Opinion
A22-1285 A22-1417
05-17-2023
Vollie Andre Brown, Jr., petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-16-6660
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Peter M. Reyes, Jr., Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Vollie Andre Brown with second-degree assault, first-degree assault, and felony domestic assault following a stabbing that caused the victim life-threatening injuries. Appellant waived his right to counsel and represented himself at his jury trial. The jury found appellant guilty on all three counts. The district court adjudicated the three counts of assault but imposed a sentence of 135 months' imprisonment on the first-degree-assault count.
2. In 2018, appellant, represented by counsel, argued in a direct appeal that the district court plainly erred by not giving a limiting instruction on the proper use of relationship evidence. State v. Brown, No. A17-0859, 2018 WL 1997587 (Minn. App. Apr. 30, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2018). Appellant also filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction and prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at *2 n.1. We affirmed appellant's conviction, concluding that the error of not instructing the jury did not affect appellant's substantial rights in part because "appellant and his girlfriend discussed the incident in the back of a police car[] and appellant admitted in a post-Miranda interview that he stabbed [the victim] after a disagreement about a plate of cocaine." Id. at *2. We also concluded that appellant forfeited the arguments in his pro se supplemental brief because they were not supported by citations to the record or legal authority. Id. at *2 n.1. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied review.
3. Appellant filed his first petition for postconviction relief in December 2018, raising several issues, including ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The postconviction court denied the petition. It determined, in relevant part, that appellant's prosecutorial-misconduct claim was procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). The postconviction court denied the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because it failed both prongs of the Strickland test. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
The Strickland test requires appellant to prove that: (1) his "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) "there is a reasonable probabilit y that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Zumberge v. State, 937 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted).
4. We affirmed on appeal, and the supreme court denied review. Brown v. State, No. A19-0622, 2020 WL 290450, at *2 (Minn.App. Jan. 21, 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 14, 2020).
5. In his second postconviction petition filed in March 2020, appellant asserted that the prosecutor presented "false evidence" not in the record which "denied [him] a fair direct appeal." Appellant also argued ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to investigate the state's use of false evidence. The postconviction court determined that his claims were Knaffla-barred because he had already raised these issues in his 2018 petition and did not provide "any new facts or legal arguments."
6. Appellant filed a "motion to reconsider or amend" in July 2022, again asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and prosecutorial misconduct during the direct appeal. The postconviction court treated the motion as a new, third petition for postconviction relief.
7. Appellant asserted that the state's reference to his statements in the police car and during the post-Miranda interview were "bogus scam statements" by the state on appeal and were "not presented during trial," constituting misconduct. He also argued that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his attorney did not move to strike the reference to those statements from the state's brief on direct appeal.
8. The postconviction court found that appellant's two prior postconviction motions were nearly identical and both included claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. It determined that appellant did not provide any new facts or legal arguments in support of the issues he raised, so his claims were Knaffla-barred. Appellant filed two appeals from the same postconviction court order. By order from this court, we consolidated the cases. This appeal follows.
9. We review a denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. See Campbell v. State, 916 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2018). We will not reverse unless the postconviction court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015).
10. Under the Knaffla rule, matters raised or known at the time of direct appeal will not be considered in a later petition for relief. 243 N.W.2d at 741. Claims that were raised or could have been raised in a previous postconviction petition are also Knaffla-barred. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 2015).
11. First, the record indicates that Knaffla bars appellant's prosecutorial-misconduct claim based on references made to his statements in the police car and during the post-Miranda interview. Appellant raised this same claim through every petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court therefore acted within its discretion by determining that this claim is Knaffla-barred.
12. Second, appellant's argument that his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim was not Knaffla-barred is not supported by the record. "Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is properly raised in a first postconviction petition, because the petitioner could not have known of such a claim at the time of direct appeal." Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 370-71 (Minn. 2016). But appellant raised this same claim in his 2018 and 2020 postconviction petitions. The postconviction court denied appellant's 2018 ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on the merits, and we affirmed. Brown, 2020 WL 290459, at *2. The postconviction court denied the 2020 petition, finding the claim duplicative. Here, appellant reasserts the claim without any new facts or novel legal arguments. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim.
13. Appellant also argues that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing because he alleged facts related to both ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct that, if proved, would entitle him to relief We review a denied request for an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (citations omitted). "[A] petition may be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing if the court concludes there are no material facts in dispute that preclude dismissal." Matakis, 862 N.W.2d at 37 (quotation omitted).
14. As noted above, because we already concluded that those two arguments are legally insufficient, there would have been no need for an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court acted within its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The postconviction court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.