Opinion
Case No. 99-4167-DES
May 17, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 80). Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 82), and defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. 84). Defendant requests the court to reconsider two of its previous Memorandum and Orders (Doc. 78 and 79), which were issued simultaneously by the court on April 10, 2002. Also before the court is plaintiff's Calculation of Prejudgment Interest (Doc. 81). As to plaintiff's calculations, defendant has offered no objections. For the following reasons, defendant's motion to reconsider shall be denied, and the court shall accept and adopt plaintiff's proffered prejudgment interest figure.
I. BACKGROUND
The procedural and factual history of this case, as previously discussed by the court, is as follows:
On February 2, 2002, this case proceeded to trial on plaintiff's claims of intentional gender and race discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and on plaintiff's claim of denied due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the close of plaintiff's case on February 6, 2002, defendant moved for judgment as matter of law on all of plaintiff's claims. The court granted defendant's motion in regards to plaintiff's § 1983 claim. In its Memorandum and Order (Doc. 72) dated February 26, 2002, the court memorialized its rulings in regards to defendant's motion. Franco v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 437, No. 99-4167, 2002 WL 398731 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 2002). At the close of all the evidence, defendant once again moved for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's claims, which the court denied.
On February 8, 2002, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on her Title VII gender based discriminatory discharge claim, but the jury rejected plaintiff's claims of discriminatory discipline and race based discriminatory discharge. Although the jury found defendant had intentionally discriminated against plaintiff on account of her gender, the jury found plaintiff had suffered zero damages.
Plaintiff, a female Mexican-American, was employed as a custodian at defendant's Washburn Rural Middle School ("Washburn"). In 1997, defendant terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged in her Title VII claims that her discipline and termination were the product of intentional racial and/or gender discrimination. Defendant proffers it disciplined and terminated plaintiff due to her insubordination. Washburn's principal, Dr. Linhos, testified she was forced to terminate plaintiff because she refused to follow the school's policy regarding the monitoring of children during lunch periods. In particular, plaintiff was allegedly allowing students to move to new seats once already seated. Dr. Linhos met with plaintiff to discuss her infraction. During this meeting, Dr. Linhos testified plaintiff directly stated she would not follow the policy, forcing Dr. Linhos to terminate plaintiff for insubordination.
Central to plaintiff's case was the introduction of evidence concerning a male custodian, Brian Wohler, also employed at Washburn Rural Middle School. According to the evidence presented at trial, Mr. Wohler was caught recording time on his timecard for hours he was not actually present at work. The "time theft" was discovered by administrative central staff not located within Washburn's local administration. A meeting was called by Dr. Dennis Johnson, defendant's Director of Support services, to discuss Mr. Wohler's violation. The meeting was also attended by Washburn's principal, Dr. Linhos. During the course of the meeting, it was discovered that Mr. Wohler was dealing with financial and emotional difficulties, and Mr. Wohler expressed remorse for his actions. In the end, the testimony made clear that it was Dr. Linhos's recommendation that Mr. Wohler not be terminated. In fact, Dr. Johnson testified he was of the opinion Mr. Wohler should have been terminated, but he was persuaded by Dr. Linhos's opinion.
Plaintiff alleged that her treatment by Dr. Linhos, when compared to the treatment Mr. Wohler received at the hands of Dr. Linhos, raised a inference of intentional discrimination and demonstrated defendant's proffered justification was pretextual. The jury was instructed that defendant's disparate treatment of similarly-situated, non-protected employees could raise such an inference. See English v. Colorado Dep't of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) ("dissimilar treatment between similarly-situated protected and non-protected employees may give rise to an inference of discrimination") (citing Hardy v. S. F. Phosphates Ltd., 185 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 1999)); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000) ("a plaintiff may also show pretext on a theory of disparate treatment by providing evidence that he was treated differently from other similarly-situated, non-protected employees").Franco v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 437, No. 99-4167, 2002 WL 538807, at *1-*2 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2002).
II. DISCUSSION
1. Relevant Orders
A. Motion to Reconsider
As noted above, defendant moves for reconsideration of two separate court orders. In its first Memorandum and Order (Doc. 78), the court denied defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Franco v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 437 ("Franco I"), No. 99-4167, 2002 WL 538807 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2002) (denying defendant's motion brought pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). In its Rule 50(b) motion, defendant argued plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence supporting her intentional discrimination charge. The court rejected defendant's position by finding that "more than a mere scintilla of evidence supported plaintiff's claim." Id. at *3.
In the second Memorandum and Order (Doc. 79), the court, exercising its equitable power, found plaintiff was entitled to two and a half months of back pay on her Title VII claim. Franco v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 437 ("Franco II"), No. 99-4167, 2002 WL 538817 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2002). Although the jury in this case returned a verdict with no damages, the court had instructed the parties that as to equitable remedies, the jury's findings were merely advisory. Therefore, after its own review, the court found plaintiff was entitled to a limited measure of back pay. Id. at *3.
In the present motion, defendant seeks reconsideration of both orders.
2. Standard of Review
As noted above, defendant has titled its filing as a "motion to reconsider." Although a common motion before the court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly recognize such a motion. This lack of specific authorization and direction have led, as in this case, to general confusion regarding such motions' legal foundation. Generally, federal courts interpret requests for reconsideration as being brought pursuant to either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 546 (10th Cir. 1995). The determinative factor in which rule to apply is whether the movant has complied with the ten-day limitation period embodied in Rule 59(e). See Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting motions to reconsider filed within ten days of entry of judgment should be considered under Rule 59(e)); Hannon v. Maschner, 981 F.2d 1142, 1144 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); Security Nat'l Bank v. John Deere Co., 927 F.2d 519, 519 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1991) (same).
The rule states: "Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
In the present case, defendant submits the court's authority to reconsider its orders flows from Rule 59(e), The court disagrees, for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is limited to review of final judgments. See Wagoner v. Wagoner, 938 F.2d 1120, 1122 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Deere Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 1988). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a) (defining "judgment" as "a decree and any order from which an appeal lies"). Unfortunately, neither of the court's orders presently at issue could be construed as final judgments. See generally Coopers Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (opining a final order ends litigation on merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment). In fact, as the court noted in Franco II, final judgment in this case has specifically not been entered while the issue of equitable remedies is awaiting disposition. Franco II, 2002 WL 538817 at *4 ("The court will enter final judgment upon consideration of the additional [prejudgment interest] submissions."). See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976) (where issue of liability has been determined, but assessment of damages or award or other relief remains to be resolved, order determining liability is not final order). Therefore, as interlocutory orders, reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is precluded.
Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) include: (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) new evidence previously unavailable; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Brumark Corp. v. Samson Res. Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir. 1995).
On the other hand, it is well within the court's discretion to revise interlocutory orders prior to the entry of final judgment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). See also Anderson, 852 F.2d at 1246 (acknowledging district court's discretionary power to revise interlocutory orders).
Within the present context, the distinction between reconsideration under Rule 59(e) and the court's general power to revise interlocutory orders is somewhat academic, for courts routinely turn to the standards established under Rule 59(e) for instruction in constructing a review standard when considering a possible revision of an interlocutory order. See, e.g., Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kansas, 732 F. Supp. 1116, 1117 (D. Kan. 1990). Therefore, in general, "[a] motion to reconsider should be denied unless it clearly demonstrates manifest error of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence." National Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Jim Williamson Prods., Inc., 115 F. Supp.2d 1250, 1256 (D. Colo. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). See also Dees v. Wilson, 796 F. Supp. 474, 475 (D. Kan. 1992) ("A motion to reconsider is appropriate if the court has obviously misapprehended a party's position, the facts, or mistakenly has decided issues not presented for determination."). In addition, "arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration are not properly before the court and generally need not be addressed." United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1197 (10th Cir. 1997). See also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Greif, 906 F. Supp. 1446, 1456-57 (D. Kan. 1995) (noting a motion to reconsider is not a mechanism to raise arguments that should have been raised in the first instance or to rehash arguments previously considered and rejected by the court).
As a final issue, plaintiff's argument that defendant's motion is untimely because it was not filed within Rule 59(e)'s ten-day time period is clearly misplaced, for, as the above discussion reveals, the motion to reconsider is not controlled by the dictates of Rule 59(e). See Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Because a final judgment had not yet been entered in this action to commence Rule 59's ten-day limitations period, the district court's consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the district court's sua sponte granting a new trial did not violate Rule 59.").
The parties' shared confusion regarding the present motion and its timeliness was exacerbated by defendant's decision to file its Rule 50(b) motion before the entry of judgment. The Rule provides: "The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing its motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment . . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). While the completed verdict form was filed as part of the court record on February 8, 2002, the court specifically instructed the parties at the close of the trial that final judgment would not be entered until the court had issued a ruling on the pending equitable remedies issue. Although Rule 50(b)'s "no later than" language certainly allows for a filing prior to the entry of judgment, defendant's strategy apparently encouraged both parties' erroneous belief that the court entered a final judgment in this case on February 8, 2002.
3. Analysis
After review, the court finds defendant's arguments advocating reconsideration of both Franco I and Franco II are merely restatements of arguments previously considered and rejected by the court. While defendant certainly disagrees with the court's conclusions, defendant's papers on the matter fail to convince the court that reconsideration of either decision is warranted. Pursuant to the review standard elucidated above, the court declines to revisit issues fully adjudicated by the court in the absence of any showing of manifest error or mistake. For these reasons, defendant's motion shall be denied.
B. Prejudgment Interest
As discussed above, the court previously ruled plaintiff was entitled to two months of back pay. Franco II, 2002 WL 538817 at *3, Additionally, the court found it proper to grant plaintiff prejudgment interest on the back pay award. Id. at *4, After identifying a reasonable rate of interest, the court instructed plaintiff to file prejudgment interest calculations with the court. Id. The court undertook this procedure to insure that this case's final judgment will contain an undisputed sum certain. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Plaintiff has timely filed her computations and corresponding figure, and defendant has levied no objection to the calculations. For this reason, the court accepts and adopts the prejudgment interest figure proffered by plaintiff.
III. CONCLUSION
After setting forth the appropriate standard of review, the court finds defendant's motion to reconsider presents no compelling arguments justifying reconsideration. The motion shall be denied. In addition, the court accepts plaintiff's prejudgment interest calculations, and the court is prepared to enter final judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 80) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER BY THIS COURT ORDERED that judgment in favor of plaintiff on her Title VII gender discrimination claim be entered in this case as follows:
Back pay: $3,458.92
Prejudgment Interest: $1,752.98
TOTAL $5,211.90