Opinion
November 10, 1959.
December 17, 1959.
Unemployment Compensation — Availability for work — Full time student — Willingness to give up schooling — Conditions — Question of fact for board — Unemployment Compensation Law.
1. In an unemployment compensation case, in which it appeared that claimant, a regular student at a college, had been employed after school hours, that employment possibilities that would correspond to the hours that claimant was available for work were practically nonexistent in the area, and that he stated that he would quit school if the job offered him were good enough, it was Held that claimant was properly denied benefits on the ground that he failed to meet the availability requirements of § 401(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law.
2. One may render himself unavailable for work by conditions and limitations imposed by him.
3. The determination of availability is largely a question of fact for the board.
4. The board is the ultimate fact finding body.
Before HIRT, GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, ERVIN, and WATKINS, JJ. (RHODES, P.J., absent).
Appeal, No. 191, April T., 1959, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, in re claim of Charles F. Collins. Decision affirmed.
Charles F. Collins, appellant, in propria persona.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General, for appellee.
Argued November 10, 1959.
In this unemployment compensation case the claimant, Charles F. Collins, 20 years of age, was discharged from the Armed Service on September 22, 1958. He attended Penn State University for one semester and then enrolled as a part time student at the University of Youngstown, Youngstown, Ohio in February 1959.
He commuted from his home in New Castle, Pa., to school and attended classes during the following hours at the time his claim was pending: On Monday and Wednesday from 5:30 to 7:00 p.m.; on Tuesday and Thursday from 9:30 to 11:00 a.m., and from 5:30 to 7:00 p.m., and on Friday from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. He filed his application for benefits on January 6, 1959, and indicated to the Bureau that he was available for work after his school classes, or after 12 noon and on week-ends. The record shows that job opportunities for the type of work to meet his requirements are practically non-existent in his labor market area and that industrial job opportunities are not available unless the applicant can work rotating shifts.
The Bureau denied benefits on the ground that he failed to meet the availability requirements of Section 401(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 PS 801(d). The referee reversed the bureau's finding that he could arrange his schedule or forego his schooling and so be available for employment. The board reversed the referee, vacating his findings of fact and found that he was not available. The board is the ultimate fact finding body. Anetakis v. The Salvation Army, 191 Pa. Super. 268, 156 A.2d 590 (1959). The determination of availability is largely a question of fact for the board. Pinto Unemployment Compensation Case, 168 Pa. Super. 540, 79 A.2d 802 (1951).
Although he indicated he would change his school hours, or if necessary, discontinue some of his classes, if offered a job, when asked by the referee, "Q. Would you quit school if you were offered full-time work?", he answered, "A. Well, I would quit if the job was good enough, but if there was any way for me to continue to go to school and work I would do it."
In almost identical factual situations we held, that benefits were properly denied under Section 401(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law where it appeared that claimant was a regular student at a college while he was employed after school hours; and that the board found that employment possibilities that would correspond to the hours that claimant was available for work were practically non-existent in the area. "One may render himself unavailable for work by conditions and limitations imposed by him." Lovich Unempl. Compensation Case, 189 Pa. Super. 529, 530, 151 A.2d 647 (1959); Bates Unemployment Compensation Case, 191 Pa. Super. 266, 156 A.2d 589 (1959).
Decision affirmed.