Opinion
No. 559712.
1946-03-28
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. UNITED ELECTRICAL RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al.
Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis, of Cleveland, for plaintiff. William J. Corrigan, of Cleveland, for defendants.
Action by the General Electric Company against United Electrical & Machine Workers of America and others wherein three of individual defendants were cited to show cause why they should not be punished as for contempt of court because of violation of an order issued by the court.
Judgment in accordance with opinion.
See, also, 67 N.E.2d 798.Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis, of Cleveland, for plaintiff. William J. Corrigan, of Cleveland, for defendants.
ORR, Judge.
There individuals, whom we shall hereinafter refer to as the defendants, have been cited to show cause why they should not be punished as for contempt of court because of the violation of an order issued by this Court on the 30th day of January, 1946. On that day after due notice and a full and complete hearing, which hearing was attended by all of the defendants, the Court issued a temporary restraining order which provided, inter alia, that the defendants were enjoined and restrained
‘1. From interfering in any manner, whatsoever with the plaintiff, its officers, agents, employees, representatives and others having business with the plaintiff, and from interfering by violence, force intimidation, threats or in any manner whatsoever, from those desiring to enter or leave the plaintiff's plants and premises.
‘2. From in any way interfering with the access to the plaintiff's plants and premises by the plaintiff, its officers, agents, employees, representatives and those having a right thereto, or from interfering with, accosting, or restricting in any way whatsoever the ingress to or egress from the aforesaid plants and premises by the plaintiff, its officers, agents, employees, representatives and those having a right thereto.
‘3. From protecting, aiding, abetting or assisting anyone in the commission of said acts hereinbefore restrained.
‘4. From picketing the plants and premises of the plaintiff and all portions thereof, including the gates and entrances and at any other place and street where any portions of the plants and premises are situated and facing; and from loitering, grouping or congregating at or near any approaches or on public streets or highways adjacent to plaintiff's plants and premises, or in any place at or near plaintiff's plants where the employees of the plaintiff desiring to work enter or alight from conveyances in order to go to or leave from the plaintiff's plants and premises; provided, however, that the defendants shall be permitted to peacefully picket the plaintiff's plants and premises by five (5) pickets at each of the following entrances, to-wit:’
Among the entrances thus designated were the entrances of the plant of the General Electric Company at 1131-1133 East 152d Street and 1175 East 152d Street in the city of Cleveland, Ohio.
Before discussing the evidence in this case I should like to state that this proceeding has been instituted not because a judge has been offended or an individual displeased. It has been held since ancient times that proceedings in contempt are not to secure respect toward individual judges, but to uphold the majesty of the people, to insure the dignity of the courts and secure the uninterrupted administration of justice.
The evidence establishes the fact that pursuant to a resolution duly adopted by the Union a large number of strikers, and those in sympathy with them, assembled in the neighborhood of the Collinwood Post Office in the city of Cleveland, and marched in a procession to and past the plants of the General Electric Company located on East 152d Street. That after passing the plants the procession returned to the entrance thereof and there a large number of those parading formed picket lines which revolved in a circular or elliptical movement in front of the two entrances to the plants of the company.
It is the contention of the Company that this action resulted in barring from the plant those who desired to enter and leave; that the number of pickets was greatly in excess of the number permitted by the Court's order; that threats and intimidation occurred and in general that there was open and notorious violation of the Court's order. On the other hand it is the contention of the defendants that they did not intend to, nor did they, violate the Court's order; that they had planned a peaceful anti-injunction protest parade, and that the demonstration which they conducted was nothing more than that; that they did not violate the order of the Court with respect to the number of pickets, with respect to preventing ingress and egress at the plant, with respect to intimidation or violence, or in any other respect whatsoever.
The evidence is clear that on the mornings of March 5th and March 6th of this year, for approximately one hour on each of said days, a large number of men and women marched in a close formation and in a circular movement at the entrances of the East 152d Street plants of the General Electric Company in such a manner that the employees and others who had lawful business in the plants and desired to enter were prevented from doing so; that during said period of time the number of those participating in such demonstrations was between 150 and 300; that after the mass picketing was over, many more pickets remained than permitted by the Court's order; that the demonstrators were directed in their movements and activities by orders issued from a sound truck which had accompanied the demonstration on the first day and by other means on both days; that during this mass picketing there were threats directed toward those who desired to enter and acts of intimidation committed. That no violence occurred is due principally to the fact that few were bold enough to attempt to enter.
It is further established by the evidence that these defendants, all of whom had knowledge of the order, were active in planning, organizing, directing and participating in said activities of the strikers. It is proven beyond any doubt that the conduct of the defendants and those they led was threatening, intimidating and in direct violation of the Court's order.
This Court is not called upon to defend its order, but it is deemed proper to remind the defendants that at the time this order was issued the Court pointed out to them that they, as citizens and strikers had certain rights; that among these were the right to join unions, to strike and to peaceably picket. The Court also said at that time that there were others who had rights which must be protected, that among these were the owners of the Company and the 1700 employees who were not involved in the labor controversy.
We repeat that it is the duty of the Court to protect the property of the owners and to safeguard the rights of those employees who desire to work. These defendants have certain constitutional rights, including the right of free speech and peaceable assembly, but there are other constitutional guaranties such as the right of property and the right to work which likewise must be protected, and, as we stated at the time of the hearing, these are just as sacred as the right to strike. In addition to these rights the best interests of the public must be protected and safeguarded. While our courts have upheld the right to peacefully picket no court upholds picketing which is not peaceful, or which is intimidating, threatening or marked with violence. Likewise no court of law has ever given strikers the right to lay siege to a plant, establish a quarantine and keep out those who have lawful business therein or to determine who shall and who shall not enter a struck plant.
Knowing all this and after their rights and obligations had been made clear, these leaders of the strike saw fit to violate the court order. Sometimes in the heat of a labor controversy when feeling or passion runs high, things are said or done which thoughtlessly violate the order of the court. This was not a violation of that kind. This was not a thoughtless or unintentional violation which can be excused on the ground of passion or excitement. It was deliberately planned, widely publicized and directed with the precision of a military maneuver. Telegrams were sent inviting persons to participate. The minutes of the Union disclose the fact that not only was consideration given to the mobilization of the strikers for this demonstration, but that plans were made to arrange for bail bonds in the event some of the strikers were arrested. Those who are about to engage in a peaceful parade are not required to give consideration to the matter of bail. Such apprehension indicates a knowledge of the unlawfulness of their acts.
I am convinced that the great majority of the strikers at this plant are decent American citizens who believe in law and order and who deplore unlawful conduct. Our system of government is based upon law. Some reference was made during the course of this trial to an inscription upon the walls of this Court House. There is also carved upon this building the simple truth that ‘obedience to law is liberty.’ If the time ever comes when the orders of our courts are not obeyed, then indeed our liberty shall perish.
This unfortunate labor controversy was important to many thousands of people, and I do not mean to belittle it, but it is insignificant in comparison with the importance of upholding law and order in our community, for truly a blow struck at our courts is a blow struck at Democracy itself.
These defendants have stated from the witness stand that this was a peaceful demonstration against injunctions in labor controversies and have said that it was their desire by this means to call the attention of the public to what they consider the injustice of the law with reference to injunctions. While we do not doubt that these men entertain these views with reference to injunctions, we do not believe that their primary purpose on the days in question was to conduct a peaceful anti-injunction parade. The Union which was a defendant in this case was the Union which led in the plans and preparations for the demonstration. It was the leaders of this Union who organized, directed and participated in the demonstration. They chose the entrances to two of the plants of the Company against which they were striking as the scene of these demonstrations.
They claim that they merely conducted a parade which went by the plant and returned, and then marched around in a circular movement in front of the entrances to the plants for approximately one hour before disbanding. To hold that such a demonstration was simply a parade would be most absurd. We do not believe it was such, and we do not think that these defendants expect us to believe it was nothing more than a parade. Even if this Court were so credulous as to believe this fanciful story that this demonstration was undertaken solely as a protest, it certainly cannot be denied that for one hour on the days in question these men participated in mass picketing in a violation of the Court's order. The strike bulletin issued by the Union refers to their conduct as mass picketing.
At the close of the first day's demonstration the strikers were instructed to reassemble on the following day for a similar demonstration and what occurred on the second day was very largely a repetition of what occurred the first day.
While we are concerned only with violations which occurred on two days, there is evidence that these demonstrations continued for another two days, and that even after the citation of this Court had been served upon at least some of the defendants they continued to violate the order of the Court. It is to the credit of the defendants that their conduct indicates that they did not seek to violate permanently the injunction or, to use their expression, to break the order of the Court. The violations occurred only at the East 152nd Street plants of the Company and other plants were not picketed unlawfully and the demonstrations continued only about an hour on each day. They contented themselves with a gesture of puerile bravado whereby they could attract attention to themselves and impress their followers with the fact that they were above and beyond the law. It is apparent from the testimony of Mr. Haug that one of the purposes of these demonstrations was to attract attention to the strike. He seemed to feel that there was a lack of publicity concerning the strike, that it was necessary to do something which would dramatize it and which would gain public notice. He further indicated that he considered the newspaper publicity which followed justified their conduct.
In their zeal these labor leaders have lost sight of the fact that if they are to succeed under our system of government in protecting and advancing the rights of those they represent, they must be law abiding themselves; that while our Constitution guarantees the right of free speech and free assembly, it does not tolerate disobedience to law, and that those who would seek to advance the labor movement by disobedience or disregard of law betray the confidence placed in them by those whom they represent. Our form of government provides an orderly and legal method by which changes in the law may be accomplished. It would indeed be unfortunate if the advances which have been made after a long and difficult struggle by organized labor should be jeopardized by disregard for law and contempt of court.
These men must understand that they cannot set themselves above and beyond the law.
The Court is of the opinion that the defendants and each of them are guilty of contempt of court and their conduct is contrary to the best interests of the community. Happily the labor controversy in which the parties were involved has been settled and the strikers have returned to work. That fact, however, does not purge these defendants of contempt. Their offense was against society and the offense remained after the strike was settled. If they are permitted to go unpunished for this offense and again they or others become involved in a labor controversy they might be emboldened to take more extreme means or go to greater length in disobeying legal authority. Such conduct would, if tolerated, grow and soon undermine our governmental structure.
The statute dealing with the penalty for this offense is as follows: ‘Sec. 12142. Punishment if found guilty. The court shall then determine whether the accused is guilty of the contempt charge. If it be adjudged that he is guilty, he may be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than ten days, or both.’
While the Court is of the opinion that the gravity of this offense is such as to justify the extreme penalty of the statute, the Court also believes that these men have, through this experience in Court, acquired a more proper conception of the necessity for and importance of obedience to a judicial order; we also entertain the belief that they may be brought to a full realization of the necessity for respect of law and order without imprisonment. The Court further believes that in a matter such as this, certainty of punishment is more important than severity of punishment and so shall, therefore, not sentence them to imprisonment, but shall be content with the imposition of a fine. I therefore sentence each of these defendants to pay a fine of $300.