Opinion
C. A. 1:22-cv-4178-MGL-JDA
12-02-2022
Joey Chester Fulmer, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, County of Aiken, SC Department of Social Services; State of New Jersey, Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Joey Chester Fulmer (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, bring this action alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Plaintiff files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that this action should be dismissed without issuance and service of process for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on November 21, 2022. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff purportedly brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 4.] According to Plaintiff, the South Carolina Department of Social Services (“SCDSS”) has committed fraud on the court under the guise of state and local laws governing child support payments, costing Plaintiff 1 “thousands or possibly tens of thousand of dollars in over payments.” [Id. at 5.] Similarly, Plaintiff contends that the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development (“NJDFD”) was “actively engaged in fraudulent concealment in the exact same child support case from South Carolina and [was] equally culpable of this matter.” [Id.]
Plaintiff asserts that the events giving rise to his claims occurred on March 28, 2018, at “the time of [his] tax return.” [Id. at 6.] As to the facts underlying his claim, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
Money was wrongfully taken from me and I was on more than one occasion illegally detained; under the color of law these event[s] happen[e]d due to child support; it's a matter that's on record; there are several witnesses, but that would be a matter of those individuals whom were present.[ Id. at 6-7.] As to his injuries, Plaintiff alleges
There were no physical damages; but due to the financial and emotional distress and the violation of my civil rights and liberties, I felt I had no other resource for fixing this situation am repairing the damages and the indemnity I am suffering from and continue to be subjected to.[Id. at 7.] Plaintiff requests the following relief. First, he asks this Court to “stop the family court . . . from stealing [his] money.” [Id. at 8.] Additionally, he seeks money damages in the amount of $250,000 for “actual damages”; $250,000 for “direct damages”; $100,000 for “general an[d] hedonic damages”; and $25,000 for “delict an[d] tort as a declaratory relief.” [Id.] Plaintiff explains,
The basis for these financial claims are due to the fact that I have tried on several occasions to reach out to both of these parties to resolve this matter, they have taken over an est[i]mated 15,000 dollars from me under the proclamation of
arrears and have provide this to them with [their] receipts to no avail.[Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Further, this Court possesses the inherent authority to review the pro se Complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the ‘defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules.”); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which a plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite the pleadings to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct a plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when the complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
At its core, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff is entitled to relief because he was subjected to unfair child support proceedings conducted in the state family court, and Plaintiff sues Defendants for allegedly violating his federal civil rights in connection with the collection of his child support obligations. However, Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
42 U.S.C. § 1983Under the facts alleged, the pro se Complaint is liberally construed as asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. Weathers v. Pou, No. 2:09-cv-270-JFA-RSC, 2009 WL 1139984, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2009). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, § 1983 is the only basis apparent from the face of the Complaint to invoke this Court's exercise of jurisdiction in this case. Nevertheless, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, and his § 1983 claims against Defendants are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
Plaintiff may be asserting a claim for fraud under state tort law. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 5 (alleging SCDSS has committed fraud on the court and NJDFD was “actively engaged in fraudulent concealment”).] This Court could properly consider state tort law claims only if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are satisfied. However, upon a review of the allegations in the Complaint, there is no basis for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over any state law claims because both Plaintiff and at least one Defendant-SCDSS-are South Carolina residents. See Williams Farm P'ship, LLC v. Siegers Seed Co., 664 F.Supp.2d 611, 613 (D.S.C. 2009) (“The complete diversity rule of § 1332 requires that the citizenship of each plaintiff be different from the citizenship of each defendant.”).
The Complaint is barred by the Rooker -Feldman
Doctrine
Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because a favorable decision by this Court would require federal review of a state family court decision or would produce a result that is at odds with the result reached in the state family court. See Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Cumming, 368 F.3d 379, 383-84 (4th Cir. 2004).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates that “lower federal courts generally do not have [subject-matter] jurisdiction to review state-court decisions.” Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 857 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal “review of adjudications of the state's highest court [and] also the decisions of its lower courts.” Jordahl v. Democratic Party, 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). The Rooker-Feldman bar extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court but also to those that are “inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.” Plyler, 129 F.3d at 731 (internal quotation marks omitted). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Under either the ‘actually decided' or the ‘inextricably intertwined' prong, the principle is the same: ‘[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.'” Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). Thus, “if in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual, Rooker-Feldman is implicated.” Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202 (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997)). Because federal jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts “is reserved exclusively to the Supreme Court, it is improper for federal district courts to exercise jurisdiction over a case that is the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment.” Ernst, 108 F.3d at 491.
Plaintiff requests injunctive relief and money damages as the result of alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights related to state family court proceedings. Significantly, Plaintiff asks this Court to “stop the family court . . . from stealing [his] money.” [Doc. 1 at 8.] However, the Court cannot grant the requested relief because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this Court's exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Here, Plaintiff is clearly attacking the validity of a state family court proceeding involving child support obligations, and his claims are therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Weathers, 2009 WL 1139984, at *2 (citing Willner v. Frey, 243 Fed.Appx. 744 (4th Cir. 2007)).
“A litigant may not circumvent these jurisdictional mandates by instituting a federal action which, although not styled as an appeal, ‘amounts to nothing more than an attempt to seek review of [the state court's] decision by a lower federal court.'” Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Plyler, 129 F.3d at 731). As noted above, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is implicated when, “if in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the [state] court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual.” Smalley v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP, 526 Fed.Appx. 231, 236 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff seeks to have this Court “sit in review of a [South Carolina] state court that has already” ruled on Plaintiff's claim involving his child support obligations. Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims asserted in this federal court action are “inextricably intertwined” with the state family court's rulings as he asks this Court to “stop the family court.” See, e.g., Kelley v. Saleeby, No. 4:08-cv-00639-RBH, 2008 WL 3927230, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 2008), aff'd, 302 Fed.Appx. 218 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The proceedings and rulings made in the Darlington County Family Court cannot be reviewed or set aside by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina in this case”); Banks v. SC, No. 9:10-cv-785-CMC-BM, 2010 WL 2365352, at *5 (D.S.C. May 6, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2365417 (D.S.C. May 28, 2010) (finding Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars claims that Plaintiff was injured by the result of state family court decisions made in a child support enforcement action); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Obregon-Mejia, No. 8:17-cv-2659-TMC-JDA, 2018 WL 627892, at *8 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 625007 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2018) (finding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the plaintiff challenged a state family court order terminating Plaintiff's parental rights); Saylor-Marchant v. ACS, No. 2:15-cv-3749-DCN-MGB, 2015 WL 7871230, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 4, 2015), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2015 WL 7854233 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2015) (applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar case challenging state family court custody proceedings); Allen v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2:10-cv-2162-DCN-RSC, 2010 WL 3655566, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3655564 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2010) (explaining plaintiff's allegations, claiming that the family court proceeding was an injustice and an abuse of power, was an improper attempt to have the federal court review state family court proceedings, which “is precisely the type of claim that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes”).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief related to any currently pending state family court proceedings, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine as granting Plaintiff's requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state family court proceedings. Because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state court proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state court proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state family court proceedings, a ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court proceedings and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in any ongoing state family court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims. See Briggman v. Virginia, Dep't of Soc. Servs., Div. of Child Support Enf't, 526 F.Supp.2d 590, 604 (W.D. Va. 2007) (explaining the plaintiff's federal law claims were barred by the Younger abstention doctrine to the extent he was involved in state court proceedings for non-payment of child support).
Statute of Limitations
Additionally, even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude this Court from hearing Plaintiff's claims, the action would be time-barred under the applicable statue of limitations.
As noted, Plaintiff asserts his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Further, Plaintiff asserts that the events giving rise to his claims occurred on March 28, 2018. [Id. at 6.]
Because “there is no federal statute of limitation for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, . . . the analogous state law statute of limitations for personal injury applies.” Jacobs v. Richland Cnty., No. 3:18-cv-3216-SAL-SVH, 2020 WL 4678503, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 3428880 (D.S.C. June 23, 2020), aff'd, 855 Fed.Appx. 899 (4th Cir. 2021); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (explaining “federal law looks to the law of the State in which the cause of action arose” to determine the applicable statute of limitations). “In South Carolina, the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims is codified at S.C. Code § 15-3-530(5), which provides that the statute of limitations is three years.” Williams v. City of Sumter Police Dep't, No. 3:09-cv-2486-CMC-PJG, 2011 WL 723148, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2011). This statute “applies to § 1983 claims arising in South Carolina.” Id.; see also McCall v. McAlhaney, No. 2:15-cv-01011-TLW-MGB, 2017 WL 3981153, at *7 (D.S.C. July 24, 2017) (noting three-year statute of limitations under South Carolina personal injury statute applies to Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 3972052 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2017). “While the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that is subject to waiver if not timely raised in a responsive pleading, the court is authorized to anticipate clearly-apparent affirmative defenses available to defendants in determining whether, under § 1915, process should be issued.” Jordan v. Wilson, No. 3:18-cv-1589-JFA-SVH, 2018 WL 4523221, at * 2 (D.S.C. June 27, 2018) (citing Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1983)), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 3737999 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2018).
Because Plaintiff alleges that his claim arose on March 28, 2018, the applicable three-year statute of limitations began to run on that date and thus expired on March 28, 2021. Therefore, the instant action is time-barred as it was filed more than a year and a half later, on November 21, 2022.
Defendants are Entitled to Dismissal
Furthermore, the named Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). Here, neither Defendant is considered a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Garcia v. Lott, No. 3:21-cv-2780-JMC-PJG, 2022 WL 3239539, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 19, 2022) (explaining the South Carolina Department of Social Services is not a “person” amenable to a suit for damages under § 1983), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 3230086 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2022); Stroman v. York Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0:18-cv-1632-JMC-PJG, 2019 WL 498387, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2019) (“[Plaintiff's] § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law because the York County Department of Social Services is not a ‘person' amenable to suit.”); Wolfe v. Kaminski, No. 14-cv-1956-ES-MAH, 2016 WL 3566718, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2016) (“New Jersey's Department of Human Services is not a ‘person' subject to liability under § 1983.”). As such both Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action, and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief as he does not name any other defendant in this action.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and it is therefore recommended that the Complaint be summarily DISMISSED without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).