Opinion
Civil Action 20 Civ. 965 (ER) (SLC)
11-14-2022
DAVID I. GRAZETTE, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
TO THE HONORABLE EDGARDO RAMOS, United States District Judge:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SARAH L. CAVE, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff David I. Grazette (“Grazette”) alleges in his Second Amended Complaint that Defendantsviolated his constitutional rights in connection with a 2019 arrest. (ECF No. 96 (the “SAC”)). Defendants NYPH and Dr. Hird (“Moving Defendants”) move to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 101 at 1 (the “Motion”)). Grazette did not file an opposition to the Motion.
Defendants refers to, inter alia, The New York and Presbyterian Hospital (“NYPH”) and Sharon Hird, M.D. (“Dr. Hird”), State of New York (the “State”)*, City of New York (the “City”), New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission (the “Commission”)*, Gracie Square Hospital (“GSH”), Robert Muller (“Officer Muller”), Smita Agarkar (“Dr. Agarkar”), Matthew Levin (“Dr. Levin”), Tara Mullen (“Mullen”)*, Emilee Anne Nawa (“Nawa”), Ana Chin (“Chin”)*, Emily Menand (“Menand”), Robert Telles (“Officer Telles”), Cornell Hospital, Stephen Shann (“Officer Shann”), Fredery Alvarez (“Officer Alvarez”), Ysmael Ricardo (“Officer Ricardo”), and Anthony*. (See ECF No. 96 at 1-4). An asterisk denotes Defendants previously dismissed in the Court's order dated September 2, 2020. (ECF No. 19 at 6-7).
For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court summarizes the factual allegations in the SAC, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the Motion. See N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Corbett v. City of N.Y., No. 15 Civ. 09214 (GHW), 2016 WL 7429447, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016). In addition, because Grazette is pro se, the Court may consider and include in this summary “factual allegations contained in [his] opposition papers and other court filings.” Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, No. 10 Civ. 891 (LGS), 2013 WL 4779639, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013); see Davila v. Lang, 343 F.Supp.3d 254, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Because [Plaintiff] is proceeding pro se, the Court may consider new facts raised in opposition papers to the extent that they are consistent with the complaint, treating the new factual allegations as amending the original complaint.”).
1. The Arrest and Commitment
On September 25, 2019, two uniformed New York City Police Department officers and “two men in suits” arrested Grazette inside 30 Rockefeller Plaza (the “Building”). (ECF No. 96 at 6). The four law enforcement officers handcuffed Grazette and took him “to a back room within the [B]uilding where two additional officers” joined (the six officers together, the “Officers”). (Id.) The Officers denied Grazette's request to be released. (Id.) Grazette did not resist arrest and remained handcuffed for more than four hours before being involuntarily admitted to NYPH pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.40, under the pretense that he “was running around the [B]uilding, pulling fire alarms and telling people [he] was training for the marathon[.]” (Id. (the “Commitment”)). Grazette was held at NYPH overnight. (Id. at 7).
2. NYPH
The next day, September 26, 2019, Dr. Hird, a director at NYPH, executed an “ED Inter-Intitutional [sic] Transfer Form[.]” (ECF No. 96 at 7 (the “Transfer Form”)). Grazette requested to be released, advised staff that he “would never do what [he] was accused” of, and attempted to prove his innocence by providing his “FDNY list number” and “chapter 2 of the [p]robe manu[a]l . . . .” (Id.) The staff of NYPH refused to release him. (Id.) Menand, who did not interview or examine Grazette, executed a “Notification of Status and Rights Involuntary Admission on Medical Certification[,]” which authorized Grazette's transfer to GSH pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27. (Id.) Grazette was offered, but refused to sign, a treatment and transfer consent form. (Id. at 7-8).
3. GSH
Later the same day, September 26, 2019, Grazette was transferred from NYPH to GSH. (ECF No. 96 at 7). At some point, Dr. Levin informed Grazette that he was admitted “for wanting to kill a cop.” (Id. at 8). Grazette refutes this characterization, citing hospital records demonstrating he was “treated for ‘continued suicide, self-harm, or violence risk[;] [u]nstable with recently changed psychotropics, required frequently re-direction and PRN medication.'” (Id.) GSH declared Grazette “delusional, illogical, and paranoid when [he] explained” that he invented the “doughnut[] (donuts)” and “investigated] a PRO SE complaint in . . . EDNY[.]” (Id. at 9). Grazette was diagnosed with Bipolar I Disorder based on the “manic or psychotic episode at” the Building. (Id.)
Bipolar I Disorder, is an illness characterized by experiencing at least one episode of mania. See Bipolar Disorder, NAMI - NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/About-Mental-Illness/Mental-Health-Conditions/Bipolar-Disorder (last visited Nov. 14, 2022). To be diagnosed with Bipolar I Disorder, an individual's “manic episodes must last at least seven days or be so severe that hospitalization is required.” Id.; see also Bipolar Disorder, MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/bipolardisorder.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2022).
At GSH, Dr. Agarkar treated Grazette. (ECF No. 96 at 9). Dr. Agarkar, with the help of GSH staff, forcibly injected Grazette with medication that rendered him unconscious and unable to formulate coherent thoughts for several hours. (Id.) Some time later, Dr. Agarkar “instructed [Grazette] to orally” ingest medication so that he would be “manipulated to call off [his] 72-hour appointed court hearing[.]” (Id.) Fearful for his life, Grazette complied. (Id.; see id. at 11 (“I filed to speak to a judge and was threatened by [Dr.] Agarkar to withdraw[] the action[, or she] would keep me locked in for longer, and my time[] there harder. I complied.”); see also id. (“I was in fear.”)).
4. Discharge
GSH discharged Grazette on October 4, 2019. (ECF No. 96 at 9). The Commitment accelerated Grazette's pre-existing heart condition. (Id.)
B. Procedural Background
On February 4, 2020, Grazette filed the complaint. (ECF No. 2 (the “Complaint”)). On April 21, 2020, the Court sua sponte dismissed the Complaint and granted Grazette 60 days to file an amended complaint or face dismissal for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 9 at 10-11). See Grazette v. Rockefeller, No. 20 Civ. 0965 (LLS), 2020 WL 1940366, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020) (“Grazette I”). Grazette failed to do so, and, on July 17, 2020, the Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). (ECF Nos. 10 (the “Dismissal Order”); 11 (the “Civil Judgment”)).
On July 21, 2020, Grazette requested to re-open the case and filed an amended complaint (the “FAC”). (ECF Nos. 12-13). On August 24, 2020, the Court vacated the Dismissal Order and Civil Judgment and re-opened the case. (ECF No. 16). On September 2, 2020, the Honorable Alison J. Nathan referred this matter to the undersigned for general pretrial supervision. (ECF No. 18).
On September 2, 2020, the Court sua sponte dismissed Grazette's claims against the State pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and the Eleventh Amendment, and his claims against the Commission, Mullen, Chin, and Anthony pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). (ECF No. 19 at 6-7). The Court observed that “a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant[,]” (Id. at 5 (citing Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997))), and directed the City to “ascertain the identity and badge number of each John Doe whom [Grazette] seeks to sue[.]” (ECF No. 19 at 5-6). The Court granted Grazette leave to amend again, emphasizing that “[t]he second amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the [FAC].” (d)
On October 26, 2020, the City asked the Court to stay the case until 30 days after the resolution of a Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) investigation into Grazette's allegations. (ECF No. 32 (the “Motion to Stay”)). On October 27, 2020, the Court directed Grazette to respond to the Motion to Stay by October 30, 2020 (the “Response”), and advised him of available legal aid resources. (ECF No. 33 at 3). On November 4, 2020, the Court noted that Grazette failed to file the Response, and, accordingly, granted a courtesy extension to Grazette to file the Response. (ECF No. 36). On November 5, 2020, Grazette filed the Response. (ECF No. 37). On November 6, 2020, the Court granted the Motion to Stay. (ECF No. 38 (the “Stay”)).
Notwithstanding the Stay, on March 24, 2021, Grazette moved for a default judgment against Doctors Levin and Agarkar. (ECF Nos. 51-52 (the “Default Motions”)). On May 5, 2021, the Court acknowledged receipt of the Default Motions, but reminded Grazette that the action remained stayed until resolution of the CCRB investigation. (ECF No. 54). After the City advised the Court that the CCRB investigation had concluded, (see ECF No. 76), on January 7, 2022, the Court lifted the Stay. (ECF No. 77). On January 26, 2022, the Court denied the Default Motions. (ECF No. 90). See Grazette v. Rockefeller, No. 20 Civ. 965 (AJN) (SLC), 2022 WL 252631, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022) (“Grazette II”).
On February 22, 2022, Grazette filed the SAC, asserting that Defendantsfalsely arrested, involuntarily committed, and forcibly medicated him, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). (ECF No. 96 at 1, 6-10). Grazette seeks relief in the form of $20,000,000 in monetary relief, “total” exoneration, medical expenses, written and verbal apologies, and “an opportunity to settle my dispute with [Officer] Muller in a gentlemen's fight[.]” (Id. at 12).
Defendants named in the SAC are: Officer Muller, Dr. Hird, Dr. Agarkar, Dr. Levin, Officer Telles, Officer Shann, Officer Alvarez, Officer Ricardo, Mullen*, Nawa, Chin*, Anthony*, Menand, the City, the State*, the Commission*, and New York-Presbyterian Healthcare System (the “NYPHS”). (See ECF No. 96 at 1-4). The Court recognizes that Grazette intended NYPHS to mean NYPH. (See ECF No. 103 at 6). An asterisk denotes Defendants previously dismissed in the Court's September 2, 2020 order. (ECF No. 19 at 6-7).
On March 16, 2022, the Moving Defendants filed the Motion. (ECF Nos. 101-03). On March 17, 2022, Judge Nathan referred the Motion for a Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 107). On April 11, 2022, the case was re-assigned to the Honorable Edgardo Ramos. (ECF min. entry Apr. 11, 2022).
On July 3, 2022, Grazette sent ex parte email communications, in violation of the Court's Individual Practices. (ECF No. 115). On July 5, 2022, the Court reminded Grazette that all communications with the Court must be by ECF filing, not email. (Id.; see ECF Nos. 87; 89; 92). Grazette has not filed an opposition to the Motion.
See Individual Practices in Civil Cases, https://nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice documents/SLC%20Individual%20Practices%20in %20Civil%20Cases%20%E2%80%93%20September%2030th%2C%202022.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2022).
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
In analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must assess whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC, No. 19 Civ. 8423 (GHW), 2020 WL 7342742, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2020) (citing Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). The Court is “‘not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.'” Sanderson, 2020 WL 7342742, at *3 (quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013)). “[A] complaint that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘naked assertion[s]' without ‘further factual enhancement' will not survive a motion to dismiss.” Sanderson, 2020 WL 7342742, at *3 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). “‘Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.'” Sanderson, 2020 WL 7342742, at *3 (quoting DeJesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d. Cir. 2013)). For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), “the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
B. Pro Se Considerations
In deciding a motion to dismiss, “the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)). Nonetheless, “a pro se plaintiff must still plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Gottesfeld v. Anderson, No. 18 Civ. 10836 (PGG), 2020 WL 1082590, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020). Despite the obligation “to draw the most favorable inferences” from a complaint, the Court “cannot invent factual allegations that [a pro se plaintiff] has not pled.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). “The Court need not accept allegations that are ‘contradicted by other matters asserted or relied upon or incorporated by reference by a plaintiff in drafting the complaint.'” Tsinberg v. City of New York, No. 20 Civ. 749 (PAE), 2021 WL 1146942, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021) (quoting Fisk v. Letterman, 401 F.Supp.2d 362, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983
Liberally construing the SAC, the Court interprets Grazette to be asserting Section 1983 claims that that the Commitment violated his federal constitutional rights. (ECF No. 96 at 1, 611). The Moving Defendants argue that NYPH and Dr. Hird cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the Commitment. (ECF No. 103 at 9-15). For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees.
1. Legal Standard
“Section 1983 grants a right of action to any ‘citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof' who has been deprived of ‘any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution' or federal law by a person acting under color of state law.” Hirsch v. City of New York, 300 F.Supp.3d 501, 508 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983), aff'd, 751 Fed.Appx. 111 (2d Cir. 2018); see Pridgen v. Jail, No. 22 CIV. 2294 (ER), 2022 WL 1082411, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2022) (“Section 1983 provides that an action may be maintained against a ‘person' who has deprived another of rights under the ‘Constitution and Laws.'”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a Section 1983 claim, “a complaint must allege that the defendant (1) deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, (2) while acting under color of state law.” Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F.Supp.2d 363, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see Lurch v. Chaput, No. 16 Civ. 2517 (AT), 2022 WL 889259, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2022) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “In order to state a claim under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was injured by either a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
“To act under color of state law or authority for purposes of Section 1983, the defendant must ‘have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” Savarese v. City of New York, 547 F.Supp.3d 305, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997)). The Court must assess whether the alleged constitutional violations “have been committed by a person acting under color of state law[.]” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). The burden is on the plaintiff to “indicate that the challenged action was ‘fairly attributable to the State.'” Vasquez v. Garcia, 432 F.Supp.3d 92, 97 (D. Conn. 2019) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
a. NYPH
The Moving Defendants contend that NYPH is neither a person nor a state actor and therefore, cannot be liable under Section 1983. (ECF No. 103 at 9-12). The Court examines each argument below.
i. Personhood
The Court finds that NYPH is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983. (ECF No. 103 at 9-10). As discussed above, (see § IV.A.1, supra), Section 1983 provides statutory relief against violations of a “[e]very person who, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). “It is well established that a hospital is not a ‘person' under Section 1983[,]” and therefore NYPH is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983. Mejia v. Davis, No. 16 Civ. 9706 (GHW), 2018 WL 333829, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018); Eng v. Bellevue Hosp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160887, *12 (“Hospitals are not ‘persons' within the meaning of [Section] 1983.”); Fahie v. Mailon, No. 09 Civ. 8101 (BSJ), 2010 WL 4967839, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010) (holding that medical center was “not a ‘person' and therefore does not have the capacity to be sued under [Section] 1983”). Accordingly, NYPH cannot be liable under Section 1983 for the alleged violation of Grazette's constitutional rights.
ii. State Actor
The Moving Defendants argue that Grazette has failed to plausibly allege that NYPH was a private entity acting under color of state law. (ECF No. 103 at 10-11). The Court agrees.
A private entity acts under color of state law when “[it] exercises power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg, 850 F.Supp.2d 418, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981)). Here, Grazette alleges that NYPH acted under color of law by denying his request to be released from its care. (ECF No. 96 at 7). As the Court has previously held in Grazette I, however, “[a] private hospital and its staff are not state actors under [Section] 1983 when they involuntarily commit a plaintiff to a psychiatric hospital under New York's Mental Hygiene Law.” 2020 WL 1940366, at *3; see McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir. 2014) (observing no state action where private hospital and healthcare professionals involuntarily committed a patient pursuant to New York's Mental Hygiene Law); Doe v. Rosenberg, 166 F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Doe II”) (same); see also Doe v. Harrison, 254 F.Supp.2d 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that . . . involuntary commitment by a private party pursuant to state statute does not convert private conduct into state action for purposes of [S]ection 1983.”). Because “‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful'” is excluded from Section 1983's reach, Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)), and the Commitment of Grazette was private conduct, see McGugan, 752 F.3d at 231, Grazette cannot state a Section 1983 claim against NYPH for alleged violation of his constitutional rights.
b. NYPH's Employees
The Moving Defendants argue that neither the doctrine of respondeat superior or Monell provide a basis to hold NYPH liable under Section 1983 for the actions of its employees. (ECF No. 103 at 12-13). 436 U.S. 658. The Court examines each argument below.
i. Respondeat Superior
The Moving Defendants contend that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not provide a basis to hold NYPH for its employees' refusal to release Grazette from the Commitment. (ECF No. 103 at 12). Because Section 1983 “does not recognize respondeat superior liability,” Alwan v. City of New York, 311 F.Supp.3d 570, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), the Court agrees that NYPH cannot be liable for its employees' conduct under this doctrine. See Phelan ex rel. Phelan v. Torres, No. 04 Civ. 03538 (ERK), 2011 WL 6935354, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2011) (explaining that respondeat superior is not “a basis for liability . . . under [Section] 1983[]”); Dove v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 5052 (NG) (LB), 2005 WL 2387587, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005) (“[L]iability under Section 1983 may not be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior[.]”); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable as a basis for imposing liability under [Section] 1983[.]”). Accordingly, NYPH cannot be liable for its employees' conduct based on respondeat superior.
ii. Monell Liability
The Moving Defendants argue that Grazette cannot maintain a Monell claim against NYPH because NYPH, a private employer, cannot be held vicariously liable for alleged constitutional torts committed by its employees. (ECF No. 103 at 12-14). The Court agrees.
“The elements of a Monell claim are (1) a municipal policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Agosto v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir. 2020). Though the rationale of Monell has been extended to private businesses, see Rose v. City of Waterbury, No. 12 Civ. 291 (VLB), 2013 WL 1187049, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 21, 2013) (quoting Rojas v. Alexander's Dep't Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1990)), “Monell's bar against vicarious liability under Section 1983 has [also] been extended to private corporations.” Bowen v. Rubin, 385 F.Supp.2d 168, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Nevertheless, “[f]or a Monell claim to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege ‘sufficient factual detail' and not mere ‘boilerplate allegations' that the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights resulted from the municipality's custom or official policy.” Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F.Supp.3d 578, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Plair v. City of New York, 789 F.Supp.2d 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
Here, a Monell claim cannot survive for two reasons. First, NYPH, a private entity, cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees. See Washington v. Eaton, No. 20 Civ. 1111 (VLB), 2021 WL 3291658, at *11 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2021) (“[E]very circuit to have considered the issue has extended Monell to private entities, shielding employers from vicarious liability.”). Second, even generously construing the SAC, Grazette has failed to allege a policy or custom that subjected him to the deprivation of a constitutional right, and, therefore, his “conclusory allegations fail to allege a Monell claim.” Riccio v. Town of Old Saybrook, No. 21 Civ. 821 (SVN), 2022 WL 4585650, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2022); see Kraft v. City of New York, 696 F.Supp.2d 403, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Although the “Second Circuit has recognized that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital cannot be executed by the State without due process of law[,]” it has also observed “the process for involuntary commitment under [New York's] M[ental] H[ygiene] L[aw] meets the requirements of procedural due process”), aff'd, 441 Fed.Appx. 24 (2d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, Grazette has failed to state a Monell claim against NYPH.
Because NYPH is neither a person nor a state actor and because neither the doctrine of respondeat superior nor Monell provides a basis to hold NYPH liable for its employees' conduct, (see §§ IV.A.1.a-b, supra), the Court respectfully recommends that the Section 1983 claim be dismissed as to NYPH.
c. Dr. Hird
The Moving Defendants contend that Grazette cannot maintain a Section 1983 claim against Dr. Hird because she is not a state actor within the meaning of Section 1983, and Grazette otherwise fails to state a Section 1983 claim against her. (ECF No. 103 at 14-15). The Court examines each argument in turn.
i. State Actor
The Moving Defendants assert that Grazette has failed to plausibly allege that Dr. Hird was a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law. (ECF No. 103 at 14). The conclusion above, (see § IV.A.l.a.ii, supra), that “[a] private hospital and its staff are not state actors under [Section] 1983 when they involuntarily commit a plaintiff to a psychiatric hospital under New York's Mental Hygiene Law[,]” also extends to Dr. Hird, a director at NYPH. Grazette I, 2020 WL 1940366, at *3. Accordingly, because Dr. Hird's execution of the Transfer Form is private conduct, see McGugan, 752 F.3d at 231, Grazette has failed to state a Section 1983 claim against Dr. Hird.
ii. Dr. Hird's Conduct
The Moving Defendants contend that, even if Dr. Hird were a state actor, Grazette has failed to allege the elements of a Section 1983 claim against her. (ECF No. 103 at 14-15). To state a Section 1983 claim, as discussed above, (see § IV.A.1, supra), “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Atkins, 487 U.S. at 48. Grazette has satisfied neither element. Grazette only mentions Dr. Hird in a single paragraph in the SAC, stating:
Hours before, MEDICAL RECORDS, show, an, ED INTER-INTITUTIONAL [sic] TRANSFER FORM, was submitted, and signed by, [Dr.] HIRD, a DIRECTOR at [NYPH], time stamped on, September 26th, 2019, at 11:48, due to “bed availability” and “increased risk to the individual and in the case of labor, the unborn child from effecting the transfer . . .
Absent from Grazette's allegation is any mention of a constitutional violation by Dr. Hird, (see § IV.A.1.b.ii, supra), acting under color of state law, (see §§ IV.A.1, IV.A.1.a.ii, supra), that caused him injury. See Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323; Doe v. Rosenberg, 996 F.Supp. 343, 357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Doe I”) (dismissing Section 1983 claim as “neither practical nor legally valid” where private physician “determine[d] a patient is in need of immediate psychiatric evaluation and t[oo]k necessary steps to facilitate that evaluation”), aff'd, Doe II, 166 F.3d 507. Accordingly, Grazette has failed to state a Section 1983 claim against Dr. Hird.
Because Dr. Hird is not a state actor and Grazette has otherwise failed to plead the elements of a Section 1983 claim against her, (see § IV.A.1.c, supra), the Court respectfully recommends that the Section 1983 claim against Dr. Hird be dismissed.
B. State Law Claims
The Moving Defendants contend that, to the extent the SAC asserts state law claims, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. (ECF No. 113 at 15-17). Having recommended dismissal of Grazette's federal claims, the Court must evaluate whether it would be appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Corley v. Vance, 365 F.Supp.3d 407, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“In general, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted), aff'd, 811 Fed.Appx. 62 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Zohar CDO 2003-1, Ltd. v. Patriarch Partners, LLC, 286 F.Supp.3d 634, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. L. Offs. of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F.Supp.2d 153, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
“With respect to supplemental jurisdiction in particular, a federal court has subjectmatter jurisdiction over specified state-law claims, which it may (or may not) choose to exercise.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). “A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Id. A district court, however, “cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless there is first a proper basis for original federal jurisdiction.” Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996); see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 730 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he court may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims unless the court has ‘original jurisdiction' over at least one of the plaintiff's claims.”).
Here, this Court's subject matter jurisdiction arises principally from federal question jurisdiction, i.e., Section 1983. Because “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[.]” Loiacono v. Target Corp., No. 17 Civ. 535 (VAB), 2018 WL 2926279, at *3 (D. Conn. June 8, 2018), and Grazette has not alleged any original basis of jurisdiction over the state law claims, I respectfully recommend that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismiss those claims without prejudice. See Zohar, 286 F.Supp.3d at 651; Flexborrow LLC v. TD Auto Fin. LLC, 255 F.Supp.3d 406, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Curtis, 758 F.Supp.2d at 180; Sky Med. Supply Inc. v. SCS Support Claims Servs., Inc., 17 F.Supp.3d 207, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Lubin v. Dubin, No. 13 Civ. 6619 (LDW), 2014 WL 794313, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2014); McGee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 08 Civ. 392 (FB) (CLP), 2009 WL 2132439, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009).
C. Leave to Amend
The SAC is Grazette's third attempt to allege a plausible claim for relief. (See ECF Nos. 2; 13; 96). In preparing his SAC, Grazette had the benefit of seeing the Moving Defendants' arguments why his claims were deficient, which they set forth in their motion to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF Nos. 79-81). “Another amended complaint would therefore constitute” Grazette's “fourth bite of the proverbial apple,” which the Court need not permit. Chasman v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, No. 18 Civ. 6681 (NRB), 2020 WL 207784, at *4 (citing In re Am. Express Co. S'holder Litig., 39 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal with prejudice in part because plaintiffs had two opportunities to amend their complaint)). Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that Grazette not be permitted to amend his claims against the Moving Defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court respectfully recommends that the Moving Defendants' Motion be GRANTED.
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Ramos.
FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). If Grazette does not have access to cases cited in this Report and Recommendation that are reported on Westlaw, he may request copies from Moving Defendants' counsel. See Local Civ. R. 7.2.