Opinion
No. 01-03-00039-CV
Opinion issued October 7, 2004.
On Appeal from 311th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2000-65540.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, HANKS, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presenting three issues on appeal, appellants, Randy Gilbert Calhoun (Randy) and his trial counsel Donna Detamore (Detamore), challenge orders signed by the trial court in a post-divorce decree proceeding. In issues one and two, Randy contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his request for the court to clarify certain provisions of a final divorce decree entered between Randy and appellee Joyce Ying Calhoun (Joyce). In issue three, Randy and Detamore contend that the trial court abused its discretion in quashing the deposition of Joyce's brother and in assessing sanctions under Rule of Civil Procedure 13.
We affirm.
Background
Seven months after the trial court signed the final divorce decree between Randy and Joyce, Randy sought to enforce certain provisions of the decree that defined Randy's separate property and ordered Joyce to surrender the property. In this regard, Randy filed a motion for contempt and clarification, asserting that Joyce had not surrendered certain items as ordered in the decree.
Randy also filed a motion for contempt against Joyce's brother, Steven Ying (Steven). Randy contended that Steven had not properly responded to a subpoena duces tecum issued in relation to Steven's noticed deposition. In response to the contempt motion, Steven filed a motion for Rule 13 sanctions against Randy and Detamore. Steven later filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum and a motion for protection in relation to his deposition.
Following a hearing, the trial court signed an "Order on Randy Calhoun's Enforcement for Property Division and Clarification" on December 19, 2002. The trial court ruled that the provisions of the decree that Randy sought to enforce were ambiguous and thus unenforceable. For this reason, the trial court dismissed Randy's request for contempt with prejudice in the enforcement order. Regarding Randy's request for clarification, the enforcement order provided, "It is further ORDERED that all relief requested as clarification therein is dismissed without prejudice, and may be refiled as a separate suit."
Also on December 19, 2002, the trial court signed two other orders. One order granted Steven's motion to quash. The other — entitled "Order on Steven Ying's Answer to Contempt and Motion for Rule 13 Sanctions" — assessed $500 in sanctions against Randy and Detamore, jointly and severally, in favor of Steven's counsel.
On appeal, appellants challenge both the "Order on Randy Calhoun's Enforcement for Property Division and Clarification" and the "Order on Steven Ying's Answer to Contempt and Motion for Rule 13 Sanctions."
Appellees do not dispute that the orders signed by the trial court in this case are final and appealable orders. See Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 312-13 (Tex. 1986) (holding post-judgment order disposing of all matters placed before trial court in post-judgment motion is final and appealable); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 860 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex.App. 1993, writ denied) (providing that post-judgment orders in aid and clarification of divorce decrees are appealable, provided they are final orders). Rather, appellees assert that we should affirm the sanctions order because, though their brief attacks both the sanctions order and the enforcement order, appellants notice of appeal pertains only to the enforcement order. Appellants' notice of appeal states that "[t]he order being appealed was signed December 19, 2002." It further states, "This is a regular appeal from an order of enforcement and clarification. The 30th day from the date of the entry of the December 19, 2002 `Order on Randy's Enforcement for the Property Division and Clarification' is January 18, 2003."
A notice of appeal must "state the date of the . . . order appealed from." Tex.R.App.P. 25.1(d)(2). We must construe the appellate rules reasonably but liberally, so that the right of appeal is not lost by creating a requirement not absolutely necessary from the literal words of the rule. Maxfield v. Terry, 888 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. 1994). Here, we consider the following important facts: (1) the subject orders were both signed on December 19, 2002; (2) Detamore is named as an appellant in the notice of appeal; and (3) Detamore would have standing to appeal only the sanctions order, not the enforcement order. Applying the standard enunciated in Maxfield, we conclude that the notice of appeal is sufficient to perfect an appeal for both the enforcement order and the sanctions order.
Dismissal of Clarification Request Relevant Family Code Provisions
In issue one, Randy asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because the Family Code permits the trial court to sign a clarifying order in conjunction with a contempt action brought to enforce a decree.
An action to enforce a decree is governed by chapter 9 of Title 1 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 9.001 — .302 (Vernon 2003). Family Code section 9.002 provides that the court rendering the decree of divorce retains the power to enforce the property division. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.002; see also Dechon v. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex.App. 1995, no writ). Under Family Code subsection 9.012(a), the trial court may enforce by contempt an order requiring delivery of specific property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.012(a). The court may also render further orders to assist in the implementation of or to clarify the prior order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.006(a); see also McPherren v. McPherren, 967 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex.App. 1998, no pet.); Dechon, 909 S.W.2d at 956. These orders may more precisely specify how the previously ordered property division will be implemented so long as the substantive division of the property is not altered. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.006(b); see also McPherren, 967 S.W.2d at 490; Dechon, 909 S.W.2d at 956.
Randy correctly asserts that the Family Code allows a party, who requests to enforce a decree by contempt, to seek in tandem with that request, a request for clarification of the decree's language sought to be enforced. Although such a request is statutorily contemplated, the Family Code does not require the trial court to make such a clarification.
Family Code section 9.008(a) provides, "On the request of a party or on the court's own motion, the court may render a clarifying order before a motion for contempt is made or heard, in conjunction with a motion for contempt or on denial of a motion for contempt." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.008(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) further provides that "[o]n a finding by the court that the original form of the division of property is not specific enough to be enforceable by contempt, the court may render a clarifying order setting forth specific terms to enforce compliance with the original division of property." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.008(b) (emphasis added).
As drafted by the legislature, the statutory language of section 9.008 is permissive in nature. When, as in section 9.008, a statute uses the word "may" it "creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (Vernon 2003); see also Boots v. Lopez, 6 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex.App. 1999, pet. denied) (holding that, because Family Code section 6.308 provides that trial court may exercise its jurisdiction, it was within trial court's discretion whether to exercise partial jurisdiction over case). Section 9.008 allows a court to render a clarifying order in conjunction with a motion for contempt; however, it does not require the court to do so. Rather, such action by the trial court is discretionary. As indicated by the language of subsection 9.008(b), a court is not required to issue a clarifying order even when the court finds the language of the decree too ambiguous to enforce by contempt. Concomitantly, it was within the trial court's discretion in this case not to issue a clarifying order and to dismiss Randy's clarification request. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.008(b). Randy has failed to cite any authority to the contrary. See Boots, 6 S.W.3d at 294. We hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it dismissed Randy's clarification request without prejudice.
We overrule issue one.
Due Process Complaint
In issue two, Randy contends that the trial court denied him due process by dismissing his clarification request. We disagree.
No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. Due process, at a minimum, requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976)); see House of Tobacco, Inc. v. Calvert, 394 S.W.2d 654, 657-58 (Tex. 1965). The process due is measured by a flexible standard depending on the practical requirements of the circumstances. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S. Ct. at 902; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-77, 95 S. Ct. 729, 738-39 (1975).
In this case, the record reveals that Randy was given due process with respect to his clarification request. Randy's motion for clarification was heard and considered by the trial court. In fact, the trial court held two hearings on Randy's motions. At the second hearing, the trial court allowed each side to present his or her respective position with regard to the enforcement issues, including Randy's clarification request. Ultimately, the trial court revealed to the parties its reasoning for dismissing the clarification request. The court explained that it believed the clarification request would be better brought as a separate action to allow the parties to conduct discovery and to discuss possible mediation. For those reasons, the trial court exercised its discretion regarding Randy's clarification motion by dismissing it without prejudice and ordering that the clarification request "may be refiled as a separate suit."
The record includes a transcript only from the second hearing.
Chapter 9 specifically contemplates filing an enforcement action as a separate suit. A party affected by a divorce decree that provides for a division of property may request enforcement of the decree by filing suit in the court that rendered the decree. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.001(a). Such a suit is governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, except as otherwise provided in Chapter 9, and any affected party is entitled to be served with notice and to file an answer. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.001(b), (c). Thereafter, the proceedings are conducted as in civil cases generally. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.001(c).
In his brief, Randy asserts that because he was "following a procedure allowed by law in joining his clarification claim with his contempt action, the fact that the trial court dismissed his clarification for relief [sic] without prejudice . . . in no way diminishes the trial court's error." However, as discussed with regard to the first issue, it was within the trial court's discretion to dismiss the clarification request. Thus, Randy's argument under this issue likewise fails.
Arguably, Randy waived his due process complaint. The record reflects that Randy was fully aware of the trial court's decision to dismiss the clarification request and permit it to be filed as a separate action. Despite this knowledge, Randy never objected or otherwise alerted the trial court to his due process complaint that he now raises on appeal. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) (providing that as prerequisite to presenting complaint for appellate review, record must show that complaint was made to trial court by timely request, objection, or motion that stated grounds for ruling that complaining party sought from trial court with sufficient specificity to make trial court aware of complaint, unless specific grounds were apparent from context).
We overrule issue two.
Rule 13 Sanctions
In issue three, Randy and Detamore complain that the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning them. In support of their argument, appellants contend that the sanctions assessed against them were tied to Steven's motion to quash and that the motion to quash should not have been granted because it was untimely. Appellants assert that "[t]he trial court was without authority to grant Steven's motion to quash and [,] therefore, the award of sanctions is likewise unauthorized." Appellants' argument, however, is based on a mistaken premise. The sanctions awarded against appellants were not based on Steven's motion to quash; rather, the trial court awarded the sanctions based on Steven's motion for Rule 13 sanctions, which asserted that Randy and Detamore had, in bad faith, filed a groundless motion for contempt against Steven. Rule of Civil Procedure 13 authorizes a trial court to impose sanctions against an attorney, a represented party, or both, who file a groundless pleading brought in bad faith or brought for the purpose of harassment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. Here, the trial court stated on the record and in its order that the Rule 13 sanctions awarded against appellants were assessed for appellants' filing of the motion for contempt against Steven. The sanctions were not tied to the motion to quash. Thus, because the award of sanctions was not based on or related to the motion to quash, appellants' argument does not support their contention that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering sanctions.
We overrule issue three.
Rule 45 Sanctions
In their responsive brief, appellees "suggest" that we assess appellate sanctions against Randy on the basis that his appeal is frivolous. Rule 45 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure permits an appellate court to award a prevailing party "just damages" for "frivolous" appeals. Tex.R.App.P. 45; Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Tex.App. 2001, pet. denied). In determining whether an appeal is frivolous, we apply an objective test. Smith, 51 S.W.3d at 381. We review the record from the viewpoint of the advocate and ask whether the advocate had reasonable grounds to believe the judgment could be reversed. Id. We exercise prudence and caution and deliberate most carefully before awarding appellate sanctions. Id.
Although there is no merit to appellants' appeal, we decline to conclude that Randy has frivolously attempted to challenge the post-decree orders of the trial court.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's "Order on Randy Calhoun's Enforcement for Property Division and Clarification" and the "Order on Steve Ying's Answer to Contempt and Motion for Rule 13 Sanctions." We deny appellees' request for appellate sanctions.