Opinion
No. CV06 6000370
January 11, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The defendant M.I.B. Enterprises, Inc. has filed a motion for summary judgment, dated August 29, 2007. The defendant moves for summary judgment arguing: (1) that federal law precludes the claims against M.I.B.; and (2) M.I.B. is not liable to the plaintiff because an unauthorized driver was operating the subject motor vehicle at the time of the accident.
M.I.B. is a rental car company located in Danbury, Connecticut. On or about August 24, 2005, Heidi Faipler entered into an agreement to rent the subject vehicle from M.I.B. In the rental agreement, Faipler did not list any other authorized driver of the vehicle and agreed not to allow anyone other than herself to operate the vehicle. On September 1, 2005, the co-defendant Cynthia Carmichael was operating the vehicle in the State of Tennessee, when the vehicle collided with the rear of a truck. At the time the plaintiff was a passenger in said vehicle and claims that as a result of this accident, he suffered injuries. The plaintiff has filed the subject action against M.I.B. and Cynthia Carmichael.
"A Motion for Summary Judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 576 A.2d 829 (1989). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins., Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Corp., supra, 245 Conn. 381. "The opposing party must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. "A material fact is a fact which will make a difference in the result of a case." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).
The test used by the court is to determine if the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict if the same set of facts were presented at trial. Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246-47, 571 A.2d 116 (1990). A directed verdict is properly rendered if a trier of fact cannot reasonably and legally find in any fashion other than that directed. Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 225, 682 A.2d 106 (1996).
Discussion
On August 10, 2005 Congress enacted 49 U.S.C. § 30106, which provides in pertinent part:
a) In General. — An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if —
(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).
(C) Applicability and Effective Date. —
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section shall apply with respect to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this section without regard to whether the harm that is the subject of the action, or the conduct that caused the harm, occurred before such date of enactment.
This federal statute became effective on August 10, 2005. The accident which is the subject of this complaint occurred on or about September 1, 2005. The complaint is dated September 18, 2006 and was served on M.I.B.'s agent for service on September 19, 2006. Therefore, the law applies to this case and has the effect of precluding liability under Connecticut law. Under the foregoing statute, the owner of a vehicle is not liable under state law for personal or property damage arising from the operation of its vehicle if 1) the owner is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, 2) there is no negligence by the owner, and 3) there is no criminal wrongdoing by the owner. The defendant M.I.B. is engaged in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles. There are no direct claims of negligence against M.I.B. There are no allegations of wrongdoing by M.I.B.
Additionally, in Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668, fn.1, 911 A.2d 315 (2006), our Appellate Court determined that as of August 10, 2005, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, preempted the state law and abolishes claims for vicarious liability against lease companies.
It is also well-settled in Connecticut that car rental businesses are not liable for damages caused by unauthorized persons driving rental vehicles when the rental vehicle agreement specifically states that there were to be no additional drivers. Pedevillano v. Bryon, 231 Conn. 265, 268, 648 A.2d 873 (1994). The court held that, under General Statutes § 14-154a, the liability of the car rental company is limited to situations in which a driver is authorized to use the vehicle under the terms of the rental agreement. Id. 268. "[T]he application of this statute is limited to situations in which a driver authorized under the terms of the lease was operating the vehicle . . ."[w]e have consistently construed the statute as imposing on one who rents or leases a motor vehicle to another the same liability as that of its operator, provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 668-69. "[T]he driver is in `lawful possession' when he is an authorized driver under the terms of the lease agreement that limit the identity of the drivers authorized to use the vehicle." Fojtik v. Hunter, 265 Conn. 385, 393, 828 A.2d 589 (2003). In the present matter, the only authorized driver was Faipler. Cynthia Carmichael was not an authorized driver pursuant to the terms of the subject rental agreement.
The plaintiff claims that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 is unconstitutional in that it violates the commerce clause. However, he has not provided any Connecticut Appellate authority or federal appellate authority to support that proposition. In Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., supra, 98 Conn.App. 665, 668, fn.1, our Appellate Court, while not ruling on its constitutionality, noted that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 this federal law preempted Connecticut law.
In support of his claim of unconstitutionality, the plaintiff relies upon one federal district court case, Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Huchon, L2875388, *6-10 (S.D.Fla., Sept. 14, 2007) and one state case Dunkley v. Nilt, Inc., 13 Misc.3d 790, 827 N.Y.S. 2d 513 (2006). The court in its research has found an additional case ruling that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 is unconstitutional, written by the same judge who issued the decision in Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Huchon, supra. See Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Drouin, Case No. 06-10083 (S.D.Fla., Oct. 4, 2007). The court has read these decisions and respectfully disagrees with their reasoning that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 is unconstitutional. This court will not be bound by these decisions.
The plaintiff has a heavy burden of proof in challenging the constitutionality of this federal statute, and the unconstitutionality must be proven beyond all reasonable doubt. Bottone v. Westport, 209 Conn. 653, 657, 553 A.2d 576 (1989); Rudy's Limousine Service, Inc. v. Dept of Transportation, 76 Conn.App. 80, 89, 826 A.2d 1161 (2003). The plaintiff has failed to meet this burden.
Lastly, the plaintiff in opposing summary judgment invites the court to apply Tennessee law, as the accident site was in Tennessee. The defendant M.I.B. was located in Connecticut. The rental agreement was signed in Connecticut. The plaintiff concedes that while the domicile/residence of the parties is unknown, it appears likely they are all from Connecticut. The plaintiff cites no Tennessee statutes, no Tennessee case law and undertakes no legal analysis of this claim. In any event, the issue is moot because 49 U.S.C. § 30106 precludes state law, including Tennessee.
The motion for summary judgment is granted as to the defendant M.I.B. Enterprises, Inc.