Opinion
2001-03447
Argued November 13, 2001.
December 10, 2001.
In an action against a surety for an alleged breach of a construction contract by its principal, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O'Connell, J.), dated March 19, 2001, which granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 317 and 5015(a) to vacate its default in appearing.
HOLLANDER, STRAUSS MASTROPIETRO, LLP, Great Neck, N.Y. (JOHN P. MASTROPIETRO of counsel), for appellant.
MCELROY, DEUTSCH MULVANEY, LLP, Morristown, N.J. (ROBERT MOSKOW and JOHN MORRIS of counsel), for respondent.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, SONDRA MILLER, JJ.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Since the defendant failed to prove that it did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to appear and defend the action, the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant's motion to vacate its default pursuant to CPLR 317 (see, Nicolosi v. Sleuth Sec. Sys., 247 A.D.2d 521). Nevertheless, the record amply supports the granting of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015.
To obtain relief from a default, a defendant must show both a reasonable excuse for its default, and the merits of its defense (see, Westchester County Med. Ctr. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 A.D.2d 488; Greene v. New York City Hous. Auth., 283 A.D.2d 458; Matter of AIU Ins. Co. v. Fernandez, 281 A.D.2d 542; Poincy v. White Bus Co., 278 A.D.2d 467). Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the defendant made the requisite showings.
The defendant proffered an excuse, in effect, of in-house law office failure, that was reasonable under the facts of this case (see, Lowe v. Steinman, 284 A.D.2d 506; Poincy v. White Bus Co., supra; Parker v. City of New York, 272 A.D.2d 310). Furthermore, the defendant promptly moved to cure its brief default, thereby undercutting any claim of willfulness or prejudice to the plaintiff (see, Poincy v. White Bus Co., supra; Morgese v. Laro Maintenance Corp., 251 A.D.2d 307; Albano v. Nus Holding Corp., 233 A.D.2d 280). Indeed, at most the defendant was approximately 33 days late in filing a notice of appearance on December 22, 2000, and it moved for relief within approximately one month after learning that the plaintiff had obtained judgment on default on December 19, 2000 (see, Zolna v. Lupino, 251 A.D.2d 658; Coven v. Trust Co. of N.J., 225 A.D.2d 576). Additionally, the defendant established prima facie the existence of meritorious defenses to the plaintiff's claims (see, St. Charles Hosp. and Rehabilitation Ctr. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 282 A.D.2d 593). Accordingly, given these short time-lapses, the absence of any prejudice to the plaintiff, and the policy that favors determination of controversies on the merits, the defendant's motion to vacate its default was properly granted (see, St. Charles Hosp. and Rehabilitation Ctr. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., supra; Morgese v. Laro Maintenance Corp., supra; Classie v. Stratton Oakmont, 236 A.D.2d 505; Albano v. Nus Holding Corp., supra; Dowson v. Forest Park Assn. of Greenwood Lake, N.Y., 228 A.D.2d 471).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.
RITTER, J.P., KRAUSMAN, GOLDSTEIN and S. MILLER, JJ., concur.