Opinion
2011-11-1
Caf DOWLAH, appellant,v.Bilkis S. DOWLAH, defendant;Visnick McGovern Milizio, LLP, nonparty-respondent.
Caf Dowlah, Forest Hills, N.Y., appellant pro se.Visnick McGovern Milizio, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Avrohom Gefen of counsel), for nonparty-respondent pro se.
In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered September 23, 2009, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Jackman–Brown, J.), dated December 10, 2010, which denied his motion, in effect, to vacate a money judgment of the same court entered May 24, 2010, which, upon the judgment of divorce, is in favor of the nonparty Visnick McGovern Milizio, LLP, and against him in the principal sum of $15,000, representing an award of an attorney's fee, and to vacate the income execution enforcing the money judgment.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Pursuant to CPLR 5015(a), a court may vacate an order or judgment on several different grounds, including the fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that the money judgment issued in favor of his former wife's attorneys was procured through fraud or other misconduct ( see Gaw v. Gaw, 80 A.D.3d 557, 558, 914 N.Y.S.2d 665; Katz v. Marra, 74 A.D.3d 888, 890–891, 905 N.Y.S.2d 204; Gamba v. Gamba, 253 A.D.2d 784, 785, 677 N.Y.S.2d 610), or that any of the other statutory grounds for vacatur set forth in CPLR 5015(a) apply ( see Alderman v. Alderman, 78 A.D.3d 621, 910 N.Y.S.2d 361). The plaintiff also failed to show that there was a basis to invoke the court's inherent power to vacate the money judgment in the interest of substantial justice ( see Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 68, 760 N.Y.S.2d 727, 790 N.E.2d 1156; Galasso, Langione & Botter, LLP v. Liotti, 81 A.D.3d 884, 885, 917 N.Y.S.2d 667; Alderman v. Alderman, 78 A.D.3d at 622, 910 N.Y.S.2d 361; Katz v. Marra, 74 A.D.3d at 891, 905 N.Y.S.2d 204). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was, in effect, to vacate the money judgment.
Further, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was, in effect, to vacate the income execution enforcing the money judgment. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that protective relief was warranted pursuant to CPLR 5240 or CPLR 5231(i) ( see generally Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 419 N.Y.S.2d 56, 392 N.E.2d 1240; see also Nord v. Berman, 5 Misc.3d 1002[A], 2004 N.Y. Slip Op 51150 [U], 2004 WL 2282487; cf. Midlantic Natl. Bank/North v. Reif, 732 F.Supp. 354).
RIVERA, J.P., ENG, BELEN and AUSTIN, JJ., concur.