Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-000886-MR NO. 2016-CA-001216-ME
06-16-2017
KAREN MARTIN DOYLE, N/K/A KAREN MARTIN BRADLEY APPELLANT v. JAMES SAMUEL DOYLE A/K/A SAM DOYLE APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Darrell Hall Whitesburg, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Kevin West Columbus, Ohio
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM KNOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DWIGHT S. MARSHALL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-00232 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: JONES, D. LAMBERT, THOMPSON, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: Karen Martin Doyle n/k/a Karen Martin Bradley has filed two separate appeals from orders of the Knott Circuit Court. In her first appeal, Karen alleges that the trial court erred in denying her interest on a judgment she was awarded on March 13, 1998, which Appellee James Samuel Doyle a/k/a Sam Doyle has not yet paid. In her second appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in finding that her motion for child support was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Based on the reasoning below, we affirm both orders of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
The early facts of this case were summarized by a panel of this Court on a prior appeal, Doyle v. Doyle, No. 2012-CA-001989-MR, No. 2013-CA-000554-MR, 2014 WL 6687602 (Ky. App. Nov. 26, 2014), and we adopt them herein as follows:
Karen and James Samuel Doyle, a/k/a Sam Doyle, divorced and the questions of child custody, support, and division of property were reserved in the decree. On March 13, 1998, a judgment pertaining to custody, child support, and division of property was entered. Karen was awarded custody of the parties' three
minor children and child support of $1,410.66 per month. On August 5, 1997, when the oldest of three children reached eighteen, Sam's child support was modified to $1,055 per month.
In the summer of 2000, Sam filed a motion to modify custody requesting he be awarded custody of the parties' youngest child. At the same time, he filed a motion to modify child support. The court issued an order in September 2000, finding Sam had satisfied his child support obligation during the pendency of the dissolution of marriage action. After Karen did not comply with requests to submit her financial records and medical and dental records concerning the children, a contempt order was entered on October 16, 2000. Karen appealed and this Court affirmed.
An order granting Sam's motion for modification of custody of the youngest child was entered on November 8, 2000. Custody was to be transferred following the child's Christmas school break in December. The parties' second youngest child remained with Karen. A decision on child support was reserved.
After the parties' youngest child was transferred to Sam, the family court scheduled a hearing concerning child support. Karen continued to refuse to produce sufficient financial information to calculate child support. On May 16, 2001, an order was entered terminating Sam's child support obligation "pending further orders of the Court[.]"
Sam renewed his motion for child support on November 29, 2004. At that time, the child in Karen's custody had been emancipated. No action was taken on that motion and after December 2000, Karen did not pay child support to Sam and Sam did not pay child support to Karen.
The issue of child support did not surface again until 2010 when Sam filed a motion to release a judgment lien Karen filed against property owned by Sam for an amount awarded to her in the dissolution action as marital property. In addition to requesting the lien be released, Sam filed a motion for an
arrearage judgment for unpaid child support for the parties' youngest child. In response, on July 29, 2010, Karen filed a motion for arrearage judgment for unpaid child support for the parties' then emancipated second youngest child.Id. at *1-2.
After several hearings on child support were held, on August 20, 2012, the family court issued an order stating it had authority to retroactively set child support owed by Karen to Sam from December 2000, when custody of the youngest child was transferred, until the child turned eighteen in September 2006. The family court noted Sam filed several prior motions to require Karen to pay child support. However, the family court further stated it did not have authority to grant Karen's motion for an arrearage judgment for unpaid child support because the motion was filed more than seven years after the child in her custody reached eighteen. Subsequently, the family court issued an order clarifying the basis for its denial of child support to Karen was that KRS 403.213 prohibits a retroactive modification of a child support obligation if no written motion is filed. Karen did not file any motions after May 16, 2001, concerning child support until after the emancipation of the child in her custody.
The parties have four children. The oldest had reached eighteen when the judgment was entered and, therefore, custody of that child was not at issue.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Karen filed two separate appeals with this Court, which were consolidated (the "2014 Appeal"). In her first appeal, she argued that the trial court erred when it ruled that it did not have authority to award her a child support arrearage judgment. For her second appeal, Karen contended that the trial court erroneously denied her prejudgment interest on the $24,277.02 awarded to her as marital property (the "1998 Judgment"). Id. at *1. This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that it lacked authority to award Karen a child support arrearage judgment. The Court noted the fact that the trial court had terminated Karen's child support "pending further order of the court" because Karen had repeatedly refused to provide the records necessary to award either party child support. Further, the Court found that Karen had not made any motions to modify that order until July 29, 2010. Because "statutory and case law preclude retroactive awards of child support for any amount owed prior to the filing of a written motion for modification" the Court agreed that Karen could not be awarded any arrearages allegedly owed to her by Sam. Id. at *2 (citing KRS 403.213(1); Price v. Price, 912 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Ky. 1995)).
The Court reversed and remanded on the issue of the trial court's order prohibiting Karen from collecting interest on the 1998 Judgment. The Court noted that interest on a judgment is not necessarily precluded on a judgment that is silent regarding interest. Additionally, the Court opined that while the language of KRS 360.040 is mandatory, a trial court is only required to impose 12% interest once it determines that interest is appropriate. Id. at *2-3. While acknowledging that, in dissolution actions, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether interest is appropriate, the Court found that the trial court had acted based on erroneous interpretations of the law. Therefore, the Court remanded to the trial court and directed the trial court to make specific findings of fact to support its decision if it should find that awarding interest was inappropriate. Id. at *3. Karen did not file a motion for discretionary review with the Kentucky Supreme Court.
On remand, Sam filed a renewed motion to prohibit the collection of interest on the 1998 Judgment and a renewed motion for partial release of Karen's judgment lien. Karen filed a motion for the court to enter an order awarding her interest on the 1998 Judgment. On April 13, 2015, the trial court entered two orders: one denying Sam's motion for partial release of the judgment lien, as the trial court found there was no legal or equitable basis for doing so; and one granting Sam's motion to prohibit the collection of interest on the 1998 Judgment. In support of its order prohibiting the collection of interest, the trial court found that Sam had made several attempts to agree upon a settlement amount to no avail and that Karen had made no attempt to collect on the 1998 Judgement until 2010. Therefore, the trial court concluded that it would be inequitable to allow Karen to collect interest on the judgment.
Karen filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's order prohibiting the collection of interest. In that motion, Karen asserted that the trial court's order was contrary to law and flew in the face of KRS 360.040. Karen contended that her delayed attempts to collect on the 1998 Judgment were due, in part, to the various appeals that had taken place during the pendency of the action. Karen additionally requested the trial court make specific findings of fact as to Sam's attempts to settle, to make findings as to any attempts Sam had made to pay the 1998 Judgment, and to cite any case law or statutes the court relied on in denying Karen her judgment interest.
The trial court ordered the parties attend mediation, which proved to be unsuccessful. Thereafter, Karen moved the court to enter an order for Sam to pay her child support for the period of December 2000 through September 2004 - the time during which the parties' second-youngest child was a minor and living with Karen. In response to Karen's motion for child support, Sam argued that the issue had already been decided by the trial court and affirmed by this Court, and, accordingly, the issue was barred by res judicata. Additionally, Sam filed an amended motion for partial release of the judgment lien Karen held on his properties. An evidentiary hearing was held on all pending motions on February 29, 2016.
The trial court ruled on all pending motions on May 20, 2016. Sam's motion for partial release of judgment lien was overruled. The trial court denied Karen's motion for child support on the grounds that it was barred by res judicata; Sam's motion for child support was granted. Additionally, the trial court denied Karen's motion to alter, amend, or vacate its order prohibiting the collection of interest on the 1998 Judgment. The trial court issued additional findings of fact supporting its order prohibiting interest. Specifically, the trial court found as follows:
Sam last filed a motion for child support on May 25, 2010. That motion was granted by the same August 20, 2012, order that denied Karen's motion for child support - the order that she appealed to this Court in the 2014 Appeal. Both parties reference Sam's motion for child support in the written record and at the evidentiary hearing on the motion on February 29, 2016; however, the record does not contain a motion for child support filed by Sam later than May 25, 2010. --------
. . .
7. It is undisputed by the parties that [Sam] has made no payments on the [1998 Judgment].
8. The Court finds that the [1998 Judgment] was an amount the Court found after balancing out the marital property interest of the parties.
9. The Court finds that if [Karen's] request for interest was awarded, it would amount to [Karen] being awarded more than twice the original amount of the judgment.
10. The Court finds from the testimony of [Sam] that he believed that he was not obligated to pay the judgment amount until all remaining issues regarding the parties' financial obligations to one another were resolved, as the issue of the amount of child support owed to him by [Karen] remained unresolved.
11. It is disputed by [Karen] that [Sam] made several overtures to agree upon an amount to settle all pending issues between the parties, to no avail.
12. The Court finds from the testimony of the parties that there was no significant attempt to collect upon the debt which [Karen] claimed [Sam] owed her until 2008. In 1999 and 2000, shortly after entry of the 1998 Judgment, she did have some garnishments issued, but she made no efforts to collect with regard to any of the garnishments issued. Similarly, she claims that she sought court intervention to obtain the release of escrowed funds held by her counsel, but the record reflects that: (1) [Sam's] only objection to the release of the funds . . . was that [Karen] filed her motion with the Kentucky Court of Appeals, rather than the Knott Circuit Court in 2001 and that the Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed and denied her motion; (2) [Karen] waited until 2008 to file the motion with this Court.
13. The Court finds that [Karen] perfected judgment liens against real property held by [Sam] which has protected her interest in the judgment amount and [Karen] has not attempted to enforce her interest in those judgment liens.
Karen moved to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's orders denying her child support and granting Sam child support. Karen alleged that the trial court erred in finding that this Court's opinion from the 2014 Appeal worked to bar her claim for child support, as she was not asking for child support arrearage, but requesting that child support be reinstated. She further contended that: the court abused its discretion in allowing Sam to escape paying child support and requiring her to pay child support when Sam had over a million dollars in assets; the trial court had failed to protect the rights of the parties' second-youngest child; and that the trial court had abused its discretion by averaging the parties' respective incomes when it calculated the amount of child support she owed to Sam.
On June 16, 2016, Karen filed a notice of appeal as to the trial court's order prohibiting collection of interest on the 1998 Judgment and the trial court's order denying her motion to alter, amend, or vacate that order. On July 25, 2016, the trial court denied both of Karen's motions to alter, amend, or vacate the child support orders. On August 17, 2016, Karen filed a notice of appeal from both child support orders and the order denying her motions to alter, amend, or vacate.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Karen argues that: the trial court committed reversible error by ignoring KRS 360.040; the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous and do not support its decision to deny her interest on the 1998 Judgment; the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that it would be inequitable to allow her to collect interest on the 1998 Judgment; the trial court misinterpreted this Court's opinion from the 2014 Appeal, committing reversible error; the trial court committed reversible error in finding that her motion for child support was precluded by res judicata; the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Sam, who has assets in excess of one million dollars, to escape paying Karen child support while requiring Karen to pay Sam child support; and the trial court committed reversible error by failing to enforce the statutory duty of a parent to support under KRS 405.020 and by failing to adhere to the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution. We address each argument in turn.
A. Collection of Interest on the 1998 Judgment
Karen first contends that, by finding that she was not entitled to collect interest on the 1998 Judgment, the trial court ignored the mandate of KRS 360.040, which states that "[a] judgment shall bear twelve percent (12%) interest compounded annually from its date." Karen argues that trial courts lack authority under KRS 360.040 to impose less than 12% interest in dissolution proceedings. See Ridge v. Ridge, 572 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1978). A panel of this Court already addressed this argument in the 2014 Appeal and found that,
Despite the mandatory language of KRS 360.040, the statute simply requires that a trial court must impose 12% interest once it determines interest is appropriate. In the context of a dissolution action, it has been held it is within the trial court's discretion to determine interest is not appropriate given the equities of the particular case.Doyle, 2014 WL 6687602, at *3 (citing Courtenay v. Willhoit, 655 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Ky. App. 1983)) (emphasis added). "Where multiple appeals occur in the course of litigation, the law-of-the-case doctrine provides that issues decided in earlier appeals should not be revisited in subsequent ones when the evidence is substantially the same." Wright v. Carroll, 452 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Ky. 2014) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 610 (Ky. 2010)). Therefore, we decline to address Karen's argument that the trial court ignored the mandate of KRS 360.040.
Karen next argues that the trial court's findings of fact in support of its decision to deny her interest on the 1998 Judgment are clearly erroneous. Specifically, Karen contends that the trial court's finding that she made "no significant attempt" to collect the debt owed to her by Sam until 2008 is completely false. She additionally takes issue with the trial court's finding that she "made no effort to collect with regard to any of the garnishments issued." A trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous when they are unsupported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003). "'Substantial evidence' is '[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion' and evidence that, when 'taken alone or in the light of all the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.'" Id. (internal citations omitted).
We disagree with Karen's contention that the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. The trial court did not say that Karen made no attempts to collect on the 1998 Judgment before 2008; it found that Karen had failed to make any significant attempt. The evidence Karen tendered to the trial court demonstrated that she did, in fact, have garnishments issued to numerous banks in an attempt to collect on the 1998 Judgment in 1999 and 2000. However, as noted at the evidentiary hearing and by the trial court in its findings of fact, when those garnishment orders were returned indicating no monies available, Karen did not take any further action to collect on the 1998 Judgment until almost a decade later. What is considered a "significant" attempt is subjective; the trial court was of the opinion that Karen's attempts to collect on the 1998 judgment were not significant. Evidence of record can reasonably support this finding. "Regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the fact that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary finding, 'due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses[.]'" Id. (internal citation omitted).
Additionally, Karen argues that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that it would be inequitable to allow her to collect interest on the 1998 Judgment. In making its determination, the trial court stated:
Based upon [Karen's] delay in attempting to collect upon the 1998 judgment, [Sam's] settlement overtures, [Sam's] good faith belief that he was not required to pay the judgment amount until all pending issues (i.e. the child support obligation of [Karen]) were resolved, and that the awarding of interest on the judgment amount would be an amount more than twice the judgment amount, and that [Karen] had enforceable judgment liens against property held by [Sam], it would be inequitable to allow [Karen] to collect interest on the judgment.We will only find an abuse of discretion when the trial court's decision is "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principals." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Neither the trial court's order nor the record show that the trial court made its decision arbitrarily; in fact, the trial court gave a list of reasons to support its decision. Karen may disagree with the trial court's reasoning and may believe that it would be more equitable to allow her to collect interest. However, disagreement with the court's decision does equate abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we find no error.
B. Arguments concerning child support owed to Karen
Karen contends that the trial court erred in interpreting this Court's opinion on the 2014 Appeal as barring her January 2016 motion for child support. She argues that she is not seeking a modification of her child support or an arrearage judgment for unpaid child support - issues that were undisputedly determined in the 2014 Appeal. Rather, she states that the January 2016 motion was seeking to have her child support reinstated; thus, KRS 403.213(1) and the 2014 Appeal are irrelevant to her claim and she is not barred by res judicata from bringing it.
Whether res judicata applies to preclude a claim is a question of law, therefore we review it de novo. Ragland v. DiGiuro, 352 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Ky. App. 2010). "The doctrine of res judicata is formed by two subparts: 1) claim preclusion and 2) issue preclusion." Yeoman v. Commonwealth Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 464-65 (Ky. 1998). "Claim preclusion bars a party from re-litigating a previously adjudicated cause of action and entirely bars a new lawsuit on the same cause of action." Id. at 465 (internal citations omitted). "Issue preclusion bars the parties from relitigating any issue actually litigated and finally decided in an earlier action. . . . The key inquiry in deciding whether the lawsuits concern the same controversy is whether they both arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts." Id.
While we are aware that Karen styled her July 2010 and January 2016 motions differently, the motions concerned identical issues - Sam's child support obligation to Karen for the period of December 2000 through September 2004. We agree with the trial court that res judicata, specifically issue preclusion, prevents Karen from relitigating the issue of child support now because the "essential fact" that Karen seeks to prove is that Sam owes her child support for the December 2000 - September 2004 period. A panel of this Court has already affirmed the trial court's determination that Karen cannot collect child support from Sam for that period. Karen cannot now challenge the law of the case. See Napier v. Jones, 925 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. App. 1996). Because we find that the trial court's application of res judicata is appropriate, we decline to address Karen's remaining arguments on the child support issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order of the trial court prohibiting Karen from collecting interest on the 1998 Judgment and the order of the trial court finding that Karen's child support claims are barred by res judicata.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
LAMBERT, D., JUDGE, DISSENTS. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Darrell Hall
Whitesburg, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Kevin West
Columbus, Ohio