considering the arguments of the parties, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court makes the following determinations.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 12, 1999, Plaintiff James Hanners ("Plaintiff") and Defendant Melanie Sue Davies ("Defendant") ended their eight-year marriage with the filing of an Agreed Final Decree of Divorce in Texas state court. Pursuant to the terms of the Decree, Defendant received sole custody of the couple's young daughter, Emily Elizabeth Hanners. Plaintiff was allowed visitation with his daughter only within discretion of Defendant or future court order.
In the two years since the entering of the divorce decree, Plaintiff has attempted to challenge and modify the divorce decree's visitation and custody arrangements by filing several actions in both state and federal court against his ex-wife and her new husband, Paul Jeffrey Brown. Plaintiff's Complaint in this case — filed on April 20, 2001, along with an identical federal suit against Mr. Brown, James M. Hanners v. Paul Jeffrey Brown, 4:01-CV-0326-Y (Means, J.) — alleges several vague and amorphous claims against Davies. With the barest of factual detail, Plaintiff asserts causes of action against his ex-wife for violation of privacy, infliction of mental distress, intent to deceive, intentional interference with a person, interference with fundamental family rights, false light, defamation, slander, libel, and physical assault upon a child. Defendant counters by arguing that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), this Court must construe the plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations contained therein as true. See Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); Mann v. Adams Realty Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1977). A motion to dismiss should only be granted when the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); See also Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 607 (5th Cir. 1977). A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. See Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
Federal courts have long abstained from the exercise of diversity jurisdiction in cases involving intrafamily relations.See Congleton v. Holy Cross Child Placement Agency, Inc., 919 F.2d 1077, 1078 (5th Cir. 1990). This "domestic relations exception" to jurisdiction allows courts to avoid consideration of matters involving divorce and alimony, child custody, disputes over visitation rights, enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still subject to state court modification, and disputes actions over paternity and child support payments, among others. See id. The policy of abstention is founded on "the strong state interest in domestic relations matters, the competence of state courts in settling family disputes, the possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state, and the problem of congested dockets in federal courts." Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978).
Because it is often difficult to classify a case squarely within the traditional scope of the field of domestic relations, the Fifth Circuit has held that a district court may abstain from hearing a matter if it will "necessitate the court's involvement in domestic issues, i.e., . . . it will require inquiry into the marital or parent-child relationship."Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 565 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The court also may decline jurisdiction if the tortious conduct alleged by the plaintiff is part of an ongoing series of disputes centering around the marital relationship. See Rogers v. Janzen, 891 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1989).
Having reviewed the First Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction requires the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for (1) intent to deceive; (2) intentional interference with a person; (3) interference with fundamental family rights; (4) false light; (5) defamation, slander, and libel; and (6) physical assault upon a child. See Compl. at VI-IX. In each of these claims, Plaintiff accuses Defendant of various abuses of the child custody process, including slandering him to custody evaluators and lying about the whereabouts of his daughter in violation of court order. Consideration of these causes of action would improperly involve the Court in the ongoing custody dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant, a matter currently being resolved in state court. An intrusive federal inquiry into the relationships between Plaintiff, Defendant, and their daughter would encroach on the state court's custody determinations, and would present an unreasonable danger of incompatible federal and state decrees. See id.; Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1981). This is a risk the Court is unwilling to take.
Having determined that six of Plaintiff's claims shall be dismissed pursuant to the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, the Court considers it unnecessary to address Defendant's contention that diversity jurisdiction does not even exist in this case because both the Plaintiff and Defendant allegedly are citizens of Texas.
The only remaining causes of action in Plaintiff's Complaint are for "invasion of and violation of privacy law, federal law and Texas criminal law" and "infliction of mental distress on plaintiff and his child." Both claims arise out of Plaintiff's allegations that his ex-wife surreptitiously recorded conversations between Plaintiff and his daughter. Plaintiff asserts that the alleged wiretapping is a violation of both Texas and Tennessee criminal law, and is prohibited by the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim is drafted in such vague and general terms that it offers Defendant and the Court little assistance in discerning the legal bases for the claim. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's alleged recording of private telephone conversations is illegal under federal and state law, but fails to identify the specific statutes Defendant allegedly has violated. Nor does Defendant indicate which, if any, of the four distinct Texas common law privacy torts he relies upon for relief. Considering these glaring deficiencies, but mindful of the liberal approach of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding pleading and the apparent likelihood that Plaintiff can state a valid invasion of privacy claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff shall have 14 days from the date of this Order to amend his Complaint to replead his invasion of privacy claim in greater specificity. See Mills v. Injury Benefits Plan of Schepps-Foremost, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 804, 806 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (plaintiffs should have "an opportunity to amend their complaint if it appears that a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim upon which relief may be granted."); see also Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 604 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The trial court may require the plaintiff to state the claim with greater particularity . . . where the plaintiff may assert a valid claim, even if inartfully stated, the liberal approach of the federal rules requires that the plaintiff be given the opportunity to state his claim. . . .").
Plaintiff's cause of action for infliction of mental distress also fails to provide the specificity of pleading demanded by the Federal Rules. Under Texas law, a plaintiff asserting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must demonstrate: (1) intentional or reckless acts by the defendant, (2) which are extreme and outrageous, (3) causing the plaintiff's emotional distress, (4) which distress is of a severe nature. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993). The plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." See id.
Plaintiff's claim for infliction of mental distress fails to allege any specific facts that would establish the above elements. Unable to point to any evidence of extreme or outrageous conduct by Defendant, Plaintiff vaguely contends that Defendant inflicted mental distress through "blatant and deliberate conduct and unrestrained actions." This allegation, without more evidence to substantiate it, is not enough to support a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be given 14 days from the date of this Order to amend his Complaint to replead his action for infliction of mental distress, or it shall be dismissed with prejudice. See Mills, 851 F. Supp. at 806.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered the motion to dismiss submitted by Defendant Melanie Sue Davies, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court determines that: (1) Plaintiff's claims for intent to deceive; intentional interference with a person; interference with fundamental family rights; false light; defamation, slander, and libel; and physical assault upon a child are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction; and (2) Plaintiff shall have 14 days from the date of this Order to replead his invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, both of which fail to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) in their present form. If Plaintiff does not replead these actions by the court-imposed deadline, both claims shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In closing, Plaintiff is hereby warned that the Court will not tolerate any attempts to utilize the federal court system as a tool to needlessly harass and intimidate Defendant and her family. Having reviewed the factual background of this case, as well as the virtually-identical pleadings filed in Plaintiff's federal lawsuit against Defendant's husband, the Court is concerned that Plaintiff will not hesitate to use his experience with the legal system to deluge Defendant with frivolous lawsuits and motions. The Court considers Plaintiff to be on notice that such behavior will be swiftly and strongly punished by all means at the Court's disposal.
Plaintiff is an attorney who was disbarred by the State Bar of Texas in 1992. See Hanners v. State Bar of Tex., 860 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, writ dism'd).
IT IS SO ORDERED.