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dismissing priest's breach of contract and wrongful discharge claims under 12(b), but stating in dicta that Free Exercise Clause does not bar court from deciding every dispute that might arise in context of church-minister employment contract
Summary of this case from Dolquist v. Heartland PresbyteryOpinion
01-CV-7871 (KMW)
March 15, 2004
OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff, a former senior associate priest at defendant Grace Church in New York ("Grace Church"), was terminated by Grace Church. Plaintiff does not contest the Church's right to terminate her, and does not seek reinstatement to her former position. Rather, plaintiff claims damages for breach of her employment contract and for the allegedly tortious conduct surrounding her termination. Specifically, plaintiff sues for: breach of, and tortious interference with, her employment contract; wrongful discharge; wrongful denial of employment benefits; and defamation. Each of the defendants moves to dismiss the Complaint, either in whole or in part.
Plaintiff's claims all arise out of her employment agreement. This agreement permitted Grace Church to terminate plaintiff with or without cause, but it entitled her to certain benefits if her termination was without cause. Plaintiff claims that she was ultimately terminated without cause, and yet did not receive the benefits to which she was entitled. Defendants claim that plaintiff was terminated for cause; namely, that certain expenditures made by plaintiff from her discretionary fund, and on the church credit card, were improper and in violation of canon law. Plaintiff's actions in tort similarly derive from her challenge to the Church's position that she was terminated for cause.
As discussed below, the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution (the "Free Exercise Clause") bars courts from adjudicating a dispute, such as this, regarding the reasons for a church's decision to terminate one of its ministers. Additionally, resolving the precise dispute posed by plaintiff in this litigation — namely, whether the challenged expenditures furthered her ministry and/or whether they complied with canon law — would likely entangle the Court in a religious dispute, in violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (the "Establishment Clause"). I. Background
"Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. Const. Amend. I.
"Congress shall make no law . . . respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. Const. Amend. I.
For the purposes of deciding these 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the Court assumes the facts surrounding the events in question as alleged in the Complaint. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff is an ordained priest of the Episcopal Church in good standing. See Complaint, ¶ 10. In 1997, plaintiff resigned as Rector of All Saints' Church in Briarcliff Manor, New York, to accept the position of Senior Associate Priest, with the title of "Vicar," at defendant Grace Church in New York. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. At that time, plaintiff entered into a written employment agreement (the "Agreement") with Grace Church. The Agreement provides that the "Vicar [i.e., plaintiff] shall serve at the pleasure of the Rector. If Vicar is terminated for any reason . . . other than for cause, she will be given not less than one year's prior written notice thereof." Agreement, § F(1). The Agreement also provides for: (1) specified compensation and benefits, id. Exh. A, § B; (2) "periods of leave at full compensation," id. at § A(2); and (3) plaintiff's ability to make disbursements from a clergy discretionary fund and a vicar's discretionary fund, id. at § D. The vicar's discretionary fund was established for the purpose of plaintiff to "deposit and, at her sole discretion, disburse all donations received to support her ministry."Id.
All references to the Employment Agreement are attached as Exhibit A to plaintiff's Complaint.
In May 1999, the Reverend John Andrew ("Andrew") became the "Priest-in-Charge" at Grace Church. See Complaint, ¶ 22. In late September 2000, Andrew notified plaintiff that she would be terminated without cause, effective October 1, 2001. Id. at 1 25. Upon receiving that notice, plaintiff began her search for employment at other parishes. Id. at ¶ 26. On January 18, 2001, plaintiff began a seven-month sabbatical leave. Id. at 1 29. In March 2001, Reverend David Rider ("Rider") was appointed the Priest-in-Charge of Grace Church, to be effective June 1, 2001. Id. at ¶ 34.
In April 2001, Defendant Bishop Grein ("Grein") directed Andrew to sign a letter (the "Termination Letter") immediately terminating plaintiff's employment for cause, based on alleged improprieties in plaintiff's use of the discretionary funds and of the parish's credit card. Id. at 55 36-38. On May I, 2001, Andrew read the Termination Letter at a meeting attended by: plaintiff; counsel for plaintiff; counsel for Grace Church; the Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer of Grace Church; the two Wardens; and Andrew. Id. at 55 42-46. In response, plaintiff asked for details about her alleged improprieties. She received a computer printout listing the allegedly improper transactions. Id. at ¶ 49. Included in the printout were several payments to the high school that her son attended, as well as payments to people who had, at some point, allegedly served as plaintiff's babysitter. See Defendants' Exh. 1. Kraft also used the discretionary funds to send her son and two friends on a ski trip with FOCUS, a religious group. Id. Kraft admits to having made the challenged expenditures, but defends them as having been properly made, at her discretion, to support her ministry. See Oct. 17, 2002, Tr. 69:14-21.
Representatives of Grace Church asked plaintiff to approve a draft announcement of her termination and to sign a draft agreement of termination. Complaint, 55 51-54. The draft announcement stated that there was cause for plaintiff's discharge; the draft agreement claimed to supercede all prior agreements. Id. at 15 51-52 54. Plaintiff refused to sign either. Id. at ¶¶ 52 56.
In a May 3, 2001, telephone conversation, and in a May 16, 2001, letter, Grein threatened and attempted to intimidate plaintiff to compel her to sign the draft termination agreement. Id. at II 59 61. In the letter, Grein advised plaintiff that, if she continued to refuse to sign the draft termination agreement, she could be charged in a formal canonical complaint with "conduct unbecoming of a member of clergy." Id. at Exh. D. Sometime thereafter, Grace Church terminated plaintiff's salary and all of her benefits. Id. at 163.
Throughout April, May and June 2001, Grein and Rider made false statements about plaintiff's alleged misuse of her discretionary funds and about plaintiff's other, unspecified, alleged "wrongdoing." Id. at ¶ 64. Grein and Rider made those statements to (among others) members of the congregation of Grace Church and plaintiff's prospective employers.Id. In an effort to discredit the allegations of impropriety, plaintiff documented each challenged financial transaction and requested an opportunity to present her documentation to the vestry of Grace Church.Id. at 1 65. When Rider denied her that opportunity, she distributed, on her own accord and for consideration at the next-scheduled meeting, written explanatory materials to all members of the vestry. Id. at ¶ 66. Rider directed the vestry to return the materials unread. Id. at ¶ 68.
On June 6, 2001, at a meeting between Grein and plaintiff, Grein acknowledged that plaintiff had not used improperly any of Grace Church's money. Id. at ¶ 75. Nonetheless, Grein continued to threaten plaintiff with ecclesiastical charges and attempted to intimidate her into not filing a lawsuit. Id. at ¶¶ 75-76. On June 26, at a special vestry meeting, Rider announced that he intended to appoint Richards to the position previously held by plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 79. Rider subsequently appointed Richards to the position. Id. at ¶ 81.
Plaintiff now charges Grace Church with breach of the Agreement, wrongful discharge and wrongfully denying her employment benefits. Plaintiff charges Grein, Richards and Rider with tortious interference with the Agreement. She charges all defendants with improperly damaging her professional reputation. Defendants move to dismiss, in part and in whole.
Plaintiff also seems to charge Grein, Richards and Rider with civil conspiracy, but she neither defines the conspiracy nor relates it to a specific cause of action. See Complaint, I 32. Because New York law does not recognize an independent tort for conspiracy, see Alexander Alexander of New York, Inc. v. Frizen, 68 N.Y.2d 968, 969 (1986); Burns Jackson Miller Summit Spitzer v. Lindner, 88 A.D.2d 50, 72 (App.Div. 1982), aff'd 59 N.Y.2d 314 (1983), the Court sua sponte dismisses plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim, to the extent that she raises one.
II. Discussion
Defendants move to dismiss this action, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff. See Jaghory v. New York State Pep't of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may not consider any material outside of the pleadings. See Fonte v. Bd. Managers of Cont'l Towers Condominium, 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1988). However, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court may refer to evidence outside of the pleadings to resolve any disputed jurisdictional facts. See Zappia Middle East Constr. Co., Ltd, v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994). The nature of the plaintiff's burden depends on the procedural posture of the litigation. See Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990). Where, as here, a court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether it can exercise jurisdiction, the plaintiff must demonstrate jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco, 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996);Robinson, 21 F.3d at 507 n. 3.
The Court held two evidentiary hearings in this matter, on August 14, 2002 and October 17, 2002.
Defendants challenge the Court's jurisdiction under both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that neither of these clauses protects defendants from a Court exercising jurisdiction. The key difference between a Free Exercise Clause analysis and an Establishment Clause analysis, is that the former focuses on the nature of the parties involved in the dispute, whereas the latter focuses on the issues that would have to be addressed in order to resolve the suit. See Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus College, 93 F. Supp.2d 200, 211 n. 13 212 n. 15 (D. Conn. 2000).
1. The Free Exercise Clause
If a suit involves an employment decision by a church with respect to one of its ministers, courts lack jurisdiction because the Free Exercise Clause bars court involvement in the employment relationship between a minister and a church. This absolute bar has developed under a line of Supreme Court cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause as prohibiting courts from encroaching on a church's ability to manage its internal affairs, particularly with respect to decisions regarding the selection and retention of clergy. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) ("it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them"); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) ("questions of church discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern").
See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952) (Free Exercise Clause protects the power of religious organizations "to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.").
Numerous Courts of Appeal have considered whether the Free Exercise Clause precludes ministers from suing church employers for purported violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes. Those courts have held, unanimously, that the Free Exercise Clause bars the application of these statutes to churches' employment decisions concerning ministers. Courts have referred to this bar as being a "ministerial exception" to, or a "ministerial exemption" from, federal anti-discrimination statutes.
See, e.g. Gellinaton v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of a minister's Title VII retaliation and constructive discharge claims, where the minister alleged that the church reassigned him to a far away church and decreased his pay because he assisted a co-worker in filing an official complaint to the church elders regarding sexual advances by a superior); Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing dismissal of a Title VII sexual harassment suit, but specifically noting that if the plaintiff there challenged a decision by the church to terminate him, the court "would simply defer [to the church's decision] without further inquiry");Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187-88 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of a minister's Title VII race-and gender-based claims challenging the church's decisionto deny her a promotion to the position of "Elder" and to ultimately terminate her as a minister, because "the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids a review of a church's procedures when it makes employment decisions affecting its clergy"); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of a minister's ADEA claim challenging the church's decision to deny him a pastorship, because the "determination of whose voice speaks for the church is per se a religious matter") (internal quotation marks omitted); McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59 (affirming dismissal of minister's Title VII gender-based discrimination claim challenging The Salvation Army's decision to terminate her, because "[t]he relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.").
Courts have extended this "ministerial exception" to bar not only claims by ministers, but also claims by lay employees of religious institutions, when the lay employees serve a function sufficiently similar to that served by ministers. See, e.g. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (noting that the ministerial exception extends to lay employees who serve the function of ministers); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 463-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a Catholic nun's Title VII sex discrimination suit, because the nun's duties as a member of the faculty at Catholic University of America were sufficiently similar to those of a minister under the "ministerial function test");Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary judgment against Chaplain's Title VII claim and ADEA claim, because the Chaplain's duties were similar to those of a minister, and "[p]ersonnel decisions by church-affiliated institutions affecting clergy are per se religious matters and cannot be reviewed by civil courts"; Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that if an employee's "primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship," that employee is a member of the clergy and is included within the ministerial exemption); E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283-85 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of faculty members' Title VII claims, because faculty members at the Seminary functioned as ministers, but reversing dismissal of Title VII claims brought by support staff and other persons, because they did not function as ministers).
Although the instant suit asserts common law claims, rather than federal statutory claims, the same constitutional principle applies to both, and bars court review of church decisions regarding the employment of ministers.
See, e.g. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950 ("Just as there is a ministerial exception to Title VII, there must also be a ministerial exception to any state law cause of action that would otherwise impinge on the church's prerogative to choose its ministers or to exercise its religious beliefs in the context of employing its ministers"); Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of numerous contract and tort claims arising from church's decision to terminate its minister as barred by Free Exercise Clause, because "a minister's employment relationship with his church implicates internal church discipline, faith, and organization, all of which are governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law"); Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1577 (1st Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of clergyman's suit for wrongful termination because "once a court is called upon to probe into a religious body's selection and retention of clergymen, the First Amendment is implicated").
The Second Circuit has never been called upon to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause prohibits courts from adjudicating employment disputes between members of the clergy and religious institutions. It made indirect reference to the "ministerial exception," without adopting it, in a case in which it held that the ADEA applied to a parochial school teacher because his duties were unlike a minister's duties. See DeMarco. v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1973: (denying motion to dismiss typist-receptionist's race-based Title VII claim, because her duties were nor similar to those of a minister, and thus the Free Exercise Clause did not bar adjudication of her claim).
The DeMarco court addressed the inapplicability of several "ministerial exception" cases during its Establishment Clause analysis.See DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 171-72. However, the "ministerial exception" cases that the court distinguished from the case before it appear to be based upon a Free Exercise Clause analysis.
In this case, plaintiff acknowledges that she was a minister at a church (her employment agreement states that her duties as Vicar included, inter alia, liturgical participation, preaching, pastoral care, supervision of children's ministries, and Women's Bible Study).See Agreement, Position Description. Plaintiff asks this Court to determine whether she was terminated for cause, which necessarily would require the Court to scrutinize the reasons for the church's decision to terminate one of its ministers. For the reasons explained above, the Free Exercise Clause bars the Court from resolving this dispute.
A very helpful discussion of the Free Exercise Clause doctrine is contained in Hartwig, 93 F. Supp.2d 200. After reviewing numerous cases addressing the implications of the Free Exercise Clause, the court concluded: "In sum, the cases teach that the Free Exercise Clause does not shield all employment decisions by religiously-affiliated institutions. Courts are required to examine the duties and responsibilities of the particular employee and examine whether they are ministerial or secular in nature. It is only when the Court concludes that the employee had primarily religious duties and responsibilities that the employment decision made by the religiously-affiliated institution is barred from review by the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
It is important to note that the Court does not hold that the Free Exercise Clause bars a court from adjudicating every dispute that might arise in the context of an employment contract between a minister and her church. The Court's holding is limited to a church's decisions concerningemployment of ministers.
For instance, in plaintiff's Agreement with Grace Church, the church agreed to provide plaintiff with an apartment, and to pay her utilities. See Agreement, § B(2). If the church failed to pay plaintiff's utilities bills, and plaintiff chose to sue the church for breach, the Free Exercise Clause would not bar such an action. The crucial distinction between that permissible suit, and this impermissible suit, is that this suit involves a challenge to the church's decision to terminate plaintiff. The Court cannot adjudicate such disputes. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (noting that the "ministerial exception" to Title VII suits only bars consideration of suits alleging "adverse personnel action[s]").
Plaintiff argues that this case would not require court involvement in a church's decision regarding who is fit to be a minister, because the Court is not being asked to order the church to do anything other than pay damages for breaching the Agreement, and for its tortious conduct surrounding that breach.
The Court rejects plaintiff's argument. Under a Free Exercise Clause analysis, plaintiff's distinction between a claim for damages and a claim for reinstatement is irrelevant. Regardless of the relief requested, a court may not exercise jurisdiction over a case disputing the reasons why a church decided to terminate a minister. The fact that courts do not accept plaintiff's proposed distinction is reflected in decisions declining to exercise any jurisdiction over cases brought by ministers pursuant to federal anti-discrimination laws. If these courts had found it appropriate to exercise jurisdiction over disputes to the extent that the disputes are over damages, they would have done so.
The Court is aware that two courts have suggested that the distinction between damages and reinstatement might make a difference. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950 (suggesting that the scope of the ministerial exception may depend upon the remedy sought); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360 (reversing dismissal of plaintiff's claim for breach of oral contract, stating "as the remedy would be limited to the award of money damages, we see no potential for distortion of church appointment decisions").
The prohibition on a court resolving employment disputes between a church and its minister is founded on the principle that courts may not second-guess a church's determination of who is fit to perform religious duties. It is irrelevant whether the end result of such a court determination would be damages or reinstatement.
The Court recognizes that this decision allows a church to contract to terminate a minister only "for cause," with the minister's only recourse for breach being an appeal to the church itself. See National Network of Episcopal Clergy Associates, amicus curiae letter-brief, dated February 5, 2002. This result is required, however, by the Free Exercise Clause.
2. Establishment Clause
Because the Court holds that plaintiff's suit is barred by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court need not decide whether it is also barred by the Establishment Clause. However, the Court notes that on the facts presented in this case, it is likely that plaintiff's suit would also be barred by the Establishment Clause.
The Establishment Clause bars courts from exercising jurisdiction in cases where resolution of the dispute would result in the "entanglement" of government with religion. See Gargano v. Diocese of Rockville Centre, 80 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1996). Entanglement occurs when a court is called upon to resolve disputed issues of "religious doctrine and practice."Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 431 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969)).
The Termination Letter states that certain improprieties were discovered "concerning [plaintiff's] discretionary account funds, and [her] use of the church credit card," and that in accordance with canon law she was terminated. Complaint, Exh. C. Plaintiff contends that canon law is not implicated by her termination, because her use of the Vicar's discretionary fund is governed solely by the terms of her employment contract, which permits her "at her sole discretion" to make disbursements "to further her ministry." Agreement § D. Plaintiff argues that even if her employment contract is to be read in accordance with canon law, canon law is silent with respect to expenditures from church credit cards and vicar's discretionary funds.
The Establishment Clause would bar consideration of this suit for two reasons. First, in order to decide whether canon law applies in this suit, the Court would have to resolve the parties' dispute about the meaning and reach of canon law. The Court entanglement with religion that this decision would require is underscored by the parties' submissions of Affidavits from experts disputing the scope and meaning of canon law. A court is barred by the Free Exercise Clause from resolving such disputes. See Martinelli, 196 F.3d at 431 ("First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when . . . litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice") (quoting Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449).
Second, regardless of whether the challenged expenditures are governed by canon law or by the terms of plaintiff's employment agreement, the exercise of jurisdiction would require the Court to make determinations that are inherently religious. That is, if canon law applies to plaintiff's expenditures, resolution of this suit would require the Court to determine whether the challenged expenditures were used for "pious and charitable purposes," see Title III, Canon 14, Section 2(f) of the Canons of the General Convention, Notice of Motion, Exh. B. On the other hand, if plaintiff's expenditures are to be judged on the terms of her employment agreement, the Court would have to determine whether the funds were used in furtherance of plaintiff's ministry, see Agreement § D. In either case, the Court would be required to pass on whether the church's invocation of church doctrine and religious principles constituted sufficient cause for plaintiff's termination.
III. Conclusion
The Court concludes that the Free Exercise Clause bars this Court from adjudicating plaintiff's employment dispute with Grace Church, because resolution of the dispute would encroach upon the constitutionally protected relationship between a church and its ministers. Because plaintiff's claims of tortious interference with employment contract and defamation are essentially tied to whether the employment contract was breached, and whether plaintiff's use of her discretionary fund and the parish credit card were improper, the Court dismisses those claims as well.
The Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over this matter, and dismisses plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. Any pending motions are moot.
SO ORDERED.