Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-000773-MR
07-17-2015
SABRINA CHANEY APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION; OXYGEN PLUS; AND HONORABLE JOHN D. CAUDILL, JUDGE, FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Thomas W. Moak Prestonsburg, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION: Rosemary G. Holbrook Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, OXYGEN PLUS: Earl M. McGuire Prestonsburg, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CI-00049
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: JONES, J. LAMBERT, AND MAZE, JUDGES. J. LAMBERT, JUDGE: This appeal arises from the Floyd Circuit Court's order dismissing Sabrina Chaney's action for lack of jurisdiction. After careful review, we affirm.
After separation from her employer, Oxygen Plus, Chaney filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. On January 14, 2014, the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (the Commission) entered an order reversing a referee decision that Chaney was qualified to receive unemployment benefits. The Commission determined that Chaney voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employment and was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits.
On January 21, 2014, Chaney filed an unverified complaint with the Floyd Circuit Court. The complaint did not comply with Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 341.450(1), which plainly requires that the complaint "shall be verified by the plaintiff or his attorney." On February 6, 2014, Oxygen Plus filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as jurisdictionally defective. On February 7, 2014, the Commission also filed a motion to dismiss. Chaney, then outside the statutory appeals period, filed a motion to amend the defective complaint. On April 10, 2014, Chaney filed a notice of constitutional challenge.
On April 24, 2014, the circuit court entered its order dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the complaint was not verified as required by KRS 341.450(1). This appeal now follows.
Chaney makes several arguments on appeal. First, Chaney argues that she sufficiently and substantially complied with KRS 341.450. Next, she argues that the verification requirement of KRS 341.450 is superfluous. Finally, she argues that the verification requirement of KRS 341.450 is unconstitutional. Both Oxygen Plus and the Commission have filed briefs in response to Chaney's arguments. Because their arguments are substantially the same, we will treat them collectively as the Commission's arguments in this opinion. Furthermore, we will address Chaney's arguments collectively.
Pursuant to KRS 341.450, an employee may seek judicial review of a decision of the Commission. KRS 341.450(1) states as follows:
Except as provided in KRS 341.460, within twenty (20) days after the date of the decision of the commission, any party aggrieved thereby may, after exhausting his remedies before the commission, secure judicial review thereof by filing a complaint against the commission in the Circuit Court of the county in which the claimant was last employed by a subject employer whose reserve account or reimbursing employer account is affected by such claims. Any other party to the proceeding before the commission shall be made a defendant in such action. The complaint shall state fully the grounds upon which review is sought, assign all errors relied on, and shall be verified by the plaintiff or his attorney. The plaintiff shall furnish copies thereof for each defendant to the commission, which shall deliver one (1) copy to each defendant.
It is well settled that strict compliance is required with statutory procedures for filing appeals from administrative bodies.
There is no appeal to the courts from an action of an administrative agency as a matter of right. When grace to appeal is granted by statute, a strict compliance with its terms is required. Where the conditions for the exercise of power by a court are not met, the judicial power is not lawfully invoked. That is to say, that the court lacks jurisdiction or has no right to decide the controversy.Board of Adjustments of the City of Richmond v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1979) (emphasis added).
In Triad Development/Alta Glyne, Inc. v. Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d 43 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky Supreme Court cleared up any confusion with regard to whether an individual has a constitutional right to appeal an administrative action. In Triad, the Supreme Court stated:
American Beauty Homes Corp., supra, does not recognize a constitutional appeal or an independent claim resulting from administrative actions in addition to a statutory appeal. Instead, that case simply recognized that the courts of Kentucky have inherent jurisdiction to review decisions of administrative agencies and legislative bodies for arbitrariness. However, when the right of appeal or the trial court's jurisdiction is codified as a statutory procedure . . . then the parties are required to strictly follow those procedures.Id. at 47.
The principle that strict compliance is required when appealing pursuant to statute from a decision of an administrative agency has long been held by the courts in this Commonwealth. See Howell v. Haney, 330 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1960); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 361 S.W.2d 300 (Ky. 1962); and City of Danville v. Wilson, 395 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965).
Recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed this principle in a case similar to the case at bar. In Taylor v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 382 S.W.3d 826, 831 (Ky. 2012), the Commission denied the plaintiff's claim for unemployment benefits. The plaintiff appealed to the Henderson Circuit Court for review of the Commission's decision. However, the plaintiff failed to verify his complaint as required by KRS 341.450(1). After the Commission and the former employer moved to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to add the required verification. The circuit court concluded that strict compliance with KRS 341.450 was necessary in order to invoke jurisdiction, and without formal verification, the petition did not comply with the statute. The court reasoned that, since the defective petition was inadequate to invoke its jurisdiction, the court lacked authority to grant the motion to amend the petition.
This Court affirmed the circuit court, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed this Court's decision and reaffirmed the principle of strict compliance for administrative agency appeals. The Court stated, "It is a firmly rooted concept of law in this state that the courts have no jurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative agency action unless every statutory precondition is satisfied." Id. at 831. The plaintiff in Taylor urged the Supreme Court to adopt a substantial compliance requirement, which the Court declined to do. Instead the Court stated:
Taylor urges us now to adopt a less stringent standard of pleading for appeals from administrative agencies. However, we see no sound reason to depart from this well-settled principle of law, and therefore we decline the invitation. Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Ky. 1984) (Stare decisis requires this Court to follow precedent set by prior cases, and this Court will only depart from such established principles when "sound legal reasons to the contrary" exist.).Id. at 832.
As in Taylor, Chaney contends that she substantially complied with KRS 341.450, and she relies on Shamrock Coal Company, Inc. v. Taylor, 697 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. App. 1985), in which this Court determined that a clear attempt at verification constituted sufficient compliance with KRS 341.450(1). In Shamrock, there was a clear attempt to verify the petition within the statutory appeal period; however, the attempt did not reflect that an oath was rendered to a person authorized to receive it. In the instant case, there was no attempt at verification until after the statutory appeal period had expired. We agree with the circuit court that the Civil Rules do not apply in the instant case, and Chaney could not amend her pleadings to enable the circuit court to acquire jurisdiction. We find no error in the trial court's dismissal.
We note this case was abrogated by Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cecil, 381 S.W.3d 238 (Ky. 2012) on other grounds. --------
As stated above, there is no constitutional right to appeal the decision of an administrative agency. Assuming, arguendo, that such a right did exist, the Supreme Court has held that a party's constitutional rights do not take precedence over procedural rules, even in civil and criminal cases where there is a constitutional right to appeal:
Substantive rights, even of constitutional magnitude, do not transcend procedural rules, because without such rules those rights would smother in chaos and could not survive. There is a simple and easy procedural avenue for the enforcement and protection of every right and principle of substantive law at an appropriate time and point during the course of any litigation, civil or criminal. That is not to say that form may be exalted over substance, because procedural requirements generally doBrown v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1977). Thus, we are not persuaded by Chaney's constitutional arguments, as her rights in this case are controlled by statute and are procedural in nature.
not exist for the mere sake of form and style. They are lights and buoys to mark the channels of safe passage and assure an expeditious voyage to the right destination. Without them every trial would end in a shipwreck.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the April 24, 2014, order of the Floyd Circuit Court dismissing Chaney's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Thomas W. Moak
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE COMMISSION:
Rosemary G. Holbrook
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, OXYGEN
PLUS:
Earl M. McGuire
Prestonsburg, Kentucky