Opinion
No. 570563/14.
12-18-2015
CHRYSLER FINANCIAL SERVICES AMERICAS LLC f/k/a DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Americas LLC, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Monica MORANTE, Defendant–Appellant, -andGeraldo Marreno, Defendant.
Order (Nancy M. Bannon, J.), entered December 10, 2013, affirmed, without costs.
Civil Court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant-appellant's motion for a protective order conditioning plaintiff judgment creditor's use of an income execution (see Guardian Loan Co., Inc. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 519 [1979] ). Defendant failed to substantiate her claim of undue financial hardship or demonstrate any other basis for protective relief pursuant to CPLR 5240 or CPLR 5231(i) (see Dowlah v. Dowlah, 89 AD3d 675 [2011] ; Midlantic Nat. Bank/N. v. Reif, 732 F Supp 354 [ED N.Y.1990] ). In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to reach any other issue.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur
Concurring opinion
DORIS LING–COHAN, J.
I concur with the determination that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the relief requested below, which was to vacate Chrysler Financial Services Americas LLC's lien on defendant-appellant's automobile, as the defendant-appellant's assertions were conclusory and not substantiated by relevant proof. However, to the extent the lower court denied the requested relief based upon a claim of lack of jurisdiction, citing N.Y. City Civ Ct Act (CCA) §§ 209 and 218, I disagree.
CPLR § 5240 provides courts with broad authority, which is not limited by the CCA. In fact, CCA § 212, titled “Additional Jurisdiction and Powers”, provides: “In the exercise of its jurisdiction the court shall have all the powers that the Supreme Court would have in like actions and proceedings.” The grant of CCA § 212's comparable Supreme Court powers is “procedural and interstitial”. Kwoczka v. Dry Dock Sav. Bank, 52 Misc.2d 67, 72 (Civ Ct, N.Y. County 1982). Pursuant to CCA § 212, the only limitation to the Civil Court in exercising such comparable Supreme Court powers is that the Civil Court must have had jurisdiction in the first instance, as is the case herein . Id.
CCA § 202 grants jurisdiction to the Civil Court for actions for the recovery of money not exceeding $25,000. The instant action is to recover payment for default on a retail installment contract for $17,632.90.
A defendant seeking to modify a Civil Court judgment, therefore, need not bring a separate proceeding in the Supreme Court. See, e .g. HamiltonAir Co., Inc. v. Gould, 17 Misc.3d 222 (Civ Ct, N.Y. County 2007) (holding that motion to discharge mechanic's lien was properly before the Civil Court, regardless of the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the CCA and the Lien Law); Risicato v. Lumberyard Supply Corp., 194 Misc.2d 770 (Civ Ct, Queens County 2003) (finding that a motion to discharge an ancient mortgage within the Civil Court's jurisdiction, “ “... notwithstanding the plain language of a statute ostensibly conferring such jurisdiction exclusively in the Supreme and County Courts”). It would otherwise be illogical for a party, already under jurisdiction of the Civil Court, to be forced to bring a separate proceeding in Supreme Court, to modify the very same judgment that is the subject of the Civil Court action. See A.R.T., Ltd. v. Simpson, 114 Misc.2d 662, 665 (Civ Ct, N.Y. County 1982).Thus, pursuant to CPLR § 5240, the Civil Court is vested with the authority to, “at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any interested person ... make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure ...”. CPLR § 5240 gives the court broad discretionary power to control and regulate the enforcement of a money judgment in order to prevent “unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts.” Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515 (1979) (citations omitted).
The purpose of CPLR § 5240 is to protect judgment debtors from the harsh consequences of the lawful or abusive enforcement procedures set forth in CPLR Article 52. See Midlantic National Bank/North v. Reif, 732 F Supp 354 (ED NY1990) (“CPLR § 5240 is plainly designed to prevent the brutal use of legal procedures against a judgment debtor”); Seyfarth v. Bi–County Elec. Corp., 73 Misc.2d 363 (Sup Ct, N.Y. County 1973) (CPLR § 5240 “allows a court to restrain execution upon its judgment where unwarranted hardship would otherwise result”); Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 75 Misc.2d 32 (Sup Ct, Westchester County 1973) (the major purpose of the broad provision of CPLR § 5240 “is to prevent abuse in the use of or as a result of the use of the enforcement procedures in CPLR article 52”). The statute is to be used to aid a party who has been “inequitably burdened by enforcement procedures ... to allow him an opportunity to either meet his legal obligation or postpone the enforcement of a judgment until such time that its enforcement is more properly sought”. Kolortron Systems v. Casey, 118 A.D.2d 687 (2d Dept 1986), appeal dismissed 68 N.Y.2d 807 (1986). The goal of a supervising court is to “harmoniz[e] the judgment debtor's interest in avoiding irreparable ... harm ... with the legitimate interest of a creditor in securing payment for a valid debt”. Moskin v. Marine Midland Bank & Trust Co., 96 Misc.2d 600, 602 (Sup Ct, N.Y. County 1978) (citations omitted).
As stated above, CPLR § 5240 is applicable to Civil Court, as per CCA § 212, unaffected by CCA §§ 209 and 218 , which the lower court relied upon. The Civil Court, as a court that has jurisdiction over matters affecting ordinary people such as housing, consumer debt and other monetary transactions (CCA §§ 202, 204, 207 ), deprived of the broad discretionary power to control and regulate the enforcement of its own money judgments would cause unwarranted hardship on the small judgment debtor, and increase the cost of “doing business” for the creditor, if it had to defend such applications in the Supreme Court. See Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 519 (1979) ; CPLR § 5240. Thus, CPLR § 5240, applicable to Civil Court via CCA § 212, bridges the procedural gap between enforcement procedures and relief from such enforcement, allowing the Civil Court to properly carry out its role in adjudicating matters over ordinary people without creating undue jurisdictional burdens. See Kwoczka v. Dry Dock Sav. Bank, 52 Misc.2d 67, 72 (Civ Ct, N.Y. County 1982).
CCA § 209 is titled “Provisional” remedies. The use of “provisional” denotes a “temporary remedy awarded before judgment and pending the action's disposition, such as a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, a prejudgment receivership, or an attachment. Such a remedy is intended to maintain the status quo by protecting a person's safety or preserving property,” inapplicable to enforcement devices or security interests. Black's Law Dictionary (10th edition 2014), remedy.
CCA § 218 does not exist.
Furthermore, New York jurisprudence dictates that the courts have the inherent power to modify their own judgments. The power of the court to exercise control over its own judgments “... does not depend on any statute, but is inherent, and it would be quite unfortunate if it did not possess it to the fullest extent”. Ladd v. Stevensen, 112 N.Y. 325, 331 (1889). “Courts have control over their own proceedings, and in its exercise may open their own judgmens for sufficient reason and in furtherance of justice”. Michaud v. Loblaws, 36 A.D.2d 1013 (4th Dept 1971) (citation omitted). Accordingly, in order to further justice and the values of judicial economy, logic and case law dictate that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to modify its own judgments and enforcement procedures.
I note that, as defendant-appellant alleged, inter alia, hardship, she may qualify for other relief (which was not specifically requested in her motion), upon proper substantiation, including a modification of the income execution, which “may properly be scaled down by court order when such weekly payment is unduly burdensome' “. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank/North v. Reif, 732 F Supp 354, 357 (ED N.Y.1990) ; see also CPLR § 5231(i).