Opinion
Case No. CV-05-1641 (FB).
December 11, 2007
For the Petitioner: BRUCE BRYANT, pro se, #96-a-5569, Shawangunk Correctional Facility, Wallkill, New York.
For the Respondent: RICHARD A. BROWN, ESQ., District Attorney, Queens County, By: MERRI TURK LASKY, ESQ., Assistant District Attorney, Kew Gardens, New York.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner Bruce Bryant ("Bryant") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 following his conviction in New York Supreme Court, Queens County, of murder, attempted murder, and firearm possession charges in connection with a 1993 shooting at a beauty salon in Queens that resulted in the death of an eleven-year-old boy. In Bryant's initial habeas petition, he claimed that (1) the state appellate court erred in rejecting his claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by an investigatory line-up; (2) the state trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into his request for substitution of counsel; and (3) he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. He later amended his petition to add an additional ground in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and to add a new claim: that (4) the prosecution failed to disclose Brady material, namely the full criminal history of prosecution witness Roy Williams ("Williams"), and knowingly relied on Williams' allegedly "perjured" testimony regarding that criminal history.
The Government contends that the issues raised in the amended petition are barred by the statute of limitations and do not "relate back" to the issues raised in the initial petition; because the Court decides all of Bryant's claims on the merits, it need not address these procedural questions.
1. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Claim
The New York Appellate Division reviewed Bryant's claim that he was improperly denied counsel at an investigatory line-up, and found that, "under the circumstances of this case, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt." People v. Bryant, 765 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y.App.Div. 2003). As the Second Circuit has noted, a habeas court, "in reviewing a state court's harmless error determination . . . only may reverse determinations that are objectively unreasonable." Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2004). The Appellate Division was not objectively unreasonable in its determination that the line-up identifications, even if erroneously admitted, did not contribute to the verdict. In addition to the line-up identifications, Bryant testified that he was present at the scene of the crime when the shooting occurred; further, the prosecution presented two additional witnesses who identified Bryant in court, one of whom testified that Bryant was one of two men who fired at the beauty salon, and the other of whom testified that Bryant was walking toward the salon with his gun drawn. The line-up identifications were not crucial to the prosecution's very strong case against Bryant; the Appellate Division's harmless error determination was therefore reasonable, and the Court will not countermand it.
2. Substitution of Counsel Claim
Though the Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent criminal defendants the right to counsel at trial, the Supreme Court has explicitly "reject[ed] the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a `meaningful relationship' between an accused and his counsel." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). "[W]here a defendant voices a `seemingly substantial complaint about counsel,' the court should inquire into the reasons for dissatisfaction'" to determine whether good cause exists for reassignment. McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1981).
Bryant requested substitution of counsel at two points during proceedings before the trial court; on each occasion, the trial court conducted an inquiry as to good cause for reassignment before declining to reassign counsel. First, Bryant complained, prior to the commencement of a suppression hearing, that counsel was not acting in his best interest, that he disagreed with counsel regarding the approach to the case, and that counsel had cut short certain conversations. After hearing Bryant's arguments, the court denied his motion for substitution of counsel, but informed Bryant that he could raise the issue again before the trial judge. Bryant did just that, filing a written motion for substitution of counsel in which he claimed that counsel tried to convince him to enter a plea, and had failed to conduct an investigation, visit him in jail, or make bail requests. Prior to denying the motion, the trial court conducted a hearing, during which Bryant was afforded the opportunity to further explain his position. In each instance, the judge conducted adequate inquiry into Bryant's complaints before rejecting his motion.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
4. Brady Claim
Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 Strickland 466 U.S. at 688 Id. Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 8387See Giglio v. United States 405 U.S. 150 Brady
Bryant's § 2254 motion, as amended, is denied. Because Bryant has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
SO ORDERED.