Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 3:19-CV-01216
10-08-2019
VERTIS DILLON, III, Plaintiff, v. JOHN MUNLEY, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Caputo) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
This action comes before this court for a screening review of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the complaint states false-arrest claims against two of the defendants (Detectives Munley and Conrad), but that the complaint otherwise fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Although we granted the plaintiff Vertis Dillon, III leave to file an amended complaint, he has informed the court that he will not be filing an amended complaint. Thus, we recommend that the court dismiss all Dillon's claims except the false-arrest claims against Detectives Munley and Conrad.
II. Background.
Dillion, a pre-trial detainee at the Lackawanna County Prison, commenced this action pro se on July 17, 2019, by filing a complaint, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The defendants named are John Munley and Corey Conrad, who are identified as detectives with the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office; the city of Scranton; and the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office. Dillon brings his claims against Detectives Munley and Conrad in both their individual and official capacities.
Dillon contends that Detectives Munley and Conrad arrested him without probable cause. He also alleges that Munley lied in an affidavit of probable cause. According to Dillon, Munley stated that on the evening of June 14, 2019, he observed Dillon drive past him without his headlights. In the affidavit of probable cause, Munley recounted that he pursued Dillon and activated his lights and siren to conduct a traffic stop, but Dillon accelerated and began throwing plastic baggies containing suspected crack cocaine from his vehicle. After Munley radioed for assistance, another officer retrieved the baggies that Dillon had purportedly thrown from his vehicle. According to Munley's affidavit of probable cause, after a further chase, Dillon abandoned his vehicle and fled on foot. Munley asserted that he searched Dillon's vehicle and found four plastic bags containing what was suspected to be crack cocaine as well as a cell phone, which was open and on which Munley could see text messages coming in for Dillon. Munley put out a BOLO for Dillon.
Dillon submitted two affidavits of probable cause as exhibits to his complaint, neither of which is an affidavit of probable cause for an arrest warrant. Rather, the affidavits of probable cause that Dillon submitted are an affidavit of probable cause attached to a "Police Criminal Complaint," and an affidavit of probable cause attached to a search warrant for a telephone. See doc. 1 at 10-12, 16-23.
Dillon contends that Munley provided false information in his affidavit of probable cause and that Munley had not identified Dillon as the driver of the vehicle in question at the time. According to Dillon, Munley stated in an incident report that there was no identification of the driver, and only 30 minutes later was he purportedly identified as the driver. Dillon also alleges that a newspaper article regarding the incident stated that there was no identification of the driver.
Dillon submitted the incident report as an exhibit to his complaint. See doc. 1 at 13-15. The incident report appears to be a printout of statements officers made to the Scranton Police Department's communications center during the incident. Id. It is not clear what, if any, statements were made by Munley. Id.
Dillon alleges that Munley also made knowingly false statements in connection with the affidavit of probable cause to search the phone that Munley found in the vehicle. According to Dillon, although Munley stated that he saw text messages coming in for Dillon, after the phone was searched, nothing was found, not even a text message.
Although Dillon claims that Detectives Munley and Conrad falsely arrested him, it is not clear from the complaint exactly when or how Dillon was arrested. He cryptically states that "Munley, is currently trying to obtain identification of Plaintiff to have probable cause for his arrest of Plaintiff," and that "Munley should have obtained this information prior to arresting" him. Doc. 1 at 4. At some point, a buccal swab of Dillon was taken at the Lackawanna County Courthouse. During that process, Dillon alleges, after he told Munley that he would sue him for arresting him for a crime he did not commit, Munley and Conrad responded that they did not care because the money would come from the county, and Conrad said he had only seven dollars in his account.
Dillon alleges that Munley and Conrad radioed that the driver of the vehicle was a black male even though they had "no proof of knowing who the driver was," which, according to Dillon, was racial profiling by Munley. Dillon maintains that he did not commit any crime, that the defendants arrested him without probable cause, and that they provided false information in an affidavit of probable cause with "ill intent." Id. at 5-6.
According to Dillon, the City of Scranton has a custom of allowing its police officers to violate the Fourth Amendment rights of its citizens. Dillon alleges that the City of Scranton is aware that the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office knows that law enforcement officers have committed "unlawful arrest, but have done nothing to correct it." Id. at 5. He contends that officers previously arrested citizens with false information, were caught doing so, but were not prosecuted or disciplined. Dillon claims that the City of Scranton's inaction has caused other law enforcement officials in Scranton to make a mockery of the Fourth Amendment.
Dillon sets forth four counts in his complaint: a count for false arrest/false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a count for false arrest/false imprisonment under state law, a count for malicious prosecution under state law, and a Monell claim against the City of Scranton.
Although he presents four counts, instead of labeling them Counts I through IV, he labels them Counts II through V (with no Count I). See doc. 1 at 5-6.
"False arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). '"False arrest is a term that describes the setting for false imprisonment when it is committed by an officer or by one who claims the power to make an arrest."' Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 2d 479, 489 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 67 (2001)). "Because false arrest is a type of false imprisonment, the claims may be treated together." Ingram v. Lupas, No. 3:07-CV-02259, 2009 WL 249788, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2009).
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
We granted Dillon's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and we later screened the complaint. Although we granted Dillon leave to file an amended complaint, he has informed the court that he will not be filing an amended complaint. See doc. 10. III. Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints—Standard of Review.
This court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of complaints brought by prisoners given leave to proceed in forma pauperis in cases that seek redress against government officials. Specifically, the court must review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Screening. The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal. On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Under Section 1915A, the court must assess whether a complaint "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). "A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts." Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). But a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and "'however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV. Discussion.
Dillon brings both federal and state-law claims. We begin with his federal claims.
A. Federal Claims.
Dillon's federal claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). "It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely 'provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To state a claim under §1983, the plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
1. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against defendants Munley and Conrad in their official capacities, against the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office, and against the City of Scranton.
Dillon asserts his claims against Detectives Munley and Conrad in their official capacities as well as their individual capacities. Official-capacity suits are "only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55. In an official-capacity suit, the entity of which the officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Here, since Munley and Conrad are detectives with the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office, Dillon's official-capacity claims against them are claims against Lackawanna County.
A municipality, such as Lackawanna County, cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (1978). Rather, "under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for 'their own illegal acts.'" Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original)). "[A] § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways." Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019). One way for a plaintiff to present a claim against a municipality is to allege "that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries." Id. Another way for a plaintiff to present a claim against a municipality is to allege that his or her injuries "were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that 'reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.'" Id. (quoting Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019)). "The latter avenue arose in the failure-to-train context, but applies to other failures and inadequacies by municipalities, including those related to supervision and discipline of its police officers." Id.
To plead a claim against a municipality under the policy-or-custom strand of municipal liability, "a plaintiff must allege that 'a [local] government's policy or custom . . . inflict[ed] the injury' in question." Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). '"Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.'" Id. (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). '"Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.'" Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)).
"To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was." McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). "Although a policy or custom is necessary to plead a municipal claim, it is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798. "A plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the 'proximate cause' of his injuries." Id.
Here, Dillon has not alleged that a policy or custom on the part of Lackawanna County was the proximate cause of his injuries. Thus, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Lackawanna County under the policy-or-custom strand of municipal liability.
Dillon also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Lackawanna County under the failure-or-inadequacy strand of municipal liability. A plaintiff asserting a municipal liability claim based on a failure or inadequacy of training, supervision, or discipline "need not allege an unconstitutional policy." Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798. Rather, he must allege that the municipality's failure to train, supervise, or discipline "its employees 'reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.'" Id. (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)). In this regard, the plaintiff must show "a failure or inadequacy amounting to deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality." Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106. "This consists of a showing as to whether (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights." Id.
Here, Dillon has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that deliberate indifference by Lackawanna County caused his injuries. Thus, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Lackawanna County under the failure-or-inadequacy strand of municipal liability.
Dillon also names the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office as a defendant. But that office is not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as it is not an entity separate from the county. Rather, it is part of Lackawanna County, and the proper defendant would be Lackawanna County, not the District Attorney's Office. See Briggs v. Moore, 251 F. App'x 77, 79 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that "the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office is not a separate entity that can be sued under § 1983"); Reitz v. Cty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that "the Bucks County District Attorney's Office is not an entity for purposes of § 1983 liability").
Dillon also names the City of Scranton as a defendant claiming that the City of Scranton has a custom of allowing its police officers to violate the Fourth Amendment. He also alleges that the City of Scranton was aware that the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office knew that law enforcement officers committed unlawful arrests but did nothing to correct that situation. He also alleges that law enforcement officers were caught arresting citizens using false information, but they were not prosecuted or disciplined. According to Dillon, the City of Scranton's inaction has caused other law enforcement officials in Scranton to make a mockery of the Fourth Amendment. Dillon has not, however, alleged how the City of Scranton's alleged custom or inaction contributed to his arrest. He does not allege that a City of Scranton police officer arrested him. Rather, he suggests that Detectives Munley and Conrad were responsible for his arrest, but he identifies those defendants as detectives with the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office, not City of Scranton police officers. Thus, the complaint fails to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted against the City of Scranton.
2. The complaint states a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim upon which relief can be granted against Detectives Munley and Conrad in their individual capacities.
The complaint states a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim upon which relief can be granted against Detectives Munley and Conrad in their individual capacities.
The Fourth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . .against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause." James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012).
Here, although Dillon does not allege specifically when he was arrested, construing his complaint liberally, he does allege that Detectives Munley and Conrad arrested him. See doc. 1 at 5 ("Defendants, arrested Plaintiff without any probable cause . . . ."). And in addition to alleging that the arrest was without probable cause, Dillon alleges that Munley falsely asserted that he identified Dillon as the driver of the vehicle, and he alleges that he did not commit any crime. Thus, Dillon has alleged that there was not probable cause for his arrest. Accordingly, the complaint states a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim upon which relief can be granted against Detectives Munley and Conrad.
B. State-Law Claims.
Dillon presents two state-law claims—one for false arrest and one for malicious prosecution.
"Malicious prosecution . . . differs from false arrest" Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 591 (M.D. Pa. 2008). "While a claim for false arrest 'covers damages only for the time of detention until the issuance of process or arraignment, and not more,' a claim for malicious prosecution 'permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added)).
A false-arrest claim under Pennsylvania law is '"co-extensive'" with a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim. Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 593 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Russoli v. Salisbury Twp., 126 F.Supp.2d 821, 869 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). Thus, because as set forth above, the complaint states a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim against Detectives Munley and Conrad upon which relief can be granted, it also states a false-arrest claim under Pennsylvania law upon which relief can be granted.
The complaint fails, however, to state a malicious-prosecution claim under Pennsylvania law upon which relief can be granted. Under Pennsylvania law, "a plaintiff alleging common law malicious prosecution must show (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; and (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice." Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, Dillon does not allege that the criminal proceeding ended in his favor. Thus, he fails to state a malicious-prosecution claim upon which relief can be granted under Pennsylvania law.
The docket sheet from Dillon's state criminal case shows that the charges against him are still pending. See Commonwealth v. Dillon, Docket No. CP-35-CR-0001628-2019 (Lackawanna Cty.). "We may take judicial notice of the contents of another Court's docket." Orabi v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Wilson v. McVey, 579 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (taking judicial notices of the state court docket). The docket sheet relating to Dillon's criminal case is available on the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal, https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). Because the criminal case against Dillon is still pending, he cannot satisfy the favorable-termination requirement for a malicious-prosecution claim.
V. Recommendations.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the court dismiss all the claims except the false-arrest claims against Detectives Munley and Conrad, and we recommend that the court remand the case to the undersigned for further proceedings as to the false-arrest claims against Detectives Munley and Conrad.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 8th day of October, 2019.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge