Opinion
00 Civ. 7463 (LTS).
December 28, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff, Sherman Goldstein, commenced this action pro see pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing his handwritten complaint, with attachments, and paying the requisite filing fee in full on October 3, 2000. While the precise identity of the entities he intended to name as defendants is unclear due to the manner in which the handwritten caption appears on the pleading, the Court assumes, for purposes of this opinion, that the named defendants are: the State of New York; the State of New York Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District; the New York State Office of the Attorney General; and "Legal Department New York City."
Plaintiff's complaint purports to assert causes of action to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and pursuant to 42 U.s.c. § 1983. See Complaint at unmarked 1. However, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim is subsumed under section 1983. See generally Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 187 (1970); Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1984) ("By enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Congress provided a remedy for a claimed violation of [the Fourteenth Amendment's] constitutional guarantee.").
Whether plaintiff intended to name "Legal Department New York City" as a defendant is particularly unclear. He included addresses for certain of the defendants in the caption, and the reference to "Legal Department New York City" may have been part of the address given for the Office of the Attorney General at 120 Broadway, New York City.
The complaint, while not a model of clarity, appears to assert claims arising from a fee dispute with an attorney plaintiff retained in 1971 to pursue a cause of action for personal injuries. See Complaint at 2, 3; Letter attached to Complaint from Grace D. Moran, Deputy Counsel to Goldstein at 1 (July 13, 1995) (hereinafter "Moran Letter"). The personal injury lawsuit was settled in 1973 for $125,000. See Complaint at 3; Moran Letter at I. Plaintiff now complains that the contingent-fee arrangement he entered into for the personal injury action allocated excessive funds to his attorney, thereby violating plaintiffs constitutionally-protected property rights. He also complains that the governmental units here named as defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with the review and, ultimately, rejection of various complaints lodged by plaintiff in the years 1986-1996 regarding the fee arrangement with the attorney and the disbursement of the settlement monies. Plaintiff seeks money damages only, in "the maximum [amount] allowed." Complaint at 10.
Defendants State of New York, State of New York Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District, and State of New York Office of the Attorney General (the "State Defendants") have moved pursuant to Rules 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint. Mindful of the duty to construe pro se complaints liberally see McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (courts "read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest'") (quotingBurgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)), the Court has reviewed thoroughly plaintiffs complaint and the documentation attached thereto. The Court has also reviewed thoroughly the State Defendants' motion papers and plaintiffs response thereto (denominated "Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion Not to Dismiss the Complaint CPLR 213 1, 2, 6, Citations Enclosed, Constitutional Tort"). The State Defendants argue that plaintiffs claims against them should be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars such claims. They argue, in the alternative, that the claims are time-barred and that the complaint's broad assertions are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the State Defendants' motion is granted on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Because the Eleventh Amendment issue is jurisdictional in nature, the Court does not reach the State Defendants' other arguments. To the extent plaintiff intended to assert a cause of action against the "Legal Department, [of] New York City," the complaint is also dismissed, sua sponte, for failure to plead any facts supporting a cause of action against such defendant.
The Eleventh Amendment bars from federal court section 1983 suits for legal or equitable relief brought by citizens against unconsenting states and agencies of such states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). New York is an unconsenting state, see Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); the Eleventh Amendment thus bars plaintiffs claims against New York State itself and against the Office of the State Attorney General and the Tenth Judicial District Grievance Committee, an arm of the judicial branch of the State government. See generally Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 594-9 5 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991). See also Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d at 39-40; Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., Second Dep't Sup.Ct., 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970); Mathis v. Clerk of First Dep't, Appellate Div., 631 F. Supp. 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Finally, plaintiffs claim against the "Legal Department City of New York" must also be dismissed. In order to maintain an action against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff must allege the existence of an officially adopted policy or custom that caused injury and a causal connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional right. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 1987). Even when liberally construed, the instant complaint cannot reasonably be interpreted as alleging facts sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiffs injury was caused by any policy or custom of the municipal defendant. Indeed, the complaint fails to allege any involvement of the municipal defendant whatsoever in the event complained of. Accordingly, the claim against the "Legal Department City of New York" is dismissed, sua sponte. See Pourzandvakil v. HUMPHRY, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1995) ("[t]he law in this circuit is that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a frivolous complaint even if the plaintiff paid the filing fee") (citing Tyler v. Carter, 151 F.R.D. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994));cf. Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (sua sponte dismissal of fee paid).
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its entirety. The dismissal as against the State Defendants is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore does not constitute an adjudication on the merits of the cause of action asserted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The dismissal of the cause of action against "Legal Department New York City" (if indeed such a cause of action was intended to be asserted) is without prejudice.
Plaintiff argues in opposition to the State Defendants' motion that the complaint should not be dismissed because he might be able to assert a viable cause of action against one of the individual representatives of the Grievance Committee. The Complaint does not name this individual as a defendant, nor does it purport to frame a cause of action against him in his official or individual capacity. The Court declines to construe the opposition papers as an amendment to the already almost-incomprehensible complaint.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3) that any appeal from this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).