Opinion
05-23-00266-CR
01-29-2024
GALAHAD CRISTO CABRERA-TIBBITS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-56143-Y
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Garcia
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENNISE GARCIA, JUSTICE
Appellant pleaded guilty to injury to an elderly individual. The trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to twenty years in prison. In two issues, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his guilty plea as to the element of serious bodily injury and the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Concluding appellant's arguments are without merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. Background
Appellant was charged with injury to an elderly individual and pleaded guilty without an agreed sentence recommendation. The State offered, and the court accepted, appellant's judicial confession without objection. The complainant, Daniel Espinoza also testified about the assault and his injuries. A surveillance video and photographs of Espinoza's injuries were admitted into evidence without objection.
An investigating officer also testified about finding blood and two of Espinoza's teeth when he inspected the crime scene. Evidence of appellant's prior assault convictions was admitted without objection.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the charged offense and assessed punishment at twenty years in prison. This timely appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
We begin with jurisdiction. Appellant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case because the district court in which the indictment was returned did not enter an order of transfer. The absence of a transfer order, however, is a procedural matter, not a jurisdictional one. Fajardo v. State, No. 05-19-01277-01279-CR, 2021 WL 688444, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, the absence of a transfer order is properly addressed by a plea to the jurisdiction. Dickerson v. State, No. 05-20-00339-CR, 2021 WL 5410523, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Appellant failed to file a plea to the jurisdiction in the court below. Therefore, the issue has not been preserved for our review. See Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 231 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 2020, pet. ref'd); see also Mills v. State, 742 S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.).
Even if the issue had been preserved, as we have held on countless occasions, the issue is without merit. See Bullock v. State, 673 S.W.3d 758, 768-69 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2023, no pet.) (observing that we have rejected this issue in prior cases in which this counsel represented an appellant). Appellant's second issue is resolved against him.
See, e.g., Lane v. State, No. 05-21-10137-CR, 2022 WL 16706966, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 4, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Rivera v. State, No. 05-20-00300-CR, 2022 WL 214098, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Dickerson, 2021 WL 5410523, at *1; Kessler v. State, No. 05-20-00221-CR, 2021 WL 5002423, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Canamargarza v. State, No. 05-20-00074-CR, 2021 WL 3729311, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Pedroza v. State, No. 05-19-01570-CR, 2021 WL 804416, at *2 (Tex. App.- Dallas Mar. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Jackson v. State, No.05-19-01043, 2021 WL 791095, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar.2, 2021, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated or publication); Fajardo, 2021 WL 688444, at *3; Murphy v. State, No. 05-19-00886-CR, 2020 WL 7396009, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 231 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2020, pet. ref'd); Benton v. State, No. 05-18-01024-CR, 2020 WL 2124179, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 5, 2020, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Epps v. State, No. 05-19-00066-CR, 2019 WL 6799753, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 13, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Delarosa v. State, No. 05-18-01507-CR, 2019 WL 6317865, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Johnson v. State, No. 05-18-01230-CR, 2019 WL 6317866, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
B. Sufficiency
Appellant's first issue argues that "despite a guilty plea and a judicial confession, the evidence is insufficient to support serious bodily injury." Specifically, appellant argues that Espinoza's second degree burns and broken ribs were not serious. We disagree.
The entry of a valid guilty plea "has the effect of admitting all material facts alleged in the formal criminal charge." Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Once a defendant enters a valid guilty plea, the state is no longer constitutionally required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). Nonetheless, article 1.15 requires substantiation of the plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. To substantiate a guilty plea, there must be evidence "in addition to, and independent of, the plea itself to establish the defendant's guilt." Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15.
When a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard is not applicable. Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 13; Cloniger v. State, No. 05-15-01234-CR, 2017 WL 908788, at *2, n.1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 8, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Instead, the supporting evidence must simply embrace every essential element of the offense charged. Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
A stipulation of evidence or judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a guilty plea so long as it establishes every element of the offense charged. See Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 13. The essential elements of injury to an elderly individual, as charged in this case, are that (1) a person, (2) intentionally or knowingly, (3) caused serious bodily injury to another, and (4) the other person was 65 years of age or older. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is bodily injury that: (1) creates a substantial risk of death; (2) causes death; (3) causes serious permanent disfigurement; or (4) causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Id. § 1.07(a)(46); Guadalupeangeles v. State, No. 05-22-00276-CR, 2023 WL 2534698, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). "As numerous courts of appeals have recognized, there are no wounds that constitute 'serious bodily injury' per se." Reyes v. State, No. 03-15-00233-CR, 2017 WL 1130373, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (collecting cases). Instead, whether a victim's injuries constitute a serious bodily injury is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
Here, appellant judicially confessed, and his confession was admitted into evidence. The indictment alleged that appellant:
intentionally and knowingly cause[d] serious bodily injury to DANIEL ESPINOZA, an elderly individual 65 years of age or older, hereinafter called complainant, by STRIKING COMPLAINANT WITH A HAND, BY FORCING COMPLAINANT TO AND AGAINST THE GROUND, AND, BY KICKING AND STOMPING ON COMPLAINANT.
Appellant's confession tracked the indictment. Appellant admitted that he:
did . . . intentionally and knowingly cause serious bodily injury to DANIEL ESPINOZA, an elderly individual 65 years of age or older, hereinafter called complainant, by STRIKING COMPLAINANT WITH A HAND, BY FORCING COMPLAINANT TO AND AGAINST THE GROUND, AND, BY KICKING AND STOMPING
ON COMPLAINANT. I further judicially confess that I committed the offense with which I stand charged exactly as alleged in the indictment.
These admissions embrace every element of the offense of injury to an elderly individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §22.04(a)(1).
Moreover, Espinoza testified that the assault resulted in burns, fractured ribs, and the loss of several teeth. The burns he suffered after he passed out on the train tracks were still being treated eight months after the assault, and the injury still hurt and burned.
Espinoza was hospitalized after the assault. He testified that he is unable to eat food he previously enjoyed because he is missing three teeth. He also has scars, can no longer walk fast, and can't work or "function much."
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the evidence adduced to support appellant's plea embraces every element of the offense. See Stone, 919 S.W.2d at 427. Appellant's first issue is resolved against him.
Having resolved all of appellant's issue against him, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered January 29, 2024