Opinion
C. A. 3:21-2780-JMC-PJG
01-19-2022
Jerome Garcia, Plaintiff, v. Leon Lott; William Holbrook; Chris Williamson; Jeffery Bloom; Don Rickenbaker; Michael Leach; Richland County Sheriff's Department; Columbia Police Department; South Carolina Highway Patrol; Calhoun County Magistrate; South Carolina Department of Social Services, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jerome Garcia, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. By order dated September 13, 2021, the court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to correct the deficiencies in the original complaint that subjected this case to summary dismissal. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 12). Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that despite Plaintiff availing himself of the opportunity to correct the deficiencies in the original complaint, this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff describes four unrelated incidents in which he claims his constitutional rights were violated, seeking damages for all of them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Plaintiff claims that in December 2017, a Richland County Sheriff's Deputy stopped him without probable cause and searched his car. He claims the deputy was part of a team that patrols Wal-Mart parking lots during the holidays. Plaintiff alleges the deputy stopped and searched him only because his car was backed-in to the parking spot near the entrance to the store. The deputy found marijuana in the car, which Plaintiff claims he held lawfully pursuant to a California medical cannabis license. Plaintiff's charge for possession of marijuana was dismissed by a state magistrate. Plaintiff's claims about this incident are apparently brought against Defendant Leon Lott, the Richland County Sheriff, and Defendant Richland County Sheriff's Department.
Plaintiff is warned that unrelated parties, claims, and incidents should not be included in one suit. See generally Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[U]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits, not only to prevent the sort of morass produced by multi-claim, multi-defendants suits . . . but also to ensure that prisoners pay all fees required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act .... Complaints like this . . . should be rejected either by severing the action into separate lawsuits or by dismissing improperly joined defendants.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Second, Plaintiff claims that in June 2019, he was arrested for driving without insurance after he was in a collision with an off-duty City of Columbia police officer. Plaintiff claims the officer attacked him with the officer's vehicle and that the officer should have been arrested, but the state trooper who investigated the accident arrested Plaintiff instead. Plaintiff claims he was arrested without probable cause because driving without insurance is a civil infraction. Plaintiff claims the state trooper violated his right to due process because he is poor and cannot afford insurance. Plaintiff also claims the State has refused to go to trial (apparently on his driving without insurance change) in violation of his right to a speedy trial. Plaintiff's claims about this incident are apparently brought against Defendant William Holbrook, the City of Columbia Chief of Police; Defendant Columbia Police Department; and Defendant South Carolina Highway Patrol and its commander, Defendant Chris Williamson.
Third, Plaintiff claims that in July 2019, a family court judge violated his right to due process and his “fundamental parental rights.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 at 10.) Plaintiff refused to consent to a “voluntary parental agreement” regarding his child support and visitation rights. (Id.) Plaintiff claims the judge would not allow him to present evidence at a proceeding and Plaintiff was arrested. Plaintiff also claims he is not allowed to have a driver's license because he is delinquent on child support payments from New Mexico. Plaintiff claims this shows that Defendant South Carolina Department of Social Services and its Director, Defendant Michael Leach, violated Plaintiff's rights.
Fourth, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Don Rickenbacker and Jeffery Bloom, South Carolina Magistrates, are retaliating against Plaintiff in the Defendant Calhoun County Magistrate's Court because of Plaintiff's federal lawsuit against two state troopers in this court. (See C/A No. 21-1359.) Plaintiff claims he was arrested for driving without a license plate even though he believes that is a civil infraction. Plaintiff claims the court is violating his right to a speedy trial and does not have jurisdiction over him because he does not consent to its jurisdiction.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
1. Duplicative Litigation
Initially, the court concludes that this entire case is subject to summary dismissal because all of the claims raised by Plaintiff are duplicative of claims he has previously raised in this court, some of which are still pending. (See C/A No. 3:21-1715 (raising claims against the family court judge); C/A No. 3:21-1359 (raising claims against the state troopers); C/A No. 3:21-1318 (raising claims regarding the denial of his driver's license); C/A No. 3:20-695 (again raising claims against the family court judge); C/A No. 3:20-694 (raising claims regarding Plaintiff's January 2019 arrest); C/A No. 3:19-1934 (raising claims regarding Plaintiff's June 2017 traffic stop)). The court considers duplicative claims frivolous because it is a waste of judicial resources to unnecessarily consider the same claims in multiple cases. See Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989) (“To this end, IFP complaints may be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(d) when they seek to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff.”); see also Quinonez v. Texas, No. CV H-16-0822, 2016 WL 2894920, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2016) (stating “[a] prisoner civil rights complaint is considered ‘malicious' for purposes of the PLRA if it duplicates allegations made in another federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff,” and also dismissing a duplicative, successive § 1983 action on the basis of res judicata) (citing Pittman v. Moore, 900 F.2d 994, 994 (5th Cir. 1993)).Consequently, this case should be dismissed as frivolous.
As to claims that were dismissed with prejudice in other cases, those claims are also subject to dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. See generally United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 432 (1980) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting) (“While res judicata is a defense which can be waived, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c), if a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the defense has not been raised . . . This result is fully consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.”) (some internal citations omitted); Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (“As a general matter, a court may, sua sponte, dismiss a case on preclusion grounds ‘where the records of that court show that a previous action covering the same subject matter and parties had been dismissed.' ”) (quoting Evarts v. W. Metal Finishing Co., 253 F.2d 637, 639 n.1 (9th Cir. 1958)).
2. Failure to State a Claim
Alternatively, the court concludes that despite having availed himself of the opportunity to correct the deficiencies in the original complaint identified by the court's September 13 order, the Amended Complaint still fails to plausibly show that the named defendants are liable for any violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff provides no facts in the Amended Complaint explaining how Defendants Lott, Holbrook, Williamson, or Leach were personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Plaintiff also provides no facts that could plausibly establish municipal liability on the part of Defendant Columbia Police Department (to the extent it is even an entity subject to suit). See generally Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (providing that municipalities are only liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations where the constitutionally offensive acts of city employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal policy or custom). Also, Defendants Richland County Sheriff's Department, South Carolina Highway Patrol, South Carolina Department of Social Services, and Calhoun County Magistrate are not “persons” amenable to a suit for damages under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-68, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983, and finding Congress did not intend to override the State's sovereign immunity by enacting the statute); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 482-83 (4th Cir. 2005). Finally, Defendants Rickenbacker and Bloom, South Carolina magistrates, are immune from suit for actions they take in their judicial roles, as are the bases for Plaintiff's claims against them here. See Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding state magistrates are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for act performed in their judicial capacity). Consequently, this case is still subject to dismissal for the reasons stated in the court's September 13 order.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that this action be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff is warned that filing frivolous and duplicative cases in this court may subject him to sanctions. See generally Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817-19 (4th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).