Opinion
23-cv-7536 (NSR)
07-15-2024
SUZANNE CORRADO, M.D., Plaintiff, v. MONTEFIORE ST. LUKE'S CORNWALL MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
NELSON S. ROMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Suzanne Corrado, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against defendants Montefiore St. Luke's Cornwall Medical Center (“St. Luke's”), Sgt. Douglas G. Schofield, Garnet Medical Center (“Garnet”), Dr. Nkiruka Iloh, and Dr. Maryam Rakhmatullina (together with Garnet and Iloh, the “Garnet Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment, and Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and that Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned. Presently pending before the Court are St. Luke's and the Garnet Defendants'(together, the “Moving Defendants”) respective motions to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (ECF Nos. 54, 58.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Moving Defendants' respective motions to dismiss.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Complaint (“Compl.”, ECF No. 1.) and are assumed true for purposes of this motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff was in a euphoric mood and believed that she was closer to God than she had ever been. (Compl. ¶ 11.) She expressed these feelings to her residential development's superintendent, neighbors, and her son. (Id. ¶ 13.) The superintendent contacted Plaintiff's son to report Plaintiff's behavior. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff's son then visited Plaintiff and witnessed, to his alarm, her dispose of medications and rip and throw a tablecloth off her kitchen table. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff's son called 911, and Plaintiff was transported to the emergency department at St. Luke's. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) St. Luke's does not have a mental health unit. (Id. ¶ 20.) By 10 pm on the same day, Plaintiff was “medically cleared for psychiatric evaluation.” (Id. ¶ 23.) St. Luke's monitored Plaintiff's condition and sought to transfer her to a mental health facility but could not locate a bed for her. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) Plaintiff did not remain at St. Luke's voluntarily. (Id. ¶ 34).
Plaintiff was transferred from St. Luke's to Garnet late on April 21, 2023. (Id. ¶ 40.) A psychiatry team at Garnet found no basis to involuntarily commit Plaintiff under the New York State Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) and permitted Plaintiff to return home. (Id. at ¶ 41.)
On April 25, 2023, Plaintiff was involved in a dispute at a Cornwall, New York CVS, (Id. ¶¶ 47-54.) As a result of this dispute, Plaintiff was transferred to the behavioral health unit at Garnet. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 77.) Upon arrival, Iloh interviewed Plaintiff and admitted her to the mental health unit. (Id. ¶¶ 77, 85.)
On April 26, 2023, Plaintiff made a demand to be released to Rakhmatullina, who was Plaintiff's principal psychiatrist at the time. (Id. ¶¶ 97-98.) Rakhmatullina found Plaintiff to be “unruly and non-complaint [sic]” and thus refused Plaintiff's request. (Id. ¶ 99.) On April 27, 2023, Plaintiff again demanded discharge and was denied. (Id.) After eleven days, Plaintiff was released from her involuntary confinement at Garnet. (See Id. ¶ 110.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action on August 24, 2023. (ECF No. 1.)
On September 27, 2023, Schofield filed an answer to the complaint. (ECF No. 29.). Rakhmatullina followed suit the next day. (ECF No. 32.) St. Luke's filed its own answer on October 6, 2023. (ECF No. 38.)
Garnet and Iloh filed individual premotion letters on October 26, 2023. (ECF Nos. 40, 42.) Rakhmatullina filed a premotion letter on October 31, 2023. (ECF No. 45.) The Court directed Plaintiff to respond to each of the foregoing letters. (ECF Nos. 41, 43, 46.)
On November 1, 2023, the Court granted the Moving Defendants leave to file motions to dismiss and set a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 48.) On January 18, 2024, the Garnet Defendants and Plaintiff submitted a fully briefed motion to dismiss consisting of, among others: (1) the Garnet Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (“Garnet Mem.”, ECF No. 54.); (2) Plaintiff's Memorandum in Law in Opposition (“Pl. Garnet Opp.”, ECF No. 57.); and (3) the Garnet Defendants' Reply Affidavit in Support of First Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 55.)
St Luke's filed a premotion letter on December 11, 2023. (ECF No. 50.) After directing Plaintiff to respond (ECF No. 51) and receiving Plaintiff's response (ECF No. 52), the Court granted St. Luke's leave to file a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 53.)
On March 14, 2024, St. Luke's and Plaintiff submitted a fully briefed motion to dismiss consisting of, among others: (1) St. Luke's First Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (“St. Luke's Mem.”, ECF No. 58); (2) Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition (“Pl. St. Luke's Opp.”, ECF No. 60); and (3) St. Luke's First Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of First Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 59.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the existence of such jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). However, “[f]or purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction may be either facial or fact-based.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). “When the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is facial, i.e., based solely on the allegations of the complaint or the complaint and exhibits attached to it, the plaintiff has no evidentiary burden.” Id. (citations omitted). “The task of the district court is to determine whether the [complaint and attached exhibits] ‘allege facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [the plaintiff] has standing to sue.” Id. (citations omitted).
“Alternatively, a defendant is permitted to make a fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion, proffering evidence beyond the [p]leading.” Carter, 822 F.3d at 57 (citations omitted). “In opposition to such a motion, the plaintiffs will need to come forward with evidence of their own to controvert that presented by the defendant ‘if the affidavits submitted on a 12(b)(1) motion . . . reveal the existence of factual problems' in the assertion of jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)). “However, the plaintiffs are entitled to rely on the allegations in the [p]leading if the evidence proffered by the defendant is immaterial because it does not contradict plausible allegations that are themselves sufficient to show standing.” Id. “If the extrinsic evidence presented by the defendant is material and controverted, the district court will need to make findings of fact in aid of its decision as to standing.” Id. Indeed, courts “must” consult factual submissions “if resolution of a proffered factual issue may result in the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction.” Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 140 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for violations of the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and a tort claim for false imprisonment. (Compl. ¶¶ 115-19.) The Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against them fail for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See generally Garnet Mem., St. Luke's Mem.)
I. Whether the Moving Defendants Are State Actors
“[T]he threshold question in every federal case[ is] determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Rankine v. Levi Strauss & Co., 674 F.Supp.3d 57, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)) (cleaned up). When a court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case, it should dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011). The Complaint alleges, primarily, federal question jurisdiction as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Relying on Section 1983, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶ 118.)
Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
More succinctly, Section 1983 protects against acts attributable to a state, not those of a private entity. Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024). “[M]ere[] private conduct, no matter how. . . wrongful” is beyond the reach of Section 1983. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)) (internal quotations omitted). A plaintiff relying on Section 1983 to bring a claim must allege that the alleged deprivation was committed by “either a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. Of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002).
Traditionally, “acting under color of state law requires that the defendant . . . have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)) (internal quotations omitted). A private entity's conduct constitutes state action where the action is (1) the result of state compulsion, (2) a public function, or (3) a “joint” action as a result of a close nexus between public and private actors. Doe v. Harrison, 254 F.Supp.2d 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Blum,457 U.S. at 1004-05).
The Moving Defendants argue that none of the foregoing tests for state action have been met. (Garnet Mem. pp.12-17; St. Luke's Mem. pp.9-15.) The Court agrees, as set forth in the following analyses.
a. State Compulsion Test
Under the state compulsion test, “a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or provided such significant encouragement, overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Doe, 254 F.Supp.2d at 342 (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004). In the context of the MHL, “[s]tate action through state compulsion requires actual coercion by a state actor that impacts upon the private physician's decision-making.” Id.
In Doe where a patient brought an action via Section 1983 against a private hospital and medical personnel who committed her against her will for twelve days, allegedly violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, the District Court held that involuntary commitment by a private party pursuant to the MHL did not establish state action through state compulsion. Doe, 254 F.Supp.2d at 340, 342. The Doe court focused on the MHL's grant of discretion to physicians in deciding whether to commit an individual, holding that discretion was sufficient to render such decision as an individual one rather than one mandated by the state. Doe, 254 F.Supp.2d at 342.
The facts here are substantially similar to those in Doe. Defendants Iloh and Rakhmatullina exercised their professional judgment and decided, respectively, that Plaintiff should be committed and remain committed. (See Compl. ¶¶ 87, 97-100.) Whether the professional judgment of both Defendants was sufficiently warranted was independent of whether their choice could be deemed that of the state. In addition, with regard to Defendant St. Luke's, the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts suggesting that the state coerced or significantly encouraged St. Luke's to detain Plaintiff. Without such a showing behind either Garnet or St. Luke's decisions to commit and detain Plaintiff, the state compulsion test is not satisfied.
b. Public Function Test
Under the public function test, state action exists when a private entity “exercise[s the] powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.” Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). “An extraordinarily low number of functions have been held to be public.” Doe, 254 F.Supp.2d at 343 (quoting Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Services, 234 F.Supp.2d 140, 166 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)) (cleaned up). In Doe, the court reviewed applicable precedent and, in agreeing with that precedent, found that involuntary commitment by a private physician was not a public function. Doe, 254 F.Supp.2d at 343. Instead, the Doe court found that involuntary confinement was not a public function since it had traditionally been a “private remedy” in New York State. Id. (citing Doe v. Rosenberg, 966 F.Supp. 343, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 166 F.3d 507, 508 (2d Cir. 1999)). There are no distinguishable facts here compared to Doe, and, accordingly, Plaintiff's involuntary commitment at both St. Luke's and Garnet, respectively, does not constitute a public function.
Plaintiff contends that the Second Circuit has deemed involuntary commitment a public function, relying on Olivier v. Yeager Mental Health Center, 398 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2005). (Pl. Garnet Opp. p.10; Pl. St. Luke's Opp. pp. 8-9.) Plaintiff argues that in Olivier, the Second Circuit held that psychiatrists implementing New York's involuntary commitment statute operated under color of state law. (Id.)
Plaintiff's argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, Olivier does not address or discuss the issue of state action at all. See generally Olivier, 398 F.3d at 188-192. The Olivier court, in reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict, confined its analysis to the sufficiency of testimony proffered at trial. Id. at 190-92. That is, the court's analysis is not only silent on the issue at hand but also inapt. Second and most damningly: the facility at issue in Olivier, the Dr. Robert L. Yeager Health Center is run by Rockland County-a state actor.
See NY CONNECTS, https://www.nyconnects.ny.gov/services/community-mental-health-services-omh-pr-704607696013 (last visited July 10, 2024) (noting the “Provider” at Robert L. Yeager Health Center is “Rockland County Dept. of Mental Health LGU”); see also Facility Directory Table List - The Dr. Robert L. Yeager Health Center, ROCKLAND COUNTY, https://www.rocklandcountyny.gov/Home/Components/FacilityDirectory/FacilityDirectory/168/32?npage=3&sortn =FCAddress&sortd=asc (last visited July 10, 2024). The Court may take judicial notice of publicly available government documents and does so with respect to the foregoing New York State and Rockland County websites. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Dep't of the Interior, 410, F.Supp.3d 582, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC, 127 F.Supp.3d 156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). Moreover, matters of which a court may take judicial notice “are deemed included in the complaint and may be considered without converting [a] motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Pearson Capital Partners LLC v. James River InsUrance Co., 151 F.Supp.3d 392, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In addition, Plaintiff relies on Rufer v. Phelps Mem 'I Hosp., 453 F.Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the court held civil commitment to be “undoubtedly a ‘public function' in New York.” (Pl. Garnet Opp. p.8; Pl. St. Luke's Opp. p.6.) However, Rufer is an outlier as subsequent rulings have departed its holding, opting instead for the reasoning in Doe, indicating a shift in judicial interpretation. See Grazette v. City of New York, 2022 WL 18958998, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2022) (noting no state action when a private hospital and its personnel involuntarily commit a plaintiff to a psychiatric hospital under the MHL). Moreover, “the Second Circuit has subsequently rejected [the reasoning from RUffler.]” Amira v. Maimonides Hospital, 21-CV-3976 (RPK) (TAM), 2022 WL 18034533, at *7, n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2022) (citing Doe v. Rosenberg, 166 F.3d 507 (per curiam)). As such, RUffler is unpersuasive in this matter.
Plaintiff also argues that because involuntary confinement is “highly regulated by the state” and can occur only pursuant to the MHL, “discharge of functions pursuant to this highly regulated structure in hospitals” designated by the New York State Office of Mental Health is “action cloaked by the state and in furtherance of a traditional state function.” (Pl. Garnet Opp. p.13; Pl. St. Luke's Opp. pp. 11-12.) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that “[e]ven extensive regulation by the government does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into those of the government.” San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm. 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987). Therefore, the Moving Defendants' involuntary commitment pursuant to the MHL does not establish state action through a public function despite New York State's heavy regulation of involuntary confinement.
c. Close Nexus Test
Under the close nexus test, the plaintiff must show that there is a “close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the [private] regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351. Turning again to Doe, that court held that because the MHL “merely authorizes private physicians and hospitals to commit involuntary commitments yet leaves the decision of whether or not to commit to the professional discretion of the physicians, New York's relationship with private hospitals is not so close that it passes the close nexus test.” Doe, 254 F.Supp.2d at 343.
For present purposes, the facts here are indistinguishable from Doe. Since the MHL grants Defendants Iloh and Rakhmatullina the professional discretion to decide whether to commit Plaintiff, the state's relationship with them is not so close as to render both Defendants' conduct as that of the state. In the case of Defendant St. Luke's, as with the state compulsion test, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege enough facts indicating a close nexus between the state and St. Luke's action. Therefore, the close nexus test is not satisfied, and the Moving Defendants cannot be construed as state actors.
Given Plaintiff has failed to adduce facts sufficient to make out any of the foregoing analyses, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Moving Defendants.
II. Potential State Law Claim
Though neither party addresses the issue in their briefs, the Complaint appears to also assert a state law tort claim for false imprisonment. (See Compl. ¶ 119.) “A district court usually should decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims have been dismissed at the pleading stage.” Torres v. City of New York, 5490 F.Supp.3d 610, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 266 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Kaplan v. Cnty. of Orange, 538 F.Supp.3d 141, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law false imprisonment claims after dismissing Section 1983 claims).
Because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff's federal claims against the Moving Defendants, the Court opts to do so here and DISMISSES Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim without prejudice to renew in the proper forum.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants Montefiore St. Luke's Cornwall Medical Center, Garnet Medical Center, Dr. Nkiruka Iloh, and Dr. Maryam Rakhmatullina's motions to dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the foregoing defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim against those defendants is dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions at ECF No. 54 and ECF No. 58 and to terminate defendants Montefiore St. Luke's Cornwall Medical Center, Garnet Medical Center, Dr. Nkiruka Iloh, and Dr. Maryam Rakhmatullina from this action.
Defendant Sgt. Douglas G. Schofield and Plaintiff Suzanne Corrado, M.D. are directed to submit a proposed Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order (blank form attached hereto) on or before August 5, 2024. After review and approval of the Scheduling Order, the Court will issue an Order of Reference to Magistrate Judge Judith C. McCarthy for general pretrial purposes. Defendant Douglas G. Schofield and Plaintiff Suzanne Corrado, M.D. are directed to contact Judge McCarthy within seven (7) business days of the date of the Order of Reference to schedule a conference.
Defendants Garnet Medical Center and Montefiore St. Luke's Cornwall Medical Center are directed to serve a copy of this Opinion & Order on pro se Plaintiff Suzanne Corrado, M.D. and to file proof of service on the docket.
SO ORDERED.