Opinion
HHDCV176075204S
07-17-2017
Abraham Chemmarappally et al. v. State of Connecticut et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION'S MOTION TO INTERVENE; HARTFORD COURANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SEAL
Antonio C. Robaina, J.
Three motions are currently pending before the court: (1) a motion to intervene that was filed by the Hartford Courant and its reporter, Vinny Vella (collectively, the Courant); (2) a motion to intervene that was filed by the Freedom of Information Commission (commission); and (3) a motion to seal a ten-second segment of a video (videotape)-which is in the possession of the University of Connecticut (UConn)-that was filed by the plaintiffs, Abraham and Shinymol Chemmarappally, as coadministrators of the estate of Jeffny Pally (decedent). For the reasons set forth subsequently in this memorandum, the court (I) grants the motions to intervene of the Courant and the commission, respectively, and (II) denies the plaintiffs' motion to seal the videotape without prejudice.
FACTS
The present action arises from a dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the state of Connecticut (state) and Dana Barrow, Jr., regarding the alleged death of the decedent. On February 2, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a complaint-which is the operative complaint-against the defendants. The complaint consists of three counts. Count one, which is asserted against the state, sounds in negligence pursuant to General Statutes § 52-556. Counts two and three, which are asserted against Barrow, sound in recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 and common-law recklessness, respectively.
General Statutes § 52-556 provides in relevant part: " Any person injured in person . . . through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to recover damages for such injury."
General Statutes § 14-295 provides in relevant part: " In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury [or] wrongful death . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, [or] 14-222 . . . and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury [or] death . . ."
In counts one, two, and three of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege the following facts. On or about October 16, 2016, the decedent was on the premises of UConn. Early that morning, at approximately 1:14 a.m., the decedent approached UConn's public safety complex (complex) and took a seat on the ground, directly in front of the complex's seventh parking bay (parking bay). The parking bay was enclosed by a garage door. Around this time, UConn's fire department, which was housed in the complex, received a request for emergency assistance. Barrow, an employee of the state, proceeded to respond to the call.
In so doing, Barrow entered a fire department Chevrolet Tahoe (truck) that was parked in the parking bay. The fire department's staff opened the garage door, and, as Barrow exited the parking bay, he drove the truck forward. Consequently, the truck drove over the decedent, and she died. Thus, the plaintiffs claim, inter alia, " monetary and compensatory" damages, " double and treble" damages as to count two, and " exemplary and punitive" damages as to count three.
The plaintiffs have filed a motion for a protective order pursuant to Practice Book § 13-5. In the motion, the plaintiffs first represent that the videotape depicts the decedent's death, and it is in UConn's possession. Second, the plaintiffs assert that " any disclosure of this [videotape] would be highly offensive, distressing and cause severe emotional anguish to the plaintiffs and to the close family members of the decedent." The plaintiffs further assert that " such disclosure may also impair the abilities of the parties to empanel a fair and impartial jury at the time of trial." Thus, the plaintiffs urge the court to enter a protective order with respect to the videotape.
Practice Book § 13-5 provides in relevant part: " Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including . . . (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place . . ."
The commission has filed a motion to intervene in the present case. It asserts that it " seeks to intervene for the purpose of objecting to those aspects of the [plaintiffs'] proposed protective order that would impermissibly supersede the FOI [a]ct and the authority of the [commission]." Similarly, the Courant has filed a motion to intervene, which is coupled with an objection to the motion for a protective order.
The plaintiffs filed an objection to the commission's motion to intervene, as well as a motion to seal the videotape pursuant to Practice Book § 11-20A. In doing so, the plaintiffs assert that (1) disclosing the videotape to the public serves " no legitimate public interest"; (2) the commission cannot intervene because it lacks an adequate interest in the present case; (3) the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., does not support the commission's intervention; (4) the videotape falls within the act's " invasion of personal privacy" exemption; and (5) the videotape is subject to the act's " Sandy Hook" exemption. In a subsequent pleading, the plaintiffs advanced a Constitutional argument in support of their position and modified their position with respect to the relief requested.
Practice Book § 11-20A provides in relevant part: " (c) Upon written motion of any party . . . the judicial authority may order that . . . materials on file or lodged with the court or in connection with a court proceeding be sealed or their disclosure limited only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in viewing such materials . . ."
In their supplemental memorandum of law, the plaintiffs, relying on Marsh v. San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012), argue that the court should grant their motion to seal the videotape because, under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, they have " a federal constitutional right to control the graphic video at issue in the present case." The court declines to address the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim because Connecticut law provides adequate and independent grounds upon which to decide the motion to seal; see part II of this memorandum; and " [t]his court has a basic judicial duty to avoid deciding a constitutional issue if a nonconstitutional ground exists that will dispose of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of New York v. Bell, 120 Conn.App. 837, 840 n.4, 993 A.2d 1022, cert. dismissed, 298 Conn. 917, 4 A.3d 1225 (2010).
DISCUSSION
I
MOTIONS TO INTERVENE
" [I]ntervention is defined, inter alia, as the proceeding by which one not originally a party to an action is permitted, on his own application, to appear therein and join one of the original parties in maintaining the action or defense . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 57 Conn.App. 589, 595-96, 749 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 926, 754 A.2d 796 (2000). " It is well established that there are two forms of intervention: (1) intervention as of right and (2) permissive intervention." Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Litchfield Housing Authority, 117 Conn.App. 30, 43, 978 A.2d 136 (2009), appeal dismissed, 302 Conn. 158, 24 A.3d 596 (2011). " Intervention as of right provides a legal right to be a party to the proceeding that may not be properly denied by the exercise of judicial discretion. Permissive intervention means that, although the person may not have the legal right to intervene, the court may, in its discretion, permit him or her to intervene, depending on the circumstances." BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 204 n.8, 990 A.2d 853 (2010).
" General Statutes § § 52-102 and 52-107 govern the intervention of nonparties to an action and provide for both permissive intervention and intervention as a matter of right." (Footnotes in original.) Id., 203-04. In ruling on a motion to intervene, the court must " look to the pleadings, that is, to the motion . . . to intervene and to the proposed complaint or defense in intervention . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 640, 648, 81 A.3d 200 (2013). " [T]he pleadings are accepted as correct, and the interest of an intervenor does not have to be proved by testimony or evidence." Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 60 Conn.App. 134, 142, 758 A.2d 916 (2000). " Further, the rules for intervention should be construed liberally to avoid multiplicity of suits." Id.
General Statutes § 52-102 provides in relevant part: " Upon motion made by any . . . nonparty to a civil action . . . the nonparty so moving . . . (1) may be made a party by the court if that person has or claims an interest in the controversy, or any part thereof, adverse to the plaintiff, or (2) shall be made a party by the court if that person is necessary for a complete determination or settlement of any question involved therein . . ." See also Practice Book § 9-6.
General Statutes § 52-107 provides: " The court may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court may direct that such other parties be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the court, on his application, shall direct him to be made a party." Accord Practice Book § 9-18. The Appellate Court has noted that " Practice Book § 9-18 'is virtually identical to C.G.S.A. § 52-107, which has been in existence since it was adopted as § 15 of the 1879 Practice Act. The recent tendency of the Supreme Court is to ignore the specific embarrassing language of these sections and follow the most analogous Federal Rule.' " Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 60 Conn.App. 134, 139 n.7, 758 A.2d 916 (2000), quoting W. Horton & K. Knox, 1 Connecticut Practice Series: Practice Book Annotated (4th Ed. 1998), § 9-18, comments, p. 310.
A
The Courant
The Courant claims that the court should permit it to intervene in the present action. In support of this claim, the Courant argues that several factors weigh in favor of permissive intervention. Specifically, the Courant argues that its motion to intervene is timely and it has a legitimate interest in the present case because, " [a]s the publisher of Connecticut's most widely-circulated daily and Sunday newspaper, [its] job is to write about and publish news of interest to the public, and to do so in a timely manner ." (Emphasis in original.) The Courant further argues that its interest is not represented adequately by the plaintiffs and defendants. Also, the Courant argues that its intervention will not cause delay, and it is necessary and valuable to the resolution of the present case.
In opposition, the plaintiffs argue that the Courant has not satisfied the standard the governs intervention under the rules of practice. With respect to this point, the plaintiffs argue that the Courant lacks a direct and immediate interest in the subject matter of the present case, i.e., the alleged tortious conduct of the defendants. In other words, " [t]he [Courant] is not in any way affected by the subject matter of this wrongful death action. Likewise, the [Courant] will not be affected in any way by the judgment of the action. Rather, the [Courant] is simply seeking to intervene in order to inject itself into a discovery issue."
1
Permissive Intervention Standard
" [Questions of permissive intervention are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . ." In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 277, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). " A trial court exercising its discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for permissive intervention balances several factors [including]: the timeliness of the intervention, the proposed intervenor's interest in the controversy, the adequacy of representation of such interests by other parties, the delay in the proceedings or other prejudice to the existing parties the intervention may cause, and the necessity for or value of the intervention in resolving the controversy [before the court]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 461, 904 A.2d 137 (2006). " With respect to the propriety of the trial court's balancing of these factors, [our Supreme Court] [has] stated that [a] ruling on a motion for permissive intervention would be erroneous only in the rare case {in which] such factors weigh so heavily against the ruling that it would amount to an abuse of the trial court's discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 226, 884 A.2d 981 (2005).
" The standard for allowing permissive intervention is more flexible than intervention by right." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kleinknecht v. Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-07-4007688-S (August 10, 2009, Martin, J.) (48 Conn.L.Rptr. 379, 381, ). " In order for a proposed intervenor to establish that it is entitled to intervene as a matter of right, the proposed intervenor must satisfy a well established four element conjunctive test: [T]he motion to intervene must be timely, the movant must have a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, the movant's interest must be impaired by disposition of the litigation without the movant's involvement and the movant's interest must not be represented adequately by any party to the litigation . . . Failure to meet any one of the four elements . . . will preclude intervention as of right ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) BNY Western Trust v. Roman, supra, 295 Conn. 205-06.
2
Application
In the present case, the foregoing factors weigh in favor of permitting the Courant to intervene for the purpose of objecting to the plaintiffs' motion to seal. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 60 Conn.App. 152 (" A court has the authority to grant intervention limited to particular issues . . ."). First, the Courant's motion was filed at the outset of the present action, which makes intervention timely. Second, the Courant has a sufficient interest in the present action because it is seeking to " gather and disseminate the news in order to enable the public to know the details of this case . . ." Hartford v. Chase, 733 F.Supp. 533, 534 (D.Conn. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 942 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1991).
In Hartford v. Chase, supra, 733 F.Supp. 534, " [a] newspaper and a reporter of that newspaper demonstrated a sufficient interest to allow intervention for the purpose of objecting to the sealing of a file on constitutional grounds in a breach of contract claim brought by a city against a real estate developer even though the intervenors asserted no personal right or interest in the outcome of the case." Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 60 Conn.App. 145.
Third, the Courant's interest in the present case is distinct and dissimilar from the primary interest of both the plaintiffs (prosecuting tort claims relating to the alleged death of the decedent) and the defendants (defeating the plaintiffs' tort claims), respectively. Fourth, the Courant's intervention would pertain exclusively to the sealing of the videotape, an issue that is ancillary to the substantive question of whether the defendants tortiously caused the decedent's death. Finally, permitting the Courant to intervene would be valuable in ruling on the plaintiffs' motion to seal because the defendants have not interposed substantive arguments in opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the court grants the Courant's motion to intervene for the purpose of objecting to the plaintiffs' motion to seal the videotape.
Although it is theoretically conceivable that the Courant's intervention could delay the resolution of the present action, this consideration alone does not militate against permissive intervention because " [i]f resolution for its own sake were the decisive factor, then permissive intervention would be a hollow remedy, as it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which allowing intervention would promote speedy resolution of a controversy." Hartford v. West Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-01-0810472-S (August 12, 2002, Beach, J.) (32 Conn.L.Rptr. 695, 697, ).
B
The Commission
The commission claims that the court should permit it to intervene in the present case and argues that five factors weigh in favor of permitting it to the intervene. Specifically, the commission argues that its motion to intervene is timely and that it has a " strong interest" in the present case because curtailing the disclosure of the videotape to the public is inconsistent with the act. In this regard, the commission argues that it is vested with " the authority and responsibility to adjudicate alleged violations of the [a]ct." The commission further argues that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants would adequately represent its interest, its intervention would not delay the present case, and its presence is necessary and valuable. Second, the commission claims that its intervention in the present case is appropriate pursuant to General Statutes § 1-242. In support of this claim, the commission argues that, for purposes of § 1-242, the issues before the court " involve" the act, and, as the administrative body that has jurisdiction over claims arising under the act, it has a " strong interest" regarding the plaintiffs' attempt to curtail the disclosure of the videotape to the public.
General Statutes § 1-242 provides in relevant part: " (a) In any action involving the assertion that a provision of the [act] has been violated or constitutes a defense, the court . . . shall make an order requiring the party asserting such violation or defense, as applicable, to provide the [commission] with notice of the action and a copy of the complaint and all pleadings in the action . . . (b) Upon the filing of a verified pleading by the commission, the court . . . may grant the commission's motion to intervene in the action for purposes of participating in any issue involving a provision of the [act]."
In opposition, the plaintiffs claim that the commission's motion to intervene should be denied because the commission has not satisfied the standard the governs intervention under the rules of practice. As with respect to the Courant, the plaintiffs argue that the commission lacks a direct and immediate interest in the subject matter of the present case, i.e., the alleged tortious conduct of the defendants. Second, the plaintiffs argue that § 1-242 does not support the commission's intervention because the subject of the complaint does not concern or implicate the act.
Turning to the present case, the court concludes that it is unnecessary to assess the commission's second claim, i.e., whether it has a right to intervene in the present action under § 1-242, because the factors set forth in part IA1 of this memorandum weigh in favor of granting the commission permission to intervene. See, e.g., Milford v. Local 1566, Council 4, AFSCME, 200 Conn. 91, 94, 510 A.2d 177 (1986) (declining to address the arbitration board's request to intervene as of right because its intervention " was fully supported under the law governing permissive intervention").
" One of the ways that a proposed intervenor may establish a right to intervene is by showing that she has such a right derived from statute." Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Litchfield Housing Authority, supra, 117 Conn.App. 44. " In such cases, the terms of the statute dictate the right to intervene . . ." BNY Western Trust v. Roman, supra, 295 Conn. 205 n.9. Alternatively, " where the question of intervention as of right is based on general jurisprudential principles rather than on whether a statute provides for a right of intervention, our Supreme Court has adopted a four part test to determine whether a party is entitled to intervention as of right." Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Litchfield Housing Authority, supra, 44 n.8. See footnote 9 of this memorandum.
The Court finds that the commission's motion was filed at the genesis of the present case, which makes intervention timely. Concerning the second factor, the commission has an adequate interest in the present action because the plaintiffs' motion to seal, if granted, presents a very real potential for an influx of claimed violations of the act, and the commission has original jurisdiction over such alleged violations. See General Statutes § § 1-205(d), 1-206(b) and 1-206(d).
" [D]ocuments sealed according to law would not be available for public inspection." Clerk of the Superior Court v. Freedom of Information Commission, 278 Conn. 28, 54 n.2, 895 A.2d 743 (2006) (Palmer, J., concurring). This effect, as applied to the videotape, could seem to be in tension with the act's general rule-i.e., public disclosure. See Lieberman v. Aronow, 319 Conn. 748, 754-55, 127 A.3d 970 (2015). Nevertheless, to be clear, the court neither decides nor expresses an opinion on whether the videotape is a public record for purposes of the act.
Tellingly, in their reply to the motion for a protective order, the defendants first represent that " UConn has received five (5) requests under the [act] that would result in production of the [videotape]." The defendants further represent that UConn " did not produce the [videotape] in response to these requests due to the filing of the [plaintiffs'] [m]otion for [a] [p]rotective [o]rder." To bolster, at short calendar, counsel for the commission represented to the court that, with respect to the videotape, " there is now an ongoing administrative process before the commission."
As to the third factor, the commission's interest is not adequately represented by the plaintiffs and the defendants because its interest is unrelated to the prosecution of tort claims that stem from the alleged death of the decedent. Regarding the fourth factor, the commission's intervention would pertain exclusively to the sealing of the videotape, an issue that is ancillary to the substantive question of whether the defendants tortiously caused the decedent's death. With respect to the final factor, permitting the commission to intervene would be valuable in ruling on the plaintiffs' motion to seal because the defendants have not interposed substantive arguments in opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the court grants the commission's motion to intervene for the purpose of objecting to the plaintiffs' motion to seal.
II
MOTION TO SEAL
Practice Book § 11-20A " governs the sealing of files and limiting the disclosure of documents in civil cases." State v. Patel, 174 Conn.App. 298, 308 n.8 (2017). Under § 11-20A, a court can seal or limit the disclosure of " files, affidavits, documents, or other materials on file or lodged with the court or in connection with a court proceeding . . . only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in viewing such materials." Practice Book § 11-20A(c). In this respect, the decision to seal or limit the disclosure of documents is within the discretion of the court. See Vargas v. Doe, 96 Conn.App. 399, 408-09, 900 A.2d 525, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 923, 908 A.2d 546 (2006). " With regard to a motion to seal, the burden is on the party wanting to seal documents." Bank of New York v. Bell, 120 Conn.App. 837, 857, 993 A.2d 1022, cert. dismissed, 298 Conn. 917, 4 A.3d 1225 (2010).
The plaintiffs claim that the court should seal the videotape to protect their privacy interests. In support of this claim, the plaintiffs argue that they would suffer " extreme mental anguish, distress and offense" if the videotape was disseminated to the public. The plaintiffs further argue that publishing the videotape fails to serve a legitimate public interest. With respect to this point, the plaintiffs assert that " [i]f [the] [videotape] is released to the public, it likely will be played and [replayed] on [i]nternet sites, where deranged individuals take interest and pleasure from viewing such videos. It strains credibility to the breaking point to suggest that [the] [videotape] has any legitimate public interest or newsworthy value." Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that sealing the videotape will protect their memory of the decedent.
The Courant and the commission both claim that the motion to seal should be denied because a court cannot seal documents or records that have not been filed with the court, and, here, the videotape is not in the court's possession. Second, the commission argues that sealing the videotape would violate the act and supersede its statutory authority.
In the context of Practice Book § 11-20A, a sealing order must meet stringent procedural requirements. See Practice Book § § 11-20A(c) and 11-20A(d); see also Burns v. RBS Securities, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-09-5013222-S, (November 4, 2011, Tierney, J.T.R.) . Specifically, a sealing order must contain an articulation of the countervailing interest that justifies sealing or limiting public disclosure, and, in addition, it must be supported by particularized findings of fact. See Practice Book § 11-20A(d); see, e.g., Clapper v. Gallup, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-13-6015755-S, (July 14, 2015, Cole-Chu, J.).
The court notes that granting the motion to seal the videotape does not implicate issues relating to the rights of the plaintiffs and the defendants under the rules of discovery. Rather, under the facts and circumstances of the present case, granting the plaintiffs' motion to seal gives rise to the potential issue that the court would be limiting public access to a record that is subject to disclosure under the act. This the court refuses to do. The legislature has vested the commission with the authority to investigate and adjudicate whether, under the act, a record is subject to public disclosure. See General Statutes § § 1-205(d), 1-206(b) and 1-206(d). Indeed, the Courant filed a complaint with the commission alleging that the videotape " is subject to mandatory disclosure under the [act], and is not exempt from release under any claim raised by [UConn]." See Vella v. University of Connecticut, Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2017-0156 (March 16, 2017). Accordingly, the court declines to exercise its discretion-i.e., seal the videotape from the public-so as to potentially fetter the commission's ongoing administrative process.
Here, the court cannot make the requisite findings of fact, and, a fortiori, articulate the interests that justify sealing the videotape because the videotape was not submitted to the court for review. These determinations cannot be made in the abstract; rather, they must be grounded in concrete fact. Accordingly, at this time, the court is foreclosed from entering a sealing order that would otherwise meet the procedural requirements of Practice Book § 11-20A.
It is undisputed that the videotape is not in the court's possession. It was neither lodged with the court; Practice Book § § 7-4B and 7-4C; nor was it submitted in connection with any motion; see, e.g., Bank of New York v. Bell, supra, 120 Conn.App. 852-53. Moreover, case law indicates that a court's authority to seal documents or records is a function of its supervisory authority over such material; see Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ring, 47 F.Supp.3d 38, 40 (D.D.C. 2014); and a court's supervisory authority over documents and records arises from its physical possession and custody over them; see Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 54, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., 558 U.S. 991, 130 S.Ct. 500, 175 L.Ed.2d 348 (2009). Under this theory, the court lacks the authority to seal the videotape because-by virtue of the undisputed fact that it is not in the court's possession-the court lacks supervisory authority over the videotape. Nevertheless, the court declines to decide the present case on this basis alone due to the complete dearth of Connecticut case law that squarely addresses the issue of whether a court can seal documents or records that are not in its possession.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court (I) grants the motions to intervene of the Courant and the commission, respectively, and (II) denies the plaintiffs' motion to seal the videotape without prejudice.
At the hearing on these motions, counsel for the plaintiffs made the following representation to the court: " To the extent that the protective order was filed earlier, we are not pursuing that. [The motion for a protective order] does not have the ten second limitation in it. It is really the motion to seal. So, we are not pursuing the protective order, we are pursuing the motion to seal . . . which is what we are seeking at the present time ." (Emphasis added.) Consequently, the court does not address the motion for a protective order. See Varley v. Varley, 189 Conn. 490, 493, 457 A.2d 1065 (1983) (" The general rule is that parties are bound by the procedural acts of their counsel"). Moreover, the court construes the Courant's motion to intervene, as well as the commission's motion to intervene, as pertaining to the plaintiffs' motion to seal the videotape, rather than the motion for a protective order. The Courant's counsel and the commission's counsel addressed the plaintiffs' motion to seal fully at short calendar.