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Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of America

Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Cuyahoga County.
Jan 29, 1946
67 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio Misc. 1946)

Opinion

No. 559712.

1946-01-29

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. UNITED ELECTRICAL RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al.

Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis, of Cleveland, for plaintiff. William J. Corrigan, of Cleveland, for defendants.


Action by the General Electric Company against United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of America and others. On plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order.

Order granted in accordance with opinion.

See, also, 67 N.E.2d 802.Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis, of Cleveland, for plaintiff. William J. Corrigan, of Cleveland, for defendants.

(Orally)

ORR, Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon an application for a temporary restraining order. The matter grows out of what is commonly known as a labor controversy. This involves several plants of a company or corporation known as the General Electric Company. These plants are located within this County. The strikers are represented by a Union. This Union is a large national Union. The company is, likewise, national in its scope. Therefore, it is quite apparent that nothing that we can do here will settle the major controversy between these parties; that is, their wage dispute. It is rather unfortunate in this enlightened age of ours that we do not have procedures which make it possible to settle controversies of this nature in a reasonable and orderly manner. Our Congress is now meeting and is considering legislation which, perhaps, will accomplish that, or, at least, go a long ways toward accomplishing it. No doubt the conduct of the parties in the various controversies which are now raging throughout our country will have some bearing on the legislation which is now before Congress or will be before the Congress.

In the strike which we are considering, both parties to this lawsuit have certain rights and certain duties. The workers who are on strike have the right to strike, they have the right to join a Union, they have a right to peaceful picketing. On the other hand, other people have rights, also. The owners have certain definite legal rights, and we must remember that there has been a change in our concept of corporations. There was a time when the owners, or the owner, of a corporation, large company, would consist of, perhaps, one man or a small group of men. That day is gone. The day of the Carnegies and the Rockefellers and the Fricks and a number of others, that day is gone. We find now, instead of one man or a few men owning a company, that hundreds of people, perhaps thousands of people, are the real owners of the company, and I presume that in this company, this corporation, there may be hundreds or thousands of people who have invested their money in the corporation and are, therefore, the owners of that corporation. They, perhaps, have invested their life savings. They may be depending upon their investment to see them through their declining years.

Now, these people have a right of property which must be protected.

There is another class of people who also have definite rights, and that is the employees who are not on strike. In a company the size of this, there are numerous employees. There has been no one here who has testified on behalf of the company that was not an employee. The stenographers, and nurses, bookkeepers, research men, even the manager, are employees of the company, and these people have a right to work, a right which is just as sacred, if not more so, than the right to strike; and in this particular case I am told that there are approximately 1700 of the workers of the General Electric Company, that is, 1700 out of 3300, or a little more than one-third of the employees of the company, who are not engaged in production but they perform other services. Now, these people have rights which it is incumbent upon this Court to protect, also.

I mentioned some of the rights which the Union has, which the strikers have. There are certain things which the law says very definitely they cannot do; for instance, they cannot mass picket, that is contrary to law; they cannot threaten, they cannot intimidate people; they cannot do violence to anyone; and they have not the right to seize a plant or prevent people who have lawful business from entering and leaving the plant without let or hindrance.

The issue in this case is a very simple one. This Court has permitted a great deal of testimony because we wanted to be sure that we understood the background of this entire controversy. The fundamental issues are not difficult. The company complains of the strikers, says that they are mass picketing, that their property is being endangered, that people who have lawful business in the plant are not permitted to enter.

It is perfectly clear from the testimony which we have heard, both by way of affidavit and from the witness stand, that there are certain processes of this company which are very valuable and which must be preserved. There is testimony, for instance, of one furnace, which if it was permitted to cool, would result in a loss of $100,000, and that is a very serious loss; but more important than that is the fact that if that furnace cools off and cannot be used, that it will take perhaps six months to put that plant in operation. Therefore, if that should happen, these people who work in that plant would be the real sufferers. They would suffer far more than anyone else.

Then there is the research and development department, the place where engineering work is done, where experiments are carried on, the place which is famous the world over as a place where great things are developed for the benefit of all of us. Now, I think in this case it is perfectly clear to the Court the importance of preserving this property, this vital property, so that when these men and women go back to work they will have a place to work in, so that their plant will not be damaged, so that research can go forward. I think it is clear to the Court, and I say that both sides recognize the importance of that.

There has been worked out between the Union and the company an arrangement thus far whereby this property has been maintained. I hope that that arrangement can in some way be continued.

The company also complains of strikers, and it says that they are guilty of mass picketing. Well, it is perfectly clear what happens at this strike, or what did happen or what is happening now. In the early days of the strike there were a great many people who turned out, and then as the strike grew or continued, according to the testimony of Mr. Haug, a certain number of pickets would report in the morning and for about two hours would indulge in mass picketing. That is what he called it. They would march around, these girls would march around in a circle, sort of a close-order drill. Now, he says the chief purpose of that-he said there were other purposes-one of them was to inform the public there was a strike going on, but he said that the chief purpose was to inform or to stimulate the morale of the strikers. Well, it is none of my concern, I suppose he knows, but I just entertain the belief that marching a group of girls these cold mornings around in circles is not particularly conducive to building morale. At this picket line, after that period of mass picketing is over, there is maintained what Mr. Haug described as a skeleton organization; that is, four or five people would picket for the rest of the day. In some places the company was kind enough to provide rather comfortable quarters for these pickets.

Now, there hasn't been any violence of any severe nature; that is, there have been no blows struck. These affidavits indicate that there have been threats, there has been intimidation, there has been some pushing and shoving, there has been some rocking of automobiles, there has been some jeering; but to the credit of both sides, be it said that there has been no actual violence. That may be due in a large measure to the fact that these people who were not permitted to enter the plant made no issue of it, they acquiesced in the demand of the pickets that they do not attempt to enter. But, in any event, violence must be prohibited or prevented.

So far as the picketing is concerned, if it were not for the fact that as a part of this picketing people who have a right to enter the premises lawfully are prohibited from doing so, I might be inclined to say that perhaps a limitation of pickets is unnecessary. But I believe in the interest of preserving law and order, and in the interest of the other matters which I will later discuss, that there should be some limitations upon the picketing. Under the showing which has been made here some courts might say that there should be no picketing, other courts might say that there should be one picket or perhaps two pickets. I am inclined to be more liberal. I am influenced very largely by the fact that the picketing the strikers have engaged in has not been marked with violence. Therefore, I am going to permit five pickets at each entrance of each plant involved.

The real issue in this case may be very simply stated, and that is this: Does the Union have a right to determine who shall and who shall not enter and leave the property of the company? The Union takes the position that no one shall enter the property of the company unless that person has a pass which has been issued by the Union or approved by the Union, and the picketing thus far has successfully prevented anyone from entering the premises I have mentioned, unless that person or persons have been approved by the Union. I again point out that the Union has permitted maintenance men and others handling emergency matters to go through the picket line, but they have kept out people who have a perfect legal right to enter the premises. I have here the affidavit of a young lawyer whom I know, who just the other day was in this court still wearing his country's uniform. He has a distinguished military record. He went to his place of employment, went to the gate wanting to go to work. He was forbidden to enter the premises. He turned away and as he did so he was booed and jeered. Now, I don't suppose that a young man who has been through what he has was greatly disturbed by that, but he shouldn't have had to suffer that indignity. I have another affidavit of a man who has worked for the company for 46 years, who reported for work and he also could not enter the premises. I have affidavits of stenographers, nurses, engineers and many others who are not involved in this controversy in the slightest degree, no more than I am involved in it, and they wanted to go to work and they couldn't do so. Those people have a right to work, have a right to earn their wages, they have a right to maintain their homes and families, and there is no law anywhere that gives anyone the right to deprive them of the privilege which they seek; namely, the right to work and the right to free access to these premises as long as they are engaged in lawful work.

Now, Mr. Haug described the conduct between the company and the Union as a warfare and pointed out that they had trenches, one on one side and one on the other, the parties fighting it out. I think his simile is an unfortunate one. I think a matter such as this should be settled not in the trenches, not by warfare, but by reasonable men sitting down and composing their differences. In no other way can labor matters be effectively handled. But even if this be warfare, certainly the rules of the game do not permit the seizure of a plant, and that is what, in effect, I think, is being attempted here.

We have spent a great deal of time during this case upon the question of arrangements which were discussed prior to the strike between the Union and management. I think those efforts were made in good faith by both parties. I think the workers and the managers wanted to work out some sort of an arrangement which would permit the physical assets of this company to be preserved intact until this controversy, the major controversy, should be settled, but, unfortunately, those arrangements failed. Now, it is not for me to say who was at fault in that. Suffice it to say that they did fail. I would have been a great deal better pleased if these people had been able to work out among themselves some sort of an arrangement, then perhaps they would have both been satisfied with the result, but they did fail and now they come in before me and the only thing I can do is to determine their rights according to law and according to the evidence. I, however, express the hope that these people will remain amiable and will still try to work out some arrangement which will protect the property and prevent the creation of a dangerous situation.

Now, this company is not now in production. I, therefore, believe that the prayer of the petition for a temporary restraining order should be granted. I have already indicated the manner in which I think the pickets should be limited. I think there should be written into the Court's Journal Entry or decree a further provision that should the company resume production in those plants where this Union, the defendant in this case, is the recognized bargaining agency, that either party might have the privilege of applying to this Court for modification of the order. I leave that to them, but in the meantime, this will be the order of the Court, and counsel may prepare a Journal Entry which will embody the suggestions of the Court.


Summaries of

Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of America

Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Cuyahoga County.
Jan 29, 1946
67 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio Misc. 1946)
Case details for

Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of America

Case Details

Full title:GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. UNITED ELECTRICAL RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS OF…

Court:Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Cuyahoga County.

Date published: Jan 29, 1946

Citations

67 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio Misc. 1946)

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