Opinion
01-21-2015
Christine CARRS, etc., appellant, v. AVCO CORPORATION, etc., et al., defendants, Superior Air Parts, Inc., respondent.
Capuder Fazio Giacoia LLP, New York, N.Y. (Douglas Capuder, Peter M. Dreyer, and Daniel S. Jo of counsel), for appellant. Alimonti Law Offices, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Frederick P. Alimonti and Lydia S. Antoncic of counsel), for respondent.
Capuder Fazio Giacoia LLP, New York, N.Y. (Douglas Capuder, Peter M. Dreyer, and Daniel S. Jo of counsel), for appellant.
Alimonti Law Offices, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Frederick P. Alimonti and Lydia S. Antoncic of counsel), for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, L. PRISCILLA HALL, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
Opinion In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (O. Bellantoni, J.), dated January 10, 2013, which granted the motion of the defendant Superior Air Parts, Inc., pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
When a motion is made to dismiss an action for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving a basis for such jurisdiction over a defendant (see Waggaman v. Arauzo, 117 A.D.3d 724, 985 N.Y.S.2d 281 ; Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 112 A.D.3d 34, 39, 973 N.Y.S.2d 681, affd. 24 N.Y.3d 370, 998 N.Y.S.2d 720, 23 N.E.3d 988 [2014] ). However, to defeat a CPLR 3211(a)(8) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only establish, prima facie, that the defendant was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (see Weitz v. Weitz, 85 A.D.3d 1153, 926 N.Y.S.2d 305 ; Cornely v. Dynamic HVAC Supply, LLC, 44 A.D.3d 986, 845 N.Y.S.2d 797 ; Brandt v. Toraby, 273 A.D.2d 429, 710 N.Y.S.2d 115 ).
In opposition to the motion of the defendant Superior Air Parts, Inc. (hereinafter Superior), pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it based on lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that the activities of Superior in New York subjected it to the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR 301 and 302(a)(3)(i) (see Daimler AG v. Bauman, –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 759–760, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 ; J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2788, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 ; Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 112–113, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 ; Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 33, 563 N.Y.S.2d 739, 565 N.E.2d 488 ; Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 309–310, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 434 N.E.2d 692 ; Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Intl., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 536, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 227 N.E.2d 851 ; Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 112 A.D.3d at 40, 973 N.Y.S.2d 681 ; Brandt v. Toraby, 273 A.D.2d 429, 710 N.Y.S.2d 115 ; Cooperstein v. Pan–Oceanic Mar., 124 A.D.2d 632, 634, 507 N.Y.S.2d 893 ; cf. Weitz v. Weitz, 85 A.D.3d 1153, 926 N.Y.S.2d 305 ; Cornely v. Dynamic HVAC Supply, LLC, 44 A.D.3d 986, 845 N.Y.S.2d 797 ).
The plaintiff's remaining contention is without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted Superior's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.