Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-F-1084-S
May 30, 2003
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has determined that pro se plaintiff Gerald J. Fondren ("Fondren") is liable for unpaid federal income taxes, interest, and penalties in excess of $33,000 for the years 1997 to 2001. On April 6, 2003, the IRS moved to collect the amounts due by issuing to Fondren's employer, Dyncorp, a "Notice of Levy on Wages, Salary, and Other Income." The Notice directs Dyncorp to remit to the IRS both Fondren's future earnings until the release of the levy and his other employment income, to the extent those sums are non-exempt. See Ex. A. to Pl.'s Mot. Proceeding pursuant to Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fondren moves to enjoin preliminary the IRS and Don R. Whitlock, a revenue agent, from seizing his wages and salary, on the ground that the IRS did not comply with constitutional due process in proceeding with the levy. He contends the proposed deductions will work an irreparable injury upon him insofar as they will leave him without adequate means to pay rent, to eat, and to have transportation. See Pl.'s Br. at 2. Upon thorough consideration of the motion and the relevant law, the Court concludes that the motion is due to be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the court's sua sponte consideration of subject matter jurisdiction dictates denial of Fondren's motion, the Magistrate Judge declined — in the interest of judicial economy — to solicit the government's response in opposition.
I. DISCUSSION
Because the federal court is a court of limited of jurisdiction, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), it is authorized to entertain only certain actions which the Constitution or Congress has authorized it to hear. Id. Accordingly, this court must determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction "at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings." Univ. of South Ala. v. American Tobacco, 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). "Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking." Id. "It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, . . ., and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction,. . . ." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. "[O]nce a court determines that there has been no grant that covers a particular case, the court's sole remaining act is to dismiss [it] for lack of jurisdiction." Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000).Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction against the IRS is jurisdictionally barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (a), which provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
"The manifest purpose of § 7421(a) is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund." Enochs v. Williams Packing Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962). Thus, the Anti-Injunction Act "withdraw[s] jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal taxes," Id. at 6, unless a litigant demonstrates one of several statutory exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act or the requisites of the judicially-created exception set forth in Enocks. "The general rule is that, except in very rare and compelling circumstances, federal courts will not entertain actions to enjoin the collection of taxes." Mathes v. United States, 901 F.2d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir. 1990). The burden is on the plaintiff to show that his case falls within an exception. Hatley v. Department of Treasury, I.R.S. 876 F. Supp. 1262, 1269 (S.D.Ala. 1995), citing Bowers v. United States, 423 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1970).
These exceptions pertain to: (1) a petition for review by the Tax Court for relief from joint and several liability on joint returns [ 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (e)]; (2) the assessment and collection of deficiencies prior to the issuance of a notice of deficiency [§§ 6212(a) and (c) and 6213]; (3) a premature action for assessing a deficiency attributed to a partnership [§§ 6225(b), 6246(b)]; (4) suspension of a levy action if a hearing is requested under Section 6330(a)(3)(B) [§ 6330(e)(1)]; (5) suspension of a levy action during the pendency of proceedings for a refund of divisible tax [§ 6331(i)]; (6) the collection of "responsible person" penalties where a bond has been filed [§ 6672(c)]; (7) the collection of a tax return preparer penalty [§ 6694(c)]; (8) the enforcement of a levy on property where such enforcement would injure the interest of a lienholder other than the person against whom the tax has been assessed [§§ 7426(a) and (b)(1)]; (9) the review of the reasonableness of a jeopardy assessment [§ 7429(b)]; and (10) proceedings for determination of employment status [§ 7436].
Fondren's pro se submission discloses no attempt to satisfy any statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Neither do his claims meet the requisites of the judicial exception. Under the judicial exception, federal courts may enjoin the collection of taxes only if the plaintiff establishes first, that under no circumstances could the government ultimately prevail on its tax claim and second, that equity jurisdiction otherwise exists, i.e., irreparable harm to the plaintiff and no adequate legal remedy. Enocks, 370 U.S. at 7. "Unless both conditions are met, a suit for preventive injunctive relief must be dismissed." U.S. v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7, 10 (1974).
While it is evident that the IRS and Fondren hold differing views about the validity of the tax penalties assessed against him, Fondren has not shown that "under the most liberal view of the law and facts, the United States cannot establish its claim," Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), or that the Government's "claim of liability . . . [is] . . . without foundation." Enochs, 370 U.S. at. 8. Indeed, in ruling adversely on Fondren's substantive claims against the IRS, the Magistrate Judge found his contentions wholly frivolous and concluded that his arguments to evade paying a frivolous return penalty "ha[d] been roundly, routinely, and summarily rejected for good cause which need not be analyzed on [his] insubstantial submissions." See Recommendation, filed May 8, 2003 at 15.
II. CONCLUSION
Absent any showing by Fondren that the requested injunction falls within any exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, this court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge Recommends that Fondren's Motion to Grant Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 14) be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
ORDER
The clerk of the court is ORDERED to file the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and to serve by mail a copy thereof on the parties to this action. The parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said Recommendation within a period of 13 days from the date of mailing to them. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District Court.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from de novo determination by the district court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the district court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (11th Cir. Unit B. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.