Opinion
05-22-00276-CR
03-16-2023
HUGO GUADALUPEANGELES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 220276F.U05
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-2120680-I
Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
EMILY MISKEL JUSTICE
Appellant Hugo Guadalupeangeles appeals his conviction for first-degree aggravated assault. In his first issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show serious bodily injury, an element of the offense. We hold that the proof of more than ten stab wounds to the complainant and the testimony illuminating the threat that those wounds posed are together sufficient to support the conviction.
In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the abstract portion of the jury charge contained an error, though he did not object to the charge below. Even assuming that this instruction was erroneous, we hold that it did not cause egregious harm in light of the correct application paragraph, the overwhelming evidence of guilt on the only contested issue in the case, and the ameliorative effect of counsel's arguments.
In his third issue, Appellant prays for a reformation of the judgment to correct an errant statutory citation. The State concedes error.
We therefore affirm the judgment as modified.
I. Background
Danielle Martin met Appellant in 2014 at a restaurant where they worked together. They began to date and moved in together in 2015. Their relationship was good at first, but she noticed that he drank heavily and often stayed out all night. When Martin became pregnant, she tried to discourage his drinking. Appellant did not change his habits, and Martin ended the relationship. They were separated for three or four months before they reconciled, with Appellant promising that he would change. Their daughter was born, and they married a few months later in early 2017.
However, Appellant eventually went back to drinking and staying out all night. As their relationship deteriorated, Martin suggested a divorce. Appellant threatened to take their child to Mexico if she left him, which led Martin to drop the idea of divorce.
One night in March of 2020, though, Martin received a call around four in the morning from Appellant's brother Luis. He reported that Appellant was drunk, furious, and uncontrollable. Luis brought Appellant home, and Appellant began to scream obscenities at Martin. He tried to grab her, but Luis held him back. Luis locked him in a bedroom, and Martin spent the night on the living room couch with their child.
The incident led Martin to ask Appellant for a divorce. Appellant again threatened to take their daughter to Mexico if she left. Martin again stayed.
The next incident took place that summer. Appellant came home around four in the morning, sat next to her as she lay in bed, and demanded sexual intercourse. Martin refused. Appellant began to choke her with both hands. They rolled off the bed in a struggle. Multiple times, Appellant let go momentarily and then began choking her again. At some point, Appellant went to the bathroom, and Martin ran out with their child and called police. Appellant was arrested and pleaded guilty to domestic violence charges. Martin moved to a new apartment and did not tell Appellant where she lived.
Appellant later contacted her and asked to see their daughter. Martin agreed and arranged weekly visits, which she supervised. However, at one visit in November 2020, Appellant showed her images of her private social media messages, having hacked her phone. Martin deactivated her social media accounts but nonetheless continued their weekly visits.
In December 2020, Appellant asked for a weekend-long visit with their daughter. Martin initially agreed, but when the weekend came, she cancelled due to her uneasiness with the idea.
In January 2021, Appellant texted Martin asking her to allow an unsupervised visit so that their daughter could have a video call with his sister in Mexico. Martin did not respond.
On January 19, 2021, Martin was working at the bakery she owned with her mother when Appellant again texted, asking her to call him. Martin did not respond. She had stepped outside to take a phone call from a friend when Appellant pulled up in a car, got out, and yelled at her to get in. She instead hurried toward the bakery. He followed and wrestled her to the ground. During the struggle, a kitchen knife fell out of his pocket. Appellant picked up the knife and stabbed her multiple times. Martin stood and stumbled back to the bakery. Appellant sped off in the car. He was arrested minutes later after he ran a stop light nearby.
Police and paramedics stabilized Martin, and she was rushed to the hospital, where she was admitted to the critical care unit for wounds to her chest, stomach, back, and arms. Doctors performed emergency surgery to address internal bleeding and a twice-punctured liver. She was hospitalized for three days. It was three weeks before she was able to walk, though even at that point, she could not sit in an automobile due to nature of the staples used to seal her wounds.
Appellant was indicted for first-degree aggravated assault. At trial, the State introduced evidence of the facts above, which we have recited in the light most favorable to the jury's eventual verdict. The jury found Appellant guilty as charged and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly.
II. Sufficient Evidence of Serious Bodily Injury
In his first issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show a single element of first-degree aggravated assault: serious bodily injury. He asserts there is no basis in the record evidence from which any reasonable jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Martin's wounds created a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.
A. Standard of Review
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We may not reevaluate the evidence's weight and credibility and substitute our judgment for the factfinder's. Id. We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 44849 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). "Under this standard, evidence may be legally insufficient when the record contains either no evidence of an essential element, merely a modicum of evidence of one element, or if it conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt." Britain v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
B. Applicable Law
"A person commits ordinary assault if he 'intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.'" Garcia v. State, No. PD-0679-21, 2023 WL 151989, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2023) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1)). The offense is elevated to first-degree aggravated assault if the actor uses a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault and causes serious bodily injury to a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by Sections 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005 of the Family Code-i.e., a family member, a member of the defendant's household, or a person with whom the defendant has a dating relationship. Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(b)(1)).
Serious bodily injury means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(46). "[T]he question is the degree of risk of death that the injury caused, or the disfiguring or impairing quality of the injury, as it was inflicted, not after the effects had been ameliorated or exacerbated by other actions such as medical treatment." Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). "As numerous courts of appeals have recognized, there are no wounds that constitute 'serious bodily injury' per se." Reyes v. State, No. 03-15-00233-CR, 2017 WL 1130373, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (collecting cases). Instead, whether a victim's injuries constitute a serious bodily injury is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
An injured party is qualified to express an opinion about the seriousness of the injuries. Coshatt v. State, 744 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd) (citing, inter alia, Hart v. State, 581 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)). Further, serious bodily injury may be established without a physician's testimony when the injury and its effects are obvious. Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Show Serious Bodily Injury
By Martin's account, she was stabbed thirteen times in her chest, stomach, back, and arms, which together created significant internal bleeding. Her medical records reflected eleven distinct stab wounds to the same areas. Also according to her medical records, the attack left two lacerations on her liver, one of which was 3.6 centimeters.
The first officer to arrive on the scene, Officer Patrick Krekel, joined the bakery's employees in pressing towels and gauze against Martin's body to stanch the bleeding. Officer Krekel was most concerned by the stab wounds to her chest because he had known such injuries to cause collapsed lungs, which he knew "can be fatal."
He was soon joined by paramedic Ellis Sherman, who described his goal at the scene as "trying to stabilize her as fast as possible, addressing life threatening injuries that she has, anything that we can make sure that we can stabilize her before she gets to the hospital." Sherman testified that in light of their locations, these knife wounds could "[d]efinitely" be fatal: a stab wound to the arms could sever arteries and lead her to bleed out; such a wound to the abdomen could rupture any one of multiple organs, affect breathing, and cause potentially fatal bleeding; and a wound to the chest came with obvious risks to the heart and lungs. He administered oxygen, IV fluids, and bandaging to minimize those risks.
Detective Javier Acosta testified as to his training on chest wounds and his understanding that stab wounds to the abdomen and chest can be fatal. Given his knowledge that Martin sustained multiple injuries of that kind, he "really did not think she was going to make it." On recross, he continued, "Unfortunately, most of the stabbings I have seen even with much lesser degree have resulted in death."
When she arrived at the hospital, she was immediately taken into critical care and emergency surgery. She was given oxygen due to a complaint that she could not breathe. Ultimately, Martin was hospitalized for three days, she could not walk for three weeks, and she did not return to any normalcy for six weeks. Even after the wounds healed, she was left with scarring on her arms, chest, stomach, and back, of which she was reminded "every day," according to her testimony.
In Blea, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury in a similar but lesser assembly of proof. See 483 S.W.3d at 35. There, blows to the victim's side left her with injuries to her chest that impaired her breathing, a lacerated liver that one witness suggested could create a risk of bleeding out, a four-day hospital stay, and "weeks" of convalescence. Id. The court upheld the conviction for first-degree aggravated assault. Id. The only area in which the evidence there surpassed the record here was in the duration of the hospital stay, and that by only one day. The guidance of Blea suggests that the evidence here is sufficient to prove serious bodily injury.
However, Appellant emphasizes several forms of proof that tended to minimize the severity of Martin's wounds. For example, he notes that Martin was able to walk back into the bakery after she was stabbed and was observed to be "alert and oriented" by paramedics. One such paramedic, Sherman, agreed he had seen situations where stab wounds were merely superficial and did not cause serious bodily injury or a threat to life. And Detective Acosta conceded that he had no idea how deep Martin's wounds were.
But the jury was presented with all this evidence, and we may not substitute our judgment for theirs. See Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. We defer to the jury's resolution of any conflicting inferences in favor of the guilty verdict that they reached. See Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448-49. As for the evidence of Martin's scarring, "[d]isfigurement, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder," and the beholder was the jury, rather than this court. See Hernandez v. State, 946 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.).
We therefore hold that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of serious bodily injury, which is the only element of the offense that Appellant has challenged. We overrule his first issue.
III. The Jury Charge
In his second issue, Appellant contends that the jury charge misstated the elements of the offense for which he was convicted. Appellant argues that the abstract portion of the charge neglected to include an element of first-degree aggravated assault-namely, serious bodily injury. Appellant maintains that this deficiency had the potential to mislead the jury and dilute the State's burden of proof.
The State counters that even if the charge was erroneous, Appellant did not object to it at trial, and thus only egregious harm would suffice to establish reversible error. According to the State, the record does not reflect egregious harm under the factors we use to assess any detriment caused by an error in the jury charge. We agree with the State.
A. Applicable Law
It is the trial court's responsibility to deliver to the jury a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case. Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The charge is meant to inform the jury of the applicable law and how to apply it to the facts of the case. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As law applicable to the case, the definitions of words or phrases defined by statute must be included in the jury charge. Arteaga, 521 S.W.3d at 334.
The abstract paragraphs of the charge serve as a glossary to help the jury understand the meaning of concepts and terms used in the application paragraphs of the charge. Id. at 338. An abstract instruction usually will not present reversible error unless it is an incorrect or misleading statement of a law that the jury must understand in order to implement the commands of the application paragraphs. Id. (citing Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
Application paragraphs apply the "pertinent penal law, abstract definitions, and general legal principles to the particular facts and the indictment allegations." Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). It is the application paragraphs of the charge, not the abstract portion, that authorize a conviction. Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Because application paragraphs specify the factual circumstances under which the jury should convict or acquit, they are often referred to as the "heart and soul" of the jury charge. Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 367.
When the defendant fails to object or, as here, states that he has no objection to the charge, we will not reverse for charge error unless the record shows egregious harm to the defendant. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Harm stemming from a charge error is assessed in light of four factors: the entire jury charge; the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence; the argument of counsel; and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 368-69. Errors that result in egregious harm are "those that affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, vitally affect the defensive theory, or make a case for conviction clearly and significantly more persuasive." Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). "Egregious harm is a high and difficult standard to meet, and such a determination must be borne out by the trial record." Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Neither party bears the burden to show harm or lack thereof. Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The appellate court must examine the relevant portions of the entire record to determine whether appellant suffered actual harm, as opposed to theoretical harm, as a result of the error. Id.
B. Any Charge Error Did Not Cause Egregious Harm
We first consider the charge in its entirety. The abstract portion of the charge was primarily devoted to setting out definitions for the relevant terms, each of which was stated correctly. The appellant complains that the definition provided in the court's abstract for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a family or household member did not include the phrase "serious bodily injury." We will assume for the sake of argument that this paragraph had the potential to mislead the jury, in that it suggested a conviction for first-degree aggravated assault could be sustained on a lesser showing than was actually required. Even so, the application paragraph correctly applied the defined terms to the facts of the case and required the jury to find all four ingredients of first-degree aggravated assault, rather than just the three that were mentioned in the abstract's definition. Despite any deficiency in the abstract paragraph, the "heart and soul" of the charge was thus correct and intact. See Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 367. "Where the application paragraph correctly instructs the jury, an error in the abstract instruction is not egregious." Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, No. 05-18-00895-CR, 2019 WL 3059878, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 12, 2019, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). It is perhaps for this reason that Appellant concedes in his brief that "the jury charge in its entirety is fundamentally correct."
The state of the evidence also favors a conclusion that Appellant did not suffer egregious harm. The State offered compelling proof on the only contested issue in the case, serious bodily injury, through four witnesses who addressed the nature of Martin's many stab wounds and the threat they posed to her life. When, as here, the evidence is overwhelming, it is "less likely the jury was influenced by an erroneous jury instruction than by the weight of the probative evidence itself." Johnson v. State, 981 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998).
Finally, the arguments of counsel also cut against egregious harm. In its closing, the State steered the jury towards the correct elements for first-degree aggravated assault. As to the sole contested element of serious bodily injury, the State made clear that the jury had to find this element beyond a reasonable doubt, both by stating that the "definition" of the offense required it and by repeatedly emphasizing the proof that corresponded with it.
The record does not show that any charge error caused egregious harm in light of the entirety of the charge (which was "fundamentally correct" in its application and entirety), the state of the evidence (which was overwhelming), and the argument of counsel (which pointed the jury to the correct elements). We therefore overrule Appellant's second issue.
IV. We Reform the Judgment to Reflect the Correct Statute
Finally, in his third issue, Appellant asks us to reform the judgment to reflect the correct deadly weapon statute. He notes that the judgment contains a deadly weapon finding that cited to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12, but that section was repealed in 2017 and replaced with article 42A.054. The State concedes error.
"When the record provides the necessary information to correct inaccuracies in the trial court's judgment, we have the authority to reform the judgment to speak the truth." Campos-Hernandez v. State, No. 05-19-01489-CR, 2021 WL 2070330, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, in Campos-Hernandez, we modified the judgment to show that article 42A.054 was the correct statutory basis for an affirmative deadly weapon finding. Id. This case calls for the same measures. We sustain Appellant's third issue.
V. Conclusion
We modify the judgment to reflect that the statutory basis for the affirmative deadly weapon finding is "Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 42A.054(c)." As modified, we affirm the judgment.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED to reflect that the statutory basis for the deadly weapon finding is "Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 42A.054(c)."
As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered.