Opinion
2014-06-20
Sylvia F. BRYANT, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. William M. CARTY, Defendant–Appellant.
Degnan Law Office, Canisteo (Edward J. Degnan of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Davidson Fink, LLP, Rochester (Donald A. White of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Respondent.
Degnan Law Office, Canisteo (Edward J. Degnan of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Davidson Fink, LLP, Rochester (Donald A. White of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, VALENTINO, and WHALEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
We agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in denying that part of his motion seeking vacatur of the child support provisions of the judgment of divorce without conducting a hearing. It is well settled that, when a “separation agreement is incorporated but not merged into the divorce judgment, vacatur of the divorce judgment has no effect on the enforceability of the agreement; the agreement survives as a separate and enforceable contract” ( Kellman v. Kellman, 162 A.D.2d 958, 958, 559 N.Y.S.2d 49). Thus, “[a] party seeking to set aside an agreement must do so by commencement of a plenary action, by affirmative defense or by counterclaim; such relief cannot be obtained on motion” ( Gaines v. Gaines, 188 A.D.2d 1048, 1048, 592 N.Y.S.2d 204).
Here, however, the judgment of divorce specifically provided that the child support provisions of the parties' 2009 Property Settlement and Separation Agreement (Agreement) merged with the judgment of divorce. Although in his motion defendant sought vacatur of the judgment of divorce in its entirety and a determination that the Agreement was unenforceable, defendant conceded at oral argument before this Court that he was seeking to challenge only the child support provisions of the judgment. Inasmuch as the child support provisions of the Agreement merged into the judgment of divorce, those provisions of the Agreement “cease[d] to exist as a separately enforceable contract” ( Rainbow v. Swisher, 72 N.Y.2d 106, 109, 531 N.Y.S.2d 775, 527 N.E.2d 258). Defendant therefore was not required to commence a plenary action to challenge those provisions but, rather, properly challenged those provisions of the judgment by motion ( see Vinokur v. Penny Lane Owners Corp., 269 A.D.2d 226, 226, 703 N.Y.S.2d 35;cf. Kellman, 162 A.D.2d at 958, 559 N.Y.S.2d 49).
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar defendant's motion. Here, “the merits of [defendant's] contention that the [judgment] was procured through fraud have not been previously litigated” ( Van Wie v. Van Wie, 124 A.D.2d 353, 354, 507 N.Y.S.2d 486;see generally Matter of Hunter, 4 N.Y.3d 260, 269–270, 794 N.Y.S.2d 286, 827 N.E.2d 269). We further agree with defendant that he did not seek modification of his future child support obligation but, rather, he sought to vacate the child support provisions that merged with the judgment of divorce. We therefore modify the order by vacating that part denying defendant's motion insofar as it sought to vacate the child support provisions that merged with the judgment of divorce, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing on that part of defendant's motion.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by vacating that part denying defendant's motion insofar as it sought to vacate the child support provisions of the judgment of divorce and as modified the order is affirmed without costs and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Allegany County, for further proceedings.