Opinion
No. TTD CV 07-5001261-S
December 1, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This case calls upon the court to decide whether the ministerial exception to the court's subject matter jurisdiction over disputes involving religious matters prevents this court from adjudicating a dispute over a church order barring a non-profit organization from soliciting donations at Saint Bernard Roman Catholic Church in Rockville, CT. The non-profit organization in this case is the plaintiff, Buguruka Orphans and Community Economic Development, Inc. (BOCED"). The defendant who gave the order in this case is Michael Cote, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, CT ("Bishop Cote"). Pending before the court is Bishop Cote's Motion to Dismiss BOCED's Fifth Revised Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the court concludes that the ministerial exception is applicable. Therefore, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
I
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) R.C. Equity Group, LLC v. Zoning Commission of Borough of Newtown, 285 Conn. 240, 248, 939 A.2d 1122 (2008).
"Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 701, 945 A.2d 927 (2008). Where the ministerial exception is applicable, the case may be dismissed on Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on Human Rights Opportunities, 98 Conn.App. 646, 649, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144 (2007), reh. denied, 128 S.Ct. 968, 169 L.Ed.2d 792 (2008).
"[I]n ruling [on] whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader[.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 290, 933 A.2d 256 (2007). Where subject matter jurisdiction is involved, it may also consider any affidavits or other uncontroverted evidence and even conduct an evidentiary hearing when appropriate. See, e.g., Fennelly v. Norton, 103 Conn.App. 125, 139 n. 11, 931 A.2d 269 (2007), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 918, 931 A.2d 936 (2007); Bellman v. Town of West Hartford, 96 Conn.App 387, 394, 900 A.2d 82 (2006); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App 103, 121, 891 A.2d 106 (2006). "[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 79, 951 A.2d 514 (2008).
II
BOCED's Fifth Revised Complaint seeks money damages from Bishop Cote in two counts. Count One states a claim for tortious interference in business relationships. Count Two states a claim for the tort of defamation. For the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the court assumes the factual allegations in the plaintiff's Fifth Revised Complaint to be true. In support of the Motion to Dismiss, Bishop Cote supplies an Affidavit of Sally J. Tolles, coordinator of the Tribunal of the Diocese of Norwich, with copies of certain ecclesiastical decrees and appeals therefrom, pertinent to the jurisdictional issue in this case. The court can consider that information as well in resolving the instant Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss did not object to, nor did it contest, any of the factual information in the Tolles Affidavit or the documents attached. To the contrary, it cited to it and the information in the documents attached approvingly. At argument on the Motion to Dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff at first agreed that the court could consider the information in the Affidavit and documents in deciding the Motion to Dismiss, but, at the end of argument, objected to the affiant's written testimony as to the content of a letter written by Bishop Cote and certain statements made by him at a meeting of parishioners on the grounds of hearsay. The objections are untimely and of no avail. The letter and statements are alleged to be defamatory. Fifth Revised Complaint, paras. 9-12. Tolles' affidavit avers that she has personal knowledge of the facts. Tolles Affidavit, para. 2. The statements to which she testified are considered verbal acts, which are not hearsay as a matter of law. See Hayard v. Maroney, 86 Conn. 261, 262, 85 A. 379 (1912); C. C. Tait and E.D. Prescott, Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (Fourth Ed., 2008) § 8.7. Therefore, the objections are overruled.
The pertinent facts are as follows: BOCED is a nonprofit, charitable organization that engages in fund raising on behalf of distressed people in Tanzania. The Reverend Justinian B. Rweyemamu (Father Justinian), a native of Tanzania, founded BOCED in 1998. At the time of its founding, Father Justinian was named President and Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation. In 1999, Father Justinian was appointed parochial vicar of Saint Bernard's Parish. Over the course of time, the Diocese received and investigated numerous complaints against Father Justinian and BOCED concerning financial and fundraising controversies and concerning the large amount of time and effort that Father Justinian was spending on BOCED. Ultimately, Bishop Cote issuing a canonical decree in October 2004, prohibiting Father Justinian from, inter alia, continuing his involvement with BOCED and prohibiting him from fundraising on behalf of BOCED. In January 2005, Bishop Cote issued another canonical decree removing Father Justinian as parochial vicar at Saint Bernard Parish due, in part, to his preoccupation with BOCED in neglect of church duties. Father Justinian publicly challenged the Bishop's authority to take action against him.
In February 2005, Bishop Cote wrote a letter to parishioners of Saint Bernard Church asserting that there were financial irregularities in BOCED. He contended that he had assembled an 800-page file during the course of a year-long investigation substantiating his concerns. The letter addressed Bishop Cote's decisions (1) prohibiting Father Justinian from any further involvement with BOCED, (2) denying BOCED permission to solicit donations in the churches of the Diocese, and (3) removing Father Justinian from his position as parochial vicar of Saint Bernard Parish. For the purposes of this motion, the court accepts as true plaintiff's allegation that the statements about financial irregularities were untrue. In March 2005, Bishop Cote attended a meeting of parishioners of Saint Bernard Church, to address questions that had been placed by parishioners in the "Question Box" of the church vestibule concerning Father Justinian. Some of the questions referred to the diocesan review of Father Justinian's relationship with BOCED as well as his removal as parochial vicar at Saint Bernard. At that meeting, Bishop Cote said that BOCED was ineffectively managed. For the purposes of this motion, the court accepts as true plaintiff's allegation that it was untrue that BOCED was ineffectively managed. It also accepts as true the plaintiff's allegations that Bishop Cote made the statements as an intentional means of tarnishing BOCED's reputation, and as part of a vendetta against Father Justinian for challenging the bishop's authority in a public manner. Certain parishioners of Saint Bernard Church, who donated to BOCED in the past, have now refused, neglected or failed to make contributions based on Bishop Cote's statements and actions.
Father Justinian challenged the Bishop's canonical decrees alleging, inter alia, racial discrimination. He appealed under church appellate remedies all the way up to the forum of last resort at the Vatican in Rome, without success. He similarly fought the action in federal and state courts seeking money damages for violations of his rights, but those lawsuits and appeals were dismissed under the ministerial exception. See, Rweyemamu v. Cote, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7637, 2006 WL 3066654 (D.Conn. February 7, 2006), aff'd, 520 F.3d 198 (2nd Cir. 2008); Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on Human Rights Opportunities, 95 Conn.App. 646, 649, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144 (2007), reh. denied, 128 S.Ct. 968, 169 L.Ed.2d 792 (2008). He fought an eviction action to remove him from the parish rectory. See Saint Bernard Society, Rockville v. Rweyemamu, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV 05-4001852 (May 4, 2005, Epstein, J.). This lawsuit followed.
III
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss invokes protections against state entanglement in religious affairs embodied in the first amendment to the United States Constitution. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .
The religious freedoms declared in the first amendment apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). The first amendment established a fundamental and familiar legal "wall of separation between Church and State" in this nation. Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State of Connecticut, 183 Conn. 522, 558-59, 441 A.2d 116 (1981). One of the oldest bulwarks is the rule that civil courts must refrain from adjudicating church disputes that require extensive inquiry into matters of "ecclesiastical rule, custom or law." Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall (80 U.S.) 679, 727, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872) (dispute over control of a church). Thus, in the seminal case of Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited court interference with a church's suspension, removal and defrocking of a Bishop — despite the fact that a lower court found that disciplinary action to be arbitrary — noting:
"[C]ivil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that sense `arbitrary' must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the first amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 713.
It is that principle, commonly called the ministerial exception, that caused the failure of jurisdiction over Father Justinian's challenges to the disciplinary action against him in federal and state court. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, supra, 520 F.3d 209; Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 654. In other cases, the ministerial exception has been applied to bar tort actions in contexts other than clerical employment litigation claims, such as where resolution of the case would require review and interpretation of church norms. See, e.g., DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn.App. 865, 878-80, 829 A.2d 38, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931, 837 A.2d 805 (2003), motion denied, 541 U.S. 985, 124 S.Ct. 2059, 158 L.Ed.2d 489 (2004) (church member's infliction of emotional distress claims denied).
Bishop Cote argues, in the instant case, that the ministerial exception should cause dismissal of BOCED's tort claims of defamation and tortious interference in business relationships for essentially two reasons: (1) The events in the instant case are inextricably intertwined with the events involved in the employment actions that have been dismissed under the ministerial exception, and this case should be dismissed for the same reasons; and (2) adjudication of this case would impermissibly entangle the court in resolving ecclesiastical rule, custom and law concerning fundraising norms in violation of the ministerial exception. This court agrees.
A
With respect to employment litigation over clerical disciplinary action, the law is abundantly clear:
The constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religious authority requires secular institutions to defer to the decisions of religious institutions in their employment relationships with their religious employees.
Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 654.
Of course, BOCED is not a religious employee. However, the offensive statements made by Bishop Cote alleged in this case concerning BOCED were made in the course of the discipline against its founder, chief executive officer and main fundraiser at Saint Bernard Church — Father Justinian — who is a religious employee. The criticisms of financial irregularities and ineffective management were criticisms of the conduct of Father Justinian. Plaintiff does not dispute the connection. In fact, it alleges in its complaint that the Bishop's statements were made as part of a vendetta against Father Justinian. Fifth Revised Complaint, para. 16. Father Justinian and BOCED were factually inseparable in the circumstances of this case. The applicability of the ministerial exception should adhere as well. Bishop Cote decided that Father Justinian's management and promotion of BOCED at Saint Bernard Church was mired in financial and fundraising controversies, unauthorized and harmful to the church, and he took action to cause it to stop. Assuming, as we must for the purposes of this motion, that Bishop Cote's statements were false, defamatory, intentionally interfered with certain donations, and made in revenge, his decision was nevertheless duly appealed through the ecclesiastical appellate process and it was ultimately upheld by the ecclesiastical tribunal of last resort. This court cannot overrule that tribunal. This court is constitutionally "bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization on matters of discipline." Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 713. Father Justinian's employment actions in federal and state court were dismissed for this reason. In other cases, it has been held that church leaders' explanations of their disciplinary actions to their parishioners, as well as their disciplinary actions, are covered by the ministerial exception. See, e.g., Brady v. Pace, 108 S.W.3d 54 (Mo.App. 2003); Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn.App. 1993). Thus, it has been held that the ministerial exception is not just limited to employment claims. It is equally applicable to defamation and tortious interference claims linked to church discipline where religious doctrine, faith or internal organization is involved. See, also, Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, 437 Mass. 505, 773 N.E.2d 929, 108 ALR 5th 843 (2002); Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 726, CT Page 19045 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985). Although cases from other jurisdictions are not binding on this court, the analysis of the common law presented in those cases are persuasive. Since the Bishop's statements in issue in the instant case were made in a context inextricably intertwined with the events involved in the employment actions against Father Justinian that are covered by the ministerial exception, and since the comments were made to parishioners affected, the claims of the plaintiff in this case also should be dismissed under the ministerial exception. The fact that BOCED is a separate legal entity from Father Justinian does not require the court to consider its claims out of context.
Of course, every lawsuit in which a church is a party involves ecclesiastical matters to some degree. The ministerial exception does not give blanket immunity to churches from all tort liability. See, e.g., Noll v. Hartford Roman Catholic Docesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. X04-CV-02-4034702 (October 20, 2008, Shapiro, J.) (negligent supervision claim against church allowed in case involving sexual abuse by priest). The United States Supreme Court has "consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (religious ceremony subject to criminal drug law enforcement). If this were simply a case of a dispute over accounting irregularities governed by neutral principles of law applicable to all, the ministerial exception would have no applicability. This is not that type of case. This case is about disciplinary action by a bishop against a priest over his performance with BOCED found to be adversely affecting the priest's religious duties and order in the clergy. It has been stated, "The neutral principles doctrine has never been extended to religious controversies in the areas of church government, order and discipline, nor should it be." Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 277, 93 L.Ed.2d 253 (1986). The law in this jurisdiction is in accord. The neutral principles doctrine does not apply to matters of internal governance of a religious institution or to matters relating to discipline of clergy — matters traditionally covered by the ministerial exception. Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 664.
In Connecticut, that broad rule has been substantially narrowed by General Statutes § 52-571b, particularly with respect to religious practices. See, also, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. That statute, however, does not control the law applicable to the issues in the instant case. Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 664.
Thus, the ministerial exception is applicable in this case, and, therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute.
B
Bishop Cote also argues that this matter should be dismissed under the ministerial exception because adjudication of this case would impermissibly entangle the court in resolving issues of ecclesiastical rule, custom and law concerning fundraising norms. The court agrees.
In DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society of New York, Inc., our Appellate Court declined to adjudicate a claim that a church member was harmed by negligent church religious counseling that urged her to endure her abusive husband. Citing established first amendment law prohibiting "excessive entanglement" by government in essentially religious matters, the court found that the ministerial exception barred the court from hearing the case, for the following reasons:
[I]n the present case, any analysis of the plaintiff's claims would require a court to delve into religious issues, which is prohibited by the first amendment. Determining whether the defendants' counseling created an unreasonable risk of emotional harm would require a court to evaluate the proprieties of religious teachings. Furthermore, the plaintiff cites certain Jehovah's scriptures, which would require the court to evaluate whether the defendants counseled in accordance therewith.
Under both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause, the first amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice. We conclude that the court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the count of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society of New York, Inc., supra, 78 Conn.App. 879-80.
In the instant case, the plaintiff's claims would require the court to resolve whether BOCED was lawfully banned from sharing in the collection of donations at Saint Bernard Church. Bishop Cote argues that this inquiry would excessively entangle the court in religious matters because it would require the court to evaluate church fundraising norms that are codified in church canon law. In particular, he points to Canon 1262. A copy of that canon is attached to defendant's reply brief together with a Decree of Promulgation of norms by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops that requires, inter alia, that fund raising appeals be "truthful and forthright, theologically sound, and should strive to motivate the faithful to a greater love of God and neighbor," and that requires written pre-approval. Decree, supra. One need not be an expert in canon law to recognize that this case will involve a deciphering of religious norms that will draw the court into "matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law" prohibited by the first amendment. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 713. It would invade the federal constitutional protection affording religious organizations "power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). Church fundraising is a religious freedom subject to first amendment protection analysis. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982). Where a case requires a court to discern and decipher canon law to ascertain wrongdoing, even where the underlying dispute concerns fiscal improprieties, other courts have concluded such a case would draw the court into an excessive entanglement with religion prohibited by the first amendment. See, e.g., Kraft v. Rector. Churchwardens Vestry of Grace Church, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4234; 2004 WL 540327 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2004). Deciding whether BOCED can pass the collection plate at Saint Bernard Church will certainly excessively entangle the court in essentially religious matters of ecclesiastical rule or governance. That is prohibited by the first amendment, and this court is deprived of jurisdiction over this case on this ground as well.
Canon law is the body of officially established rules governing the faith and practices of a Christian church. American Heritage Dictionary (Fourth Ed., 2000).
Canon 1262 provides:
The faithful are to give support to the Church by responding to appeals and according to the norms issued by the conference of bishops.
See, Code of Canon Law, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/INDEX.HTM .
IV
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted, and judgment may enter for the defendant dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.