Opinion
HHDCV095034411S
09-29-2017
Department of Transportation v. White Oak Corporation
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Antonio C. Robaina, J.
The present action arises from a dispute between the plaintiff, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the defendant, White Oak Corporation (White Oak), regarding an award that was rendered by an arbitration panel in accordance with General Statutes § 4-61. Subsequent to the award, the DOT filed an application to vacate, correct, or modify he award, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418. White Oak filed a cross application to confirm it pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417. This court denied the DOT's application and granted White Oak's cross application. See Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-5034411-S, (May 2, 2011, Rittenband, J.T.R.). Ultimately, the judgment of this court, Hon. Richard M. Rittenband, judge trial referee, was affirmed by our Supreme Court. See Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 319 Conn. 582, 621, 125 A.3d 988 (2015).
The current motion before the court is a " motion for determination as to whether judgment has been satisfied" filed by White Oak, as well as the DOT's objection thereto. For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, the court denies White Oak's " motion for determination as to whether judgment has been satisfied."
A complete recitation of the facts and protracted procedural history of the present case is of necessary to the court's disposition of White Oak's motion. Relevant facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. For a complete discussion of the underlying facts, see Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., supra, 319 Conn. 585-603.
DISCUSSION
" The law of judgments and satisfaction of judgments is well settled." Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 806, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997). " A satisfaction of judgment is the discharge of an obligation under a judgment by payment of the amount due." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, 137 Conn.App. 540, 551, 49 A.3d 770 (2012). " The satisfaction of a judgment refers to compliance with or fulfillment of the mandate thereof . . . There is realistically no substantial difference between the words 'paid' and 'satisfied' in the judgment context." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 807. " Further proceedings may not commence upon a judgment which has been satisfied . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, supra, 552.
Procedurally, " the filing of a notice of satisfaction of judgment is commonplace . . ." (Citations omitted.) Id., 550; see, e.g., G Power Invs., LLC v. Gtherm, Inc., 141 Conn.App. 552, 556, 61 A.3d 592 (2013). Nevertheless, " our rules of practice specifically authorize the filing of a motion to determine that a judgment has been satisfied." Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, supra, 551; see also Practice Book § 6-5. " A determination that a judgment has been satisfied operates to extinguish [the judgment] for all purposes . . . It is absolutely determinative of the rights of the parties . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, supra, 552. " [T]he following issues are prerequisites to the rendering of a determination by the court that a money judgment has been satisfied. First, the judgment creditor must have obtained a valid money judgment against the judgment debtor. Second, the judgment debtor must have paid the amount of that judgment. In so doing, the court must find that the judgment debtor either made actual payment to the judgment creditor or a payment equivalent thereto." (Emphasis added.) Id.
Practice Book § 6-5 provides in relevant part: " When the judgment is satisfied in a civil action, the party recovering the judgment shall file written notice thereof with the clerk, who shall endorse judgment satisfied on the judgment file, if there is one, and make a similar notation on the file and docket sheet, giving the name of the party and the date . . . The judicial authority may, upon motion, make a determination that the judgment has been satisfied."
In the present case, it is undisputed that at arbitration the panel awarded $8, 362, 308.41 to White Oak. It is also undisputed that this court, Hon. Richard M. Rittenband, judge trial referee, subsequently confirmed the panel's arbitration award, which was affirmed by our Supreme Court. On the basis of these undisputed facts, the court finds that White Oak obtained a valid money judgment against the DOT. " Prior to confirmation, enforcement of an arbitration award relies solely on the parties' voluntary compliance. Confirmation of an arbitration award converts it into an enforceable judgment of the Superior Court . It is in part that ability to have an award confirmed that has encouraged parties to submit to this informal method of dispute resolution." (Emphasis added.) Aldin Assocs. Ltd. P'shp v. Healey, 72 Conn.App. 334, 341 n.10, 804 A.2d 1049 (2002). Accordingly, the court concludes that the first element delineated in Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, supra, 137 Conn.App. 552, is satisfied.
With respect to the second element set forth in Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, i.e., the judgment debtor must have paid the amount of that judgment, White Oak argues that the judgment rendered against the DOT has not been satisfied because, in making payment to White Oak pursuant to the judgment, the Office of the State Comptroller (Comptroller) withheld over $1 million for unpaid taxes that White Oak allegedly owed to the Department of Revenue Services (DRS) and the Department of Labor (DOL). White Oak further argues that such withholdings were precluded under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because, at arbitration in the Tomlinson matter-the companion case to the present action-the DOT interposed an " affirmative claim" for a setoff on the basis of a tax debt that White Oak allegedly owed to the state of Connecticut (state), and the arbitration panel concluded that the DOT failed to prove this claim.
In its objection, the DOT claims that, by virtue of the Comptroller's payment to White Oak, the judgment that was rendered against it has been satisfied. Specifically, the DOT argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude the withholding of sums for White Oak's alleged unpaid taxes because, inter alia, the issue of whether White Oak owed taxes to the state was not " fairly and fully" litigated. The DOT further argues that, in light of General Statutes § 12-39g, " [t]he DOT's independent decision to counterclaim for a [setoff] of [s]tate debt . . . has no collateral estoppel effect on the ability of the Comptroller to statutorily [setoff] [s]tate debt owed to DRS and DOL."
General Statutes § 12-39g provides in relevant part: " (a) Upon notification to the Comptroller by the Commissioner of Revenue Services that any taxes, including penalties and interest related thereto, are (1) due to the state from any person and unpaid and a period in excess of thirty days has elapsed following the date on which such taxes were due and (2) are not the subject of a timely filed administrative appeal to said commissioner or of a timely filed appeal pending before any court of competent jurisdiction, the Comptroller shall withhold any order upon the Treasurer for payment of any amount payable by the state to such person unless the amount so payable is reduced by the amount of such taxes, penalties and interest . . ."
" The fundamental principles underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel are well established." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services, 271 Conn. 679, 689, 859 A.2d 533 (2004). " [Collateral estoppel] is that aspect of the doctrine of res judicata which serves to estop the relitigation by parties and their privies of any right, fact or legal matter which is put in issue and has been once determined by a valid and final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction." (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonner, 110 Conn.App. 621, 631, 955 A.2d 625 (2008). " The scope of matters precluded by that doctrine necessarily depends on what has occurred in the former adjudication." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, supra, 137 Conn.App. 556. " Generally, factual determinations made in final and binding arbitration proceedings are entitled to preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Robinson v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 33 Conn.App. 600, 602, 637 A.2d 397 (1994).
Athough not directly at issue in the present case, the court notes that " [t]he doctrine of res judicata provides that a former judgment serves as an absolute bar to a subsequent faction involving any claims relating to such cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Campbell v. Commissioner of Correction, 121 Conn.App. 576, 579, 997 A.2d 543 (2010).
" For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296, 596 A.2d 414 (1991). " Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded . . . [where] [t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue . . . because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action." (Emphasis added.) 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 28(5)(c) (1982). In this vein, the Appellate Court has noted that " the court in the second proceeding may conclude that issue preclusion should not apply because the party sought to be bound did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the first proceeding . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pollansky v. Pollansky, 162 Conn.App. 635, 659-60, 133 A.3d 167 (2016), quoting 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 28, comment (j); accord Gateway, Kelso & Co. v. West Hartford No. 1, LLC, 126 Conn.App. 578, 584, 15 A.3d 635 (2011).
Turning to the present case, the court concludes that the DOT did not have an adequate incentive to secure a fair and full adjudication of whether White Oak owed unpaid taxes to the DRS and DOL. in the Tomlinson arbitration. The record only supports the bare fact that a claim was made, but fails to support White Oak's contention that the matter was fully litigated. Indeed, a review of the arbitration decision would support the conclusion that the issue was not litigated at all.
In addition, § 12-39g provides in relevant part: " (a) Upon notification to the Comptroller by the Commissioner of Revenue Services that any taxes, including penalties and interest related thereto, are (1) due to the state from any person and unpaid and a period in excess of thirty days has elapsed following the date on which such taxes were due and (2) are not the subject of a timely filed administrative appeal to said commissioner or of a timely filed appeal pending before any court of competent jurisdiction, the Comptroller shall withhold any order upon the Treasurer for payment of any amount payable by the state to such person unless the amount so payable is reduced by the amount of such taxes, penalties and interest . . ." (Emphasis added.) See also General Statutes § 3-35. Thus, § 12-39g obligates the Comptroller, in satisfying a judgment rendered against the state, to deduct the value of any unpaid taxes that are otherwise owed to the state by the judgment creditor. See § 12-39g(a); see also State v. Reddy, 135 Conn.App. 65, 73, 42 A.3d 406 (2012) (" [T]he word 'shall' in the statutes generally suggests a mandatory obligation").
General Statutes § 3-35 provides: " No execution shall be issued on any judgment rendered against the Treasurer as such, but the Comptroller shall draw an order on him for its payment."
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies White Oak's " motion for determination as to whether judgment has been satisfied."