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finding $550.00 per hour a reasonable hourly rate for a partner at a civil rights firm who had been practicing for sixteen years
Summary of this case from Chawla v. Metro. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.C.Opinion
No. 09 Civ. 5378 (RJS)
09-27-2011
DONNA DECURTIS, Plaintiff, v. UPWARD BOUND INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff is represented by Valdi Licul and Jeremiah Iadevaia, of Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C. 1501 Broadway, Ste. 800, New York, NY 10036. Defendants are represented by David S. Douglas, of Gallet Dreyer & Berkey, LLP, 845 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022 and Daniel M. Tanenbaum, 111 Great Neck Road, Ste. 308, Great Neck, NY 11021.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER :
On April 27, 2010, the Court entered default judgments against Defendants Upward Bound International, Inc., LDA Travel Corporation, Seth Rudman, and Thomas Ferrandina on Plaintiff's sex discrimination and retaliation claims.
A defendant's default constitutes an admission of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint except for those relating to damages. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint as true. With regard to damages, however, it is the responsibility of the Court to determine the amount of damages that may be assessed. Id.
The Court held an inquest into Plaintiff's damages on October 14, 2010. At the inquest, the Court stated it would issue a ruling on damages at the same time it ruled on Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, which had not yet been submitted. Now before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs. For the following reasons, the Court enters judgment for the Plaintiff for $183,818.36 in back pay, $236,085 in front pay, $100,000 in compensatory damages, $75,000 in punitive damages, $206,443 in attorney's fees, and $8,851 in costs.
I. BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff, a woman, worked for Upward Bound International, Inc. ("Upward Bound") from 2003 through 2008, when she was involuntarily terminated. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) At that time, Upward Bound was a Manhattan travel agency that specialized in making travel arrangements for corporate and entertainment industry clients. (Id. ¶ 7.) Upward Bound ceased to exist in August 2009 and its operations were transferred to LDA Travel Corporation ("LDA"), a New York corporation that makes travel and transportation arrangements for clients, and Tzell Travel LLC ("Tzell"), a New York limited liability company that sells airline tickets and hotel accommodations. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 10-11.)
Thomas Ferrandina ("Ferrandina") was Vice President of Operations at Upward Bound and Plaintiff's supervisor. (Id. ¶ 8.) In 2003, Ferrandina recruited Plaintiff to work at Upward Bound. (Id. ¶ 13.) Beginning in July 2004, Ferrandina sexually harassed Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 18.) Among other things, Ferrandina repeatedly touched Plaintiff in a sexual manner without her consent (id. ¶ 19), sent Plaintiff sexually explicit e-mails and made sexually explicit comments (id. ¶¶ 20-22), and called her late at night and on weekends to talk about sex (id. ¶ 23).
When Plaintiff objected to Ferrandina's behavior, Ferrandina threatened Plaintiff's job. (Decl. of Donna DeCurtis dated September 7, 2010, Doc No. 68 ("DeCurtis Decl.") ¶ 13.) As a result of Ferrandina's actions, Plaintiff "was constantly stressed, nervous and unable to sleep." (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff dreaded going to work, and felt sick each time Ferrandina called her into his office. (Id.)
In August 2004, Plaintiff complained to Debra Feldman, the head of human resources at Upward Bound, about Ferrandina's conduct, and Feldman informed Seth Rudman ("Rudman"), the then-owner of Upward Bound. (Am. Compl ¶¶ 32, 9.) Rudman took no action in response to Plaintiff's complaint, telling Plaintiff instead to not "let Ferrandina upset her." (Id. ¶ 35.) However, in May 2006, Plaintiff's co-workers complained to Rudman about Ferrandina's behavior toward Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 37.) Upward Bound hired a law firm to conduct an internal investigation, and Ferrandina was subsequently fired in August 2006. (Id. ¶ 40.)
After firing Ferrandina, Rudman and Upward Bound retaliated against Plaintiff by refusing to give her new business and removing her from at least one account. (Id. ¶¶ 41-43.) Additionally, Rudman rebuffed Plaintiff's attempts to take on new work and generate additional business. (Id. ¶¶ 44-47.) In October 2007, Plaintiff was removed from her office and relocated to an area separate from the rest of her co-workers, even though Upward Bound had four empty offices available. (Id. ¶ 48.) During this period, Plaintiff felt like she "was going to have a nervous breakdown," lost her self-esteem and self-confidence, feared losing her job, and felt humiliated at work. (DeCurtis Decl. ¶ 31) In April 2008, Rudman fired Plaintiff, claiming Plaintiff had failed to meet her sales targets. (Am. Compl. ¶ 49.) Another person was hired to fill Plaintiff's position. (Id. ¶ 50.)
In August 2009, Upward Bound ceased its operations, continuing only as a shell corporation. (Id. ¶ 51.) Thereafter, Rudman transferred Upward Bound's operations to LDA and Tzell. (Id.) As part of the transfer, at least nine former Upward Bound employees were retained by LDA and Tzell to service Upward Bound's former clients. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff, who had been fired in 2008, was not among them.
At the time Plaintiff was dismissed by Upward Bound, she earned an annual salary of approximately $90,000. (DeCurtis Decl. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff also received additional compensation for working weekends, earning $1,500 in compensation for this work in the first quarter of 2008. (Id. ¶ 37; id., Ex. B.) In 2008, Plaintiffwas also entitled to receive $2,444.16 in home phone reimbursement and $119.76 for home Internet reimbursement. (DeCurtis Decl. ¶ 38; id., Ex. B.) Although Plaintiff eventually found employment at another travel agency, her annual salary was $47,217 per year less than what she earned at Upward Bound. (DeCurtis Decl. ¶ 39; id., Ex. C.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her original complaint on June 10, 2009, naming only Upward Bound and Ferrandina as defendants. On January 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, naming the additional defendants. Plaintiff brought claims for sex discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq. ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. ("NYCHRL"), and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL.
Because all Defendants except Tzell Travel LLC failed to answer the Amended Complaint, the Court entered default judgments against Upward Bound, Ferrandina, Rudman, and LDA on April 22, 2010, finding them liable for Plaintiff's sex discrimination claims under the state and city laws and for Plaintiff's retaliation claims under Title VII, state law, and city law. (Doc. Nos. 47-50.) Plaintiff settled her claims against the remaining Defendant, Tzell, and those claims were dismissed on August 11, 2010. (Doc. No. 56.) An inquest was originally scheduled for September 23, 2010, but was subsequently adjourned to October 14, 2010. On November 5, 2010, Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and N.Y.C. Admin. Code. § 8-502(f), and made submissions regarding back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees and costs. (See Pl.'s Damages Mem.) Plaintiff submitted a supplemental declaration providing additional information in support of her calculation of damages on September 16, 2011. The Court has received nothing from Defendants.
Though the default judgments purport to hold Ferrandina and Rudman liable under Title VII, "[u]nder Title VII, a defendant cannot be held liable in his individual capacity." Moncriffe v. Classique Interiors & Design, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 986 (ETB), 2011 WL 2224880, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2011). However, individuals can be held liable under NYSHRL and NYCHRL if they are personally involved in unlawful conduct, see Ellis v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 7605 (DAB), 2011 WL 3279057, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011), as both Ferrandina and Rudman clearly were.
III. DAMAGES
"[A] default judgment entered on well-pleaded allegations in a complaint establishes a defendant's liability." Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 854 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a default judgment is not an admission of damages. "Damages, which are neither susceptible of mathematical computation nor liquidated as of the default, usually must be established by the plaintiff in an evidentiary proceeding in which the defendant has the opportunity to contest the amount." Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc., 973 F.2d at 158. The court may either hold a hearing to fix damages or rely upon affidavits and documentary evidence. Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1993). As noted above, the Court held an inquest in October 2010 and has reviewed Plaintiff's damages submissions, which were unopposed by Defendants.
Violations of "Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL entitle a plaintiff to compensatory damages for pecuniary loss as well as pain and suffering." Moore v. Houlihan's Restaurant, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3129 (ENV) (RER), 2011 WL 2470023, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011). "Victims of employment discrimination are entitled to reasonable damages that would make the plaintiff 'whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.'" Id. (quoting Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1988)). In this action, Plaintiff seeks several different forms of economic damages, including: (1) back pay, (2) front pay, (3) compensatory damages, and (4) punitive damages, as well as interest. (See Pl.'s Damages Mem. at 8.) The Court will consider each in turn.
A. Back Pay
Back pay is available under Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); N.Y. Exec. Law. § 297(4), (9); N.Y.C Admin. Code § 8-502(a). "An award of back pay, although not automatic, is generally awarded absent special circumstances." Moore, 2011 WL 2470023, at *4. A plaintiff is ordinarily "entitled to an award of back pay from the date of her termination until the date of judgment." Saulpaugh v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1993). The award typically consists of "lost salary, including anticipated raises, and fringe benefits." Id. at 145.
Though Upward Bound ceased to exist after Plaintiff was fired, the Court concludes that, based on the experiences of her colleagues, Plaintiff's employment would have continued with LDA and or Tzell. She is therefore entitled to the compensation she would have earned from April 3, 2008 through the present. Plaintiff seeks back pay damages in the amount of $185,087.56. Having reviewed Plaintiff's calculations, the Court concludes they are sufficient to justify the award sought. Accordingly, Plaintiff is awarded back pay in the amount of $185,087.56.
B. Front Pay
In cases where reinstatement is not possible because the employer-employee relationship has been irreparably damaged by animosity associated with the litigation, a court may award front pay as equitable relief appropriate to effectuate the purposes of anti-discrimination law. See Padilla v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1996). "A front pay award 'serves a necessary role in making victims of discrimination whole in cases where the factfinder can reasonably predict that the plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable alternative employment.'" Id. at 125-26 (quoting Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984)).
Given the animosity that clearly exists between Plaintiff and Defendants, reinstatement is not possible - or requested - in this case. Instead, Plaintiff seeks front pay for five years, as a reasonable time horizon during which Plaintiff will likely continue to work for her current employer. (See Inquest Tr. 15:2-22.) The Court agrees that this is an appropriate amount of time for Plaintiff to seek front pay. Cf. Padilla, 92 F.3d at 126 (approving front pay award for twenty years). Plaintiff seeks $47,217 per year, contending it is the approximate difference between what she earned annually at Upward Bound and what she currently earns. (See Pl.'s Damages Mem. at 12; DeCurtis Decl. ¶ 39.) Having reviewed Plaintiff's wage information, the Court agrees that this is an appropriate estimate. Accordingly, the Court will award Plaintiff $236,085 in front pay.
C. Compensatory Damages
A plaintiff in an employment discrimination or retaliation case may also seek damages for emotional distress. See Moore, 2011 WL 2470023, at *6. Where a plaintiff has succeeded on her emotional distress claims, "courts have upheld a range of awards for compensatory damages, basing their decisions on whether [the] emotional distress claim presented by plaintiff can be categorized as 'garden-variety,' 'significant,' or 'egregious.'" Maher v. Alliance Mortg. Banking Corp., No. 06 Civ. 5073 (DRH) (ARL), 2010 WL 3516153, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2010).
In garden-variety claims, the evidence of emotional harm is limited to the plaintiff's testimony, which describes his or her injuries in vague or conclusory terms, and fails to relate the severity or consequences of the injury. These claims typically lack extraordinary circumstances and are not supported by medical testimony. Significant emotional distress claims are based on more substantial harm or offensive conduct and may be supported by medical testimony, evidence of treatment by a healthcare professional, and testimony from other witnesses. Egregious emotional distress claims yield the highest awards and are warranted only where the employer's conduct was outrageous and shocking or affected the physical health of the plaintiff.Id. (internal citations omitted). A review of the relevant case law in this jurisdiction reveals that plaintiffs with garden-variety claims generally receive between $30,000 and $125,000. See Olsen v. County of Nassau, 615 F. Supp. 2d 35, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in compensatory damages. (Pl.'s Damages Mem. at 13.) The Court concludes this is far too high, as Plaintiff's claim could best be categorized as a "garden-variety claim." Plaintiff stated in her sworn declaration that she felt "constantly stressed, nervous and unable to sleep" (DeCurtis Decl. ¶ 14), dreaded going to work, and felt sick each time Ferrandina called her into his office. (Id.) She further stated that she felt like she was going to have a nervous breakdown after she was moved out of her office (id. ¶ 31), that she lost her self-esteem and self-confidence (id.), that she feared losing her job and felt humiliated (id.), and that, when she was ultimately fired, she was shocked and scared (id. ¶¶ 32, 33). Although undoubtedly difficult for Plaintiff, this type of emotional distress most closely resembles garden-variety claims. See Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04 Civ. 7406 (WHP), 2008 WL 3826695, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2008) (finding a garden-variety claim when plaintiff felt stressed, shocked and devastated, and suffered from headaches, hives and welts); Hill v. Airborne Freight Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 59, 72-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that plaintiff who saw psychologist for stress, left work sick, began drinking more, and grew apart from his family had a garden-variety claim).
This analysis is not meant to belittle the significance of Plaintiff's experience or denigrate the impact of Defendants' offensive conduct. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff's experience was not "extraordinary" as that term has been defined in case law, and because she has presented no medical evidence of her distress, the Court concludes that damages for garden-variety emotional distress are appropriate here. Therefore, while the Court will award Plaintiff compensatory damages, the award shall be limited to $100,000.
D. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are available under Title VII and NYCHRL. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(a). Specifically, "[p]unitive damages may be awarded for a civil rights claim against a defendant employer under either Title VII or the NYCHRL if the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Manzo v. Sovereign Motor Cars, Ltd., No. 08 Civ. 1229 (JG) (SMG), 2010 WL 1930237, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The "requisite state of mind may be inferred from the circumstances." Id. "[E]gregious or outrageous acts may serve as evidence supporting an inference of the requisite evil motive." Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999) (internal quotations omitted).
Based on Plaintiff's unopposed allegations of fact set forth in the Complaint, the Court has no difficulty finding that punitive damages are warranted here. The acts of Ferrandina were sufficiently outrageous that any reasonable employer must have known that Plaintiff's rights were being violated. His conduct was repeated and deliberate, and Rudman was aware that it was occurring. Rudman's conduct was similarly indefensible. As Ferrandina and Rudman were supervisory employees, their acts may be imputed to Upward Bound. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(13)(b)(1).
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the amount of $250,000. While the conduct here rose above mere negligence, the Court believes an award of this magnitude is not justified. The Supreme Court has identified a number of factors for courts to consider when assessing the reasonableness of punitive damages. These include: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the difference between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties imposed in comparable cases. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Courts in this Circuit have consistently favored lower awards in circumstances comparable to those here. See Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 252, 263-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (remitting a jury award of $1.6 million in punitive damages to $190,000 when the plaintiff was not exposed to violence, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was nearly 4:1, the compensatory damages award was "substantial," and the punitive damages award was not in line with awards in similar cases); Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reducing punitive damages award to $50,000 when the plaintiff did not suffer actual harm, the award was 33 times the compensatory damages award, and the court was also awarding plaintiff attorney's fees); Lamberson v. Six W. Retail Acquisition, Inc., No. 998 Civ. 8053, 2002 WL 59424, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (reducing punitive damages award from $400,000 to $30,000 for plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim when the ratio between actual damages and punitive damages was high and the award was excessive in light of similar cases). Indeed, it is worth noting that Title VII imposes a $50,000 cap on punitive damages against employers with between 14 and 101 employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3)(A).
Here, Plaintiff did not suffer physical violence, and she is being awarded compensatory damages and attorney's fees. In light of these facts, and the other factors mentioned, the Court will award punitive damages in the amount of $75,000, in line with similar cases in this District.
Since Defendants are named in Plaintiff's state and city law claims, the $75,000 figure is warranted, even though it may be unavailable or capped pursuant to the federal Title VII claims.
E. Pre-Judgment Interest
"While the decision to award prejudgment interest is left to the discretion of the district courts, the Second Circuit has stated that '[t]o the extent . . . that damages awarded to the plaintiff represent compensation for lost wages, it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-judgment interest.'" Shannon v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir. 1998)). Under federal law, the applicable interest rate is the "the average rate of return on one-year Treasury bills ('T-bills') for the relevant time period." Kuper v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 99 Civ. 1190 (JSG) (MHD), 2003 WL 23350111, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2003). Under New York law, "[interest shall be at the rate of nine per centum per annum, except where otherwise provided by statute." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5004. Where a judgment is "based on both state and federal law with respect to which no distinction is drawn," the applicable interest rate shall be "the federal interest rate." Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 629 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 2010). However, "where prejudgment interest can only be awarded on the basis of what is solely a state claim, it is appropriate to use the state interest rate." Id. at 280 n.2.
Seeing no reason to depart from the ordinary practice, the Court will include pre-judgment interest in the award of back pay to Plaintiff. As this award results from both federal and state claims, the applicable interest rate shall be the "average rate of return on one-year Treasury bills for the relevant time period between [July 2004] until the entry of judgment." Thomas, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 264. To ensure complete compensation, the interest shall be compounded annually. The Clerk of Court is directed to use this methodology to calculate the interest on the back pay award, which is $185,087.56.
Awarding prejudgment interest on compensatory damages is within the discretion of the Court, but "[u]nlike awards of prejudgment interest on backpay, awards of prejudgment interest on emotional distress damages is not the norm for New York federal courts," and, instead, are only granted when necessary to "make the plaintiff whole." E.E.O.C. v. Everdry Mktg. and Mgmt., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 213, 223-24 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). In this case, the Court has set the amount of compensatory damages at a reasonable rate to make Plaintiff whole, and therefore, prejudgment interest is not necessary. Reiter v. Metro. Transp. Auth. of N.Y., No. 01 Civ. 2762 (JGK), 2003 WL 22271223, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003).
Plaintiff argues that the state interest rate should be used with respect to the award against the individual defendants, as they face only state claims. (See Pl.'s Ltr. dated Dec. 23, 2010, at 1.) However, this ignores the federal claims against the other defendants, who are jointly and severally liable. Because the defendants are jointly and severally liable on both the federal and state law claims, the federal interest rate shall be used. Thomas, 629 F.3d at 280 ("[J]udgments that are based on both state and federal law with respect to which no distinction is drawn shall have applicable interest calculated at the federal interest rate.").
F. Attorney's Fees
A prevailing party in a Title VII action may be awarded "a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs" in the Court's discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Similarly, under New York City law, a Court, in its discretion, may award a prevailing party in a discrimination case "costs and reasonable attorney's fees." N.Y.C. Admin. Code. § 8-502(f). A plaintiff is considered a prevailing party for attorney's fees purposes if she "succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit [she] sought in bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] 'reasonable fee' is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation in a meritorious civil rights case." Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, --- U.S. --- , 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010). "The Title VII and NYCHRL provisions are substantively and textually similar; therefore, the reasonableness of fees in [a] case would be analyzed the same [way] regardless of which provision provides [the prevailing party's] recovery." Moore, 2011 WL 2470023, at *7 n.10.
As an initial matter, there can be no serious dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation. The Court has awarded Plaintiff a default judgment against Defendants Upward Bound, Ferrandina, Rudman, and LDA, finding those Defendants liable under Title VII, NYSHRL, and/or NYCHRL. In light of the facts described above, including Defendants' default, the Court has no difficulty concluding that attorney's fees are warranted here.
The Second Circuit has recently clarified the procedural requirements for calculating attorney's fees. See Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., --- F.3d ---- , Nos. 10-409, 10-564, 2011 WL 3437513 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2011). As a starting point, a court should calculate the "lodestar - the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case - [which] creates a 'presumptively reasonable fee.'" Id. at *8 (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). The lodestar is "not 'conclusive in all circumstances,'" and "[a] district court may adjust the lodestar when it 'does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.'" Id. (quoting Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1673). However, "such adjustments are appropriate only in 'rare circumstances,'" id. (quoting Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1673)), as "'the lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a reasonable attorney's fee.'" Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1673 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566 (1986)).
1. The Reasonable Hourly Rate
A reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay. Arbor Hill, 552 F.3d at 190. In Perdue, the Supreme Court guided district courts to look to the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community," an objective measure. 130 S. Ct. at 1672. See also McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 415-16 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court's determination that attorneys' ordinary hourly rates constituted a "reasonable fee").
In this case, Plaintiff's counsel seeks $550 per hour for work performed by partner Valdi Licul ("Licul"), $275 per hour for work performed by associate Jeremiah Iadevaia ("Iadevaia"), $125 per hour for work performed by law clerks, and $100 per hour for work performed by paralegals. (Declaration of Valdi Licul dated November 5, 2010, Doc No. 76 ("Licul Decl.") ¶ 34.) The Court will consider each attorney or class of attorneys in turn.
The law firm of Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, PC specializes in representing employees in employment and labor-related matters. (See id. ¶¶ 19, 21; see also Allende v. Unitech Design, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 4256 (AJP), 2011 WL 891445, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011) ("There can be no doubt that plaintiffs' law firm, Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C., is a well-known and highly respected law firm that concentrates in representing individuals in employment and labor related matters." (internal quotation marks omitted).) Licul has worked there since 2003 and has been a partner since 2007. He graduated from Brooklyn Law School in 1995, and is an experienced trial and appellate attorney who has served as lead counsel on many employment law matters. (See Licul Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.) Licul is Plaintiff's lead counsel on this matter, and has worked on the case since its inception. (Id. ¶ 20.) He routinely bills clients $550 per hour, and partners at his firm generally charge between $500 and $750 per hour. (Id. ¶ 23.)
Iadevaia graduated from Northeastern University School of Law in 2006, and subsequently served as a law clerk to Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman in this District. (Id. ¶ 25.) Since joining the Vladeck firm in 2007, he has served as counsel for plaintiffs in many employment law matters. (Id.) He routinely bills clients at a rate of $275 per hour for his time. (Id.)
Numerous law clerks and paralegals also worked on this matter. (See id. ¶¶ 26-27.) As reflected in Plaintiff's submission, the law firm routinely charges $125 per hour for law clerks and $100 per hour for work done by paralegals at the firm. (Id.)
"'[C]onsistent precedent in the Southern District reveals that rates awarded to experienced civil rights attorneys over the past ten years have ranged from $250 to $600, and that rates for associates have ranged from $200 to $350, with average awards increasing over time.'" Lanzetta v. Florio's Enters., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6181 (DC), 2011 WL 3209521, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011) (collecting cases and quoting Mugavero v. Arms Acres Inc., 03 Civ. 5724 (PGG), 2010 WL 451045, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010)). Comparable rates have previously been approved for work performed in this District by the Vladeck firm. See Allende, 2011 WL 891445, at *3-4 (approving rate of $450 per hour for partner with less experience than Licul, $275 per hour for associate who graduated from law school in 2007, and $125 per hour for law clerks). In light of all the facts before it, the Court finds that the requested rates are reasonable.
2. Hours Reasonably Expended
After determining the appropriate hourly fee, the Court is next directed to calculate the number of hours reasonably expended by Plaintiff's counsel.
In determining how much attorney time should be compensated, the court looks initially to the amount of time spent on each category of tasks, as reflected in contemporaneous time records, and then decides how much of that time was reasonably expended. To do so the court looks to its own familiarity with the case and . . . its experience generally as
well as to the evidentiary submissions and arguments of the parties. If the court finds that some of the time was not reasonably necessary to the outcome, it should reduce the time for which compensation is awarded.Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Ally Apparel Resources, LLC, No. 05 Civ. 6757 (LTS) (MHD), 2009 WL 466136, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court's task is to make adjustments for hours that were either improperly or imprecisely billed, excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Robinson v. City of N.Y., No. 05 Civ. 9545 (GEL), 2009 WL 3109846, at *2, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009). The focus of this inquiry should not be made with the benefit of hindsight, but rather answer the question of "whether 'at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.'" Id. (quoting Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Having reviewed Plaintiff's counsel's detailed billing records, the Court notes that much of the work on the case was appropriately performed by Iadevaia or law clerks, and the amount of time spent on various tasks appears to be reasonable. In addition, Plaintiff has voluntarily lowered the amount she seeks by more than $80,000. (See Licul Decl. ¶¶ 35-36.) Accordingly, the Court finds the time here was reasonably expended. The Court awards Plaintiff $206,443 in attorney's fees.
IV. COSTS
Finally, Plaintiff seeks $8,851.53 in costs. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38.) A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover "those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients." LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998). The costs sought here are of the type normally incurred and charged to clients, including filing fees, postage fees, service of process fees, and costs associated with legal research and administrative tasks. Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff $8,851.53 in costs.
V. SET-OFF
Plaintiff settled her claims against Tzell, one of the original Defendants in this action, in a confidential settlement. Normally, this amount would be taken into consideration when calculating the damages due by the other Defendants. "If, however, a party defaults in answering the complaint, courts have held that it may not invoke the benefits of the set-off rule." Chloe v. Zarafshan, No. 06 Civ. 3140 (RJH) (MHD), 2009 WL 2956827, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009). Accordingly, in calculating the liability of the remaining Defendants, the settlement amount paid by Tzell to Plaintiff has not been, and shall not be, taken into account.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment against Defendants Upward Bound International, Inc., LDA Travel Corporation, Seth Rudman, and Thomas Ferrandina, jointly and severally, in the amount of $811,467.09, which includes $185,087.56 in back pay, $236,085 in front pay, $100,000 in compensatory damages, $75,000 in punitive damages, $206,443 in attorney's fees, and $8,851.53 in costs.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to award pre-judgment interest on the back pay award of $185,087.56 from July 1, 2004 to the date that judgment is entered. The rate shall be the average rate of return on one-year Treasury bills during this period, compounded annually.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion located at docket number 75 and close this case. SO ORDERED. Dated: September 27, 2011
New York, New York
/s/_________
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN
United States District Judge
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Plaintiff is represented by Valdi Licul and Jeremiah Iadevaia, of Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C. 1501 Broadway, Ste. 800, New York, NY 10036.
Defendants are represented by David S. Douglas, of Gallet Dreyer & Berkey, LLP, 845 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022 and Daniel M. Tanenbaum, 111 Great Neck Road, Ste. 308, Great Neck, NY 11021.