Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-10453-RWZ.
August 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Milton Gordon, an inmate at the M.C.I. Cedar Junction state prison in Walpole, Massachusetts, is a Rastafarian who observes his religion's dietary restrictions, known as I-tal. He believes that if he does not eat in accordance with I-tal laws, he will not be able to enter heaven. The Massachusetts Department of Correction ("DOC") religious services handbook notes that "[t]he diet of Rastafarians is very rigid. Meat is considered injurious to the body, and is seldom eaten. Pork is prohibited, as is liquor of any kind, as well as milk, coffee and patent medicines. . . . Fish, vegetables, fruits and juices of all kinds make up the usual diet." It is plaintiff's belief that all meat and seafood, eggs, dairy, alcohol, chemically processed foods, and foods flavored to smell or taste like meat are taboo.
On November 26, 1996, the DOC began providing plaintiff with meals that, to his mind, were consistent with the tenets of I-tal: bread, potatoes, rice, beans, carrots, fruit, and peanut butter. For nearly three years, these I-tal meals caused no problems for the prison. On August 18, 1999, however, the prison switched to a single, uniform diet available to all vegetarian inmates. The new diet consists of meatless meatballs, hamburgers, chicken patties and nuggets — all made of wheat, soy, or other vegetable products, but flavored to taste like beef or poultry — as well as yogurt, margarine, pudding, mashed potatoes, and milk. Plaintiff believes the diet is not I-tal and has refused to eat it, leading to weight loss and medical problems such as chronic edema. He filed an internal grievance against the new diet, and on February 23, 2000, shortly after his administrative appeals were exhausted, he initiated this lawsuit against the prison superintendent, Peter Pepe, and the prison's religious program coordinator and grievance coordinator, Sherry Elliot, in their official and individual capacities. In the months immediately following, he alleges that prison guards twice retaliated against him for asserting a right to an I-tal diet, forcibly removing him from his cell to disciplinary segregation and using pepper spray and restraints.
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint consists of Eight Counts, seeking damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. Counts I-III allege that the new diet violates his free exercise rights and that the retaliation violated due process under the federal and state constitutions, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H 11 I, and the Commonwealth's statutory guarantee of the free exercise of religion for prisoners, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 88. Count IV claims a violation of the DOC's own regulations regarding religious programs and services. Counts V and VI allege state and federal equal protection violations for the disparate treatment of plaintiff's request for dietary accommodation and requests made by inmates of other faiths. Count VII asserts a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Finally, Count VIII requests declaratory relief that the post-1999 vegetarian diet and the prison's retaliatory conduct violate plaintiff's rights under the Constitution and laws of Massachusetts and the United States. Defendants now seek summary judgment.
Defendants initially contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust his retaliation claims and seeks damages for emotional distress without a prior showing of physical injury, contrary to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(a) (e). Defendants have withdrawn their exhaustion defense. And the PLRA's physical injury requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), does not compel summary judgment where plaintiff seeks damages for First Amendment violations, not for emotional distress. See, e.g., Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1999);Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998);Shaheed-Mohammed v. DiPaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D. Mass. 2001).
Next, defendants claim immunity from liability on the claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and V) to the extent that defendants are sued in their official capacities. Defendants are undoubtedly correct: state officials in their official capacity are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan State Dept. of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). This argument, however, does not dispose of any counts, as defendants are also being sued in their personal capacities.
More substantively, defendants contend that the vegetarian diet now offered by the DOC does not violate plaintiff's First Amendment rights because any restrictions on those rights are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In determining the reasonableness of a prison policy, several factors are relevant: (1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between the policy and a "legitimate and neutral" government objective put forward to justify it; (2) whether "there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates"; (3) "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally"; and (4) "the absence of ready alternatives" to the prison regulation. Id. at 89-90 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants argue that the Turner factors all weigh in their favor. First, they contend that there is a legitimate interest in keeping a relatively simple food service, minimizing costs and administrative burdens. See, e.g., Denson v. Marshall, 59 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 1999). Conforming to an I-tal diet presents special problems because Rastafarians often have varying interpretations of their dietary restrictions. Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). According to defendants, it is unclear whether plaintiff's dietary preferences are religious because he has violated a prohibition against alcohol and has failed to follow prison regulations that require a letter from a Rastafarian leader specifying his dietary needs. Second, defendants argue that alternatives exist because plaintiff is not compelled to eat any food item that is taboo, and he can pray, read religious books, meet with other Rastafarian inmates, and have visits from a religious leader. Third, defendants assert that individualized meals hurt prisoner morale, cause resentment and disruptions among inmates, and create security concerns because individualized meals can be used to smuggle contraband to specific prisoners. Finally, defendants maintain that there are no ready alternatives to the uniform vegetarian diet that would not cause undue financial and operational burdens.
The record in this case does not permit summary judgment on plaintiff's free exercise claims. First, plaintiff has a right to meals that are "consistent with his religious scruples." Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The fact that plaintiff's beliefs may differ from other Rastafarians is of little consequence. "Intrafaith differences . . . are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses. . . . [T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect." Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Indiana Employment Sec., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981). At the very least, the DOC's own religious services handbook states that dairy is prohibited under the laws of I-tal. Although defendants suggest that plaintiff's dietary preferences are personal and not religious, deposition testimony establishes that the prison officials did not question his sincerity of belief when they denied him I-tal meals.
Second, defendants note that plaintiff did not have to eat what he was served and can observe the Rastafarian religion in other ways. The idea that plaintiff could simply not eat taboo foods or could trade for I-tal items would undercut any notion that the Commonwealth ever has to provide a religious diet for an inmate — or, for that matter, has to provide a nutritionally balanced diet to inmates. In addition, plaintiff disputes the availability of certain alternative avenues of religious expression, such as formal gatherings of Rastafarian inmates. Moreover, the availability of alternatives does not change the fact that plaintiff claims to believe sincerely that he will not go to heaven if he fails to meet the strictures of I-tal.
Finally, as to the effect on the prison and the availability of alternative policies, genuine issues of fact remain. Defendants cite efficiency, morale, and security interests that necessitate the new vegetarian diet. While arguments to that effect have been endorsed in other cases, they cannot be taken at face value when the record suggests that for nearly three years plaintiff was served perfectly acceptable I-tal meals without any problems or incidents.
Defendants also seek summary judgment on plaintiff's equal protection claims (Counts V and VI). These claims hinge on the fact that the prison contracts with outside vendors to provide Jewish inmates with relatively costly kosher meals. A prisoner must be given "a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam). As with the Free Exercise analysis, the Turner factors apply to equal protection. Plaintiff must also show a discriminatory motive. See International Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977) ("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment."). Defendants argue that they contract out for meals for Jewish inmates not for discriminatory reasons, but rather because prison facilities are not equipped to conform with Jewish dietary laws. Defendants seem to imply that the administrative burden and expense of preparing kosher meals is more intense than that of preparing I-tal meals, and unlike the I-tal meals provided to plaintiff from 1996 to 1999, the availability of kosher meals has actually caused some tension among inmates, according to defendants' affidavits and deposition testimony. Given the comparatively high burden of providing kosher meals, there is no reason why the DOC would accommodate Jewish inmates and not Rastafarians. The DOC's logic — that the additional efforts for Jewish inmates are justified by the additional costs and administrative burdens — makes little sense. Genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the disparate treatment of Jews and Rastafarians is reasonable, whether the DOC's motive is discriminatory, and whether plaintiff has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to observe his religion in a manner comparable to that of Jewish inmates.
As to plaintiff's retaliation claims (Counts I and III), defendant Pepe argues that undisputed facts show that DOC authorities used force against plaintiff only after he had behaved in a disruptive way and that other incidents were merely unactionable verbal harassment. Plaintiff must show that he would not have been subject to the use of force but for the exercise of his constitutional rights. Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 820 (1st Cir. 1988); Puleio v. Commissioner of Correction, 753 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Mass.App.Ct. 2001). The record supports defendant's position. Summary judgment is allowed as to Count III and as to the portion of Count I that concerns retaliation.
Plaintiff has agreed to withdraw any claims of retaliation against defendant Sherry Elliot.
Next, defendants argue that the RLUIPA claim (Count VII) fails. The statute prohibits a state and local government from imposing a "substantial burden on the religious exercise" of a prisoner unless it is "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and is "the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. First, despite the "strict scrutiny"-type language of the statute, defendants contend that it actually follows a more deferential standard along the lines of Turner v. Safley, citing a joint statement of RLUIPA's Congressional sponsors. This argument is unavailing, as the Court "do[es] not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994). Second, defendants contend that the new vegetarian diet does not "substantially burden" plaintiff's religious exercise because he is not forced to eat anything and can observe other Rastafarian religious practices. "[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion is one that constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs." Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944-45 (quoting Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996), judgment vacated and remanded by O'Leary v. Mack, 522 U.S. 801 (1997)) (internal punctuation omitted). The record presents at the very least a genuine issue of fact on this question. Plaintiff has testified that the I-tal diet is a central aspect of his faith with grave implications for the afterlife. As explained above, the possibility that he might be able to trade for food or can simply choose not to eat is not a real alternative, nor do other avenues of Rastafarian expression diminish the importance of the religious diet. Finally, defendants contend that even if the new vegetarian diet substantially burdens plaintiff's religious practice, the dietary policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest in "providing for inmate health, and limiting operational and financial burdens, and promoting security." If genuine issues of fact remain under the Turner v. Safley reasonableness standard, they certainly exist on the RLUIPA claim. Cf. Marria v. Broaddus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Defendants argue that plaintiff's state law claims (Counts II-IV) fail for several reasons. First, defendants assert that plaintiff cannot show "threats, intimidation or coercion," pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11 I. Plaintiff is behind bars and depends on the Commonwealth to provide him with nutritionally balanced meals. The choice defendants would force him to make between a healthy diet and his religion beliefs satisfies any definition of coercion. Defendants also contend that plaintiff's free exercise claims under the state Constitution and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 88, fail for substantially the same reasons that they cite with respect to the federal claims. Defendants' position on the federal claims has already been rejected, and their arguments under Massachusetts law are similarly unavailing. As to Count IV, defendants seek summary judgment because DOC regulations do not create a private right of action. Summary judgment for defendants is appropriate here. Loffredo v. Center for Addictive Behaviors, 689 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Mass. 1998).
Finally, defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on all federal and state claims for damages. Government officials performing discretionary tasks are shielded from civil liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In determining whether the defense of qualified immunity applies in a given case, a Court must first ask, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). If so, it must be determined "whether the right was clearly established" and "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 201-02.
There is no defense of qualified immunity as to claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Hegarty v. Somerset County, 25 F.3d 17, 18 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1994). Massachusetts law follows federal qualified immunity standards. Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Mass. 1989).
As to the threshold inquiry, the facts construed in plaintiff's favor show that he has a sincere belief that keeping I-tal is a central tenet of his religion. The new vegetarian diet is not I-tal, as plaintiff sincerely interprets Rastafarian dietary laws. The prison has had no problem providing him with I-tal meals, and providing him with unclean food substantially burdens his Free Exercise rights and serves no legitimate penological purpose.
It is necessary, then, to consider the other prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry. It is clearly established that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Plaintiff has a constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Plaintiff's sincere religious belief is protected, not solely those aspects of his faith that conform to the mainstream tenets of Rastafarianism. Although defendants cite a number of cases holding that there was no First Amendment violation where prisoners requested religious diets, those rulings were based on the legitimacy of the penological purposes cited to justify the burden on Free Exercise rights, not on the fact that there was no right to a religious diet. Here, there is a genuine dispute over the legitimacy of the prison's reasons for denying plaintiff I-tal meals. Moreover, where the prison in 1996 resolved plaintiff's I-tal-related complaints by giving him I-tal meals for nearly three years, the DOC's own religious services handbook said that I-tal rules forbid dairy, and defendants did not base their decisions on any lack of sincerity in plaintiff's beliefs, a reasonable official would be on ample notice that denying plaintiff an I-tal diet would be unconstitutional. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
This same conclusion applies to the claim under RLUIPA, which has a more difficult standard for defendants to meet.
Accordingly, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is allowed as to Counts III and IV in their entirety, the retaliation claims in Count I, and the allegations in Counts I and V against defendants in their official capacities. Otherwise, the motion is denied.