Opinion
Case No. 5D21-389
07-30-2021
Timothy CONLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Timothy Conley, Arcadia, pro se. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Timothy Conley, Arcadia, pro se.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
NARDELLA, J.
Timothy Conley ("Conley") challenges his designation as a sexual predator. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court's denial of his postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
On August 3, 2000, Conley kidnapped and raped a 17-year-old girl. After hearing the evidence and testimony at trial, a jury convicted Conley of one count of Kidnapping, with the Intent to Commit or Facilitate a Felony, a first-degree felony punishable by life (Count I); four counts of Sexual Battery, each a second-degree felony (Counts II, III, IV, and V); and one count of Unlawful Sexual Activity with a Minor, a second-degree felony (Count VI). Eighteen years later, Conley filed the instant Rule 3.800(a) "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence," challenging his designation as a sexual predator.
In the underlying Motion, Conley asserted that he does not meet the criteria for designation as a sexual predator under section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2002), because he lacked the requisite prior felony conviction. In support, Conley cited to Sadler v. State , 112 So. 3d 498, 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing denial of the defendant's Rule 3.800(a) motion challenging sexual predator designation imposed after conviction for offense of unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a second-degree felony, because defendant did not have necessary prior conviction); and Hickey v. State , 915 So. 2d 663, 663–64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (finding defendant's conviction for second-degree felony lewd or lascivious molestation did not meet the criteria for sexual predator designation under section 775.21 ).
The sexual predator statute codified in section 775.21 states in pertinent part as follows:
(4) Sexual predator criteria.—
(a) For a current offense committed on or after October 1, 1993, upon conviction, an offender shall be designated as a "sexual predator" under subsection (5), and subject to registration under subsection (6) and community and public notification under subsection (7) if:
1. The felony is:
a. A capital, life, or first-degree felony Violation, or any attempt thereof, of s. 787.01 or s. 787.02, where the victim is a minor and the defendant is not the victim's parent, or of chapter 794, s. 800.04, or s. 847.0145, or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction; or
b. Any felony violation, or any attempt thereof, of s. 787.01, s. 787.02, or s. 787.025, where the victim is a minor and the defendant is not the victim's parent; chapter 794, excluding ss. 794.011(10) and 794.0235; ... and the offender has previously been convicted of or found to have committed, or has pled nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, any violation of ... s. 794.011(2), (3), (4), (5), or (8) ....
....
(5) Sexual predator designation.-- An offender is designated as a sexual predator as follows:
(a)1. An offender who meets the sexual predator criteria described in paragraph (4)(a) who is before the court for sentencing for a current offense committed on or after October 1, 1993, is a sexual predator, and the sentencing court must make a written finding at the time of sentencing that the offender is a sexual predator, and the clerk of the court shall transmit a copy of the order containing the written finding to the department within 48 hours after the entry of the order ....
....
§ 775.21(4), (5)(a) 1., Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added).
Conley is correct that his convictions on Counts II, III, IV, and V for Sexual Battery, in violation of section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (2000), do not meet the criteria for "Sexual Predator" designation by themselves because those offenses are second-degree felonies. For a "current" second-degree felony to qualify a defendant for a "Sexual Predator" designation, said defendant would also need to have a prior enumerated conviction. See § 775.21(4)(a) 1.b., Fla. Stat. (2000); see also Sadler , 112 So. 3d at 499 and Hickey , 915 So. 2d at 663–64. In his Motion, Conley claimed that he did not have the requisite prior conviction when he committed the offenses in this case. The trial court did not dispute this assertion and there is nothing in the instant record to refute it. However, at the same trial, the jury convicted Conley of Kidnapping with the Intent to Commit or Facilitate the Commission of a Felony, in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)2., a first-degree felony punishable by life. See § 787.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). That "current" Kidnapping offense committed on August 3, 2000, on the 17-year-old victim, who was not related to Conley, qualified Conley for designation as a "Sexual Predator" without the need of a prior conviction. See § 775.21(4)(a) 1.a. & (5)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2000). Therefore, Conley's "Sexual Predator" designation is lawful, and the trial court is affirmed under the tipsy coachman doctrine. See Robertson v. State , 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) ("This longstanding principle of appellate law, sometimes referred to as the ‘tipsy coachman’ doctrine, allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that ‘reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons’ so long as ‘there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.’ " (citations omitted); see also Cade v. State , 116 So. 3d 613, 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (applying "tipsy coachman" doctrine to a postconviction appeal).
AFFIRMED.
COHEN and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.