Opinion
Civil Action 3:15-cv-02134
04-12-2023
MARCUS DION BROOKING, #LU7017, Plaintiff, v. D.O.C., et al., Defendants.
BRANN, C.J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights action. The plaintiff, Marcus Dion Brooking, alleges that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, he claims that he began suffering from a severe toothache on the evening of April 28, 2015, but despite alerting prison officials of his pain and discomfort repeatedly, he was denied any medical-dental treatment until the morning of May 1, 2015, at which time he was referred to a dentist for immediate extraction of a “retained root.” The only remaining defendant is Sgt. Cleaver, a correctional officer employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
Sgt. Cleaver previously moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. Cleaver had argued that Brooking's claim was barred because the inmate had failed to appeal the initial denial of his inmate grievance to the facility superintendent or the chief grievance officer for the state. In response, Brooking alleged that, due to his transfer to another prison, he was never served with a copy of the initial review response to his grievance. Ultimately, we found that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were available to him, and thus the defendant's summary judgment motion was denied. See Brooking v. D.O.C., Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-02134, 2020 WL 6330030 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2020), Doc. 44, report & recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 6321605 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2020), Doc. 45.
In accordance with Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013), and Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018), we provided the parties with notice or our intent to consider the threshold issue of exhaustion in our role as a factfinder under Small and Paladino, and we provided the parties with an opportunity to respond, including the submission of any materials relevant to exhaustion that were not already in the record before us. See generally Paladino, 885 F.3d at 211. (Doc. 46.) Both parties have submitted briefs on the issue.(Doc. 50; Doc. 52.)
Brooking also attached exhibits in support of his brief (Doc. 52-1), but all of the documents attached to his brief had previously been received into the record on summary judgment (see Doc. 34-2).
Under this Third Circuit precedent, “exhaustion is a question of law to be determined by a judge, even if that determination requires the resolution of disputed facts.” Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Drippe, 604 F.3d at 781 (“Juries decide cases, not issues of judicial traffic control. Until the issue of exhaustion is resolved, the court cannot know whether it is to decide the case or the prison authorities are to.”) (quoting Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 2008)); cf. Wilkerson v. United States, Civil Action No. 3:13-1499, 2014 WL 1653249, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2014) (“[I]f there is a dispute of material fact, the court should conduct a plenary trial on the contested facts prior to making [an exhaustion of administrative remedies] determination.”) (addressing a prisoner's FTCA claim). “Although the availability of administrative remedies to a prisoner is a question of law, it necessarily involves a factual inquiry.” Small, 728 F.3d at 271 (citations omitted). Based on the arguments presented by the parties on this issue and the evidence cited in support of their respective positions, we find an evidentiary hearing unnecessary under the circumstances presented in this case. See Paladino 885 F.3d at 210-11.
Before bringing a § 1983 action concerning prison conditions, a prisoner must first exhaust all available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (“[A]n inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.”). “[I]t is beyond the power of this court . . . to excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement, whether on the ground of futility, inadequacy or any other basis.” Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000).
Moreover, § 1997e(a) requires “proper” exhaustion of administrative remedies, meaning strict compliance with DOC deadlines and other procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89-95 (2006). “A procedural default by the prisoner, either through late or improper filings, bars the prisoner from bringing a claim in federal court unless equitable considerations warrant review of the claim.” McKinney v. Kelchner, No. 1:CV-05-0205, 2007 WL 2852373, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-32 (3d Cir. 2004)). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules'-rules that are defined not by [§ 1997e(a)], but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88) (citation omitted); see also Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Section 1997e(a) does not delineate the procedures prisoners must follow.”). “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not [§ 1997e(a)], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. “The only constraint is that no prison system may establish a requirement inconsistent with the federal policy underlying § 1983 and § 1997e(a).” Strong, 297 F.3d at 649. Thus, it follows that “grievances must contain the sort of information that the administrative system requires.” Strong, 297 F.3d at 649. But,
if prison regulations do not prescribe any particular content for inmate grievances, “a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.... [T]he grievant need not lay out the facts, articulate legal theories, or demand particular relief. All the grievance need do is object intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming.”Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Strong, 297 F.3d at 650).
In adopting DC-ADM 804, the DOC has established a multi-stage administrative remedy process through which an inmate may seek formal review of “problems or other issues arising during the course of their confinement.” (Moore Decl. attach. A, at 1 (DC-ADM 804 Policy Statement), Doc. 34-1, at 8). As we have previously summarized it, “DC-ADM 804 provides a three-tiered grievance process: (1) an initial review by a grievance officer; (2) an appeal to the facility superintendent; and (3) an appeal to the statewide chief grievance officer.” Adams v. Giroux, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-01321, 2016 WL 8229205, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2016). (See also Moore Decl. attach. A, at 1-1 to -8, 2-1 to -9 (DC- ADM 804 Procedures Manual §§ 1, 2 (eff. May 1, 2015)), Doc. 34-1, at 1118, 22-30). DC-ADM 804 sets forth various substantive and procedural requirements for inmate grievances, including requirements that the initial grievance specifically request any “compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.” (Moore Decl. attach. A., at 1-2 (DC-ADM 804 Procedures Manual § 1(A)(11)(d))).
Attachment A to the Moore Declaration is a complete copy of the DC-ADM 804 policy in effect at the time Brooking submitted his grievance in May 2015. That version of the policy was issued on April 27, 2015, and effective May 1, 2015.
Here, the defendant relies on this last provision: “If the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court, the inmate must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance.” (Id.) In this civil action, Brooking seeks monetary damages only. (See Doc. 5, at 7-8.) But nowhere in his initial grievance did Brooking articulate a request for monetary compensation. Thus, the defendant contends that Brooking failed to properly exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
On May 1, 2015, Brooking submitted a formal inmate grievance, logged by prison officials as Grievance No. 565669. In Block A of the preprinted DC-ADM 804 form, the inmate was instructed to:
Provide a brief, clear statement of your grievance. Additional paper may be used, maximum two pages (one DC-804 form and one one-sided 8/2” x 11” page). State all relief you are seeking.
In response, Brooking wrote:
From 4-27-15 to 4-30-15 Inmate Brooking complained of severe pain and was denied medical treatment by numerous officers, Sgt[.], and L.T[.] on E Unit B-Pod. Brooking was told by Sgt. Cleaver “severe pain is not a sign of a medical emergency.”
In Block B of the preprinted DC-ADM 804 form, the inmate was instructed to:
List actions taken and staff you have contacted, before submitting this grievance.
In response, Brooking wrote:
NO ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN[.]
This is the entire substance of Brooking's grievance; he did not attach any additional paper. (Alvord Decl. attach. A (Grievance No. 565669), Doc. 34-2, at 6.)
Because Brooking failed to specifically request monetary compensation in the administrative grievance process, he procedurally defaulted and failed to exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to his claim for monetary damages, and thus he is barred from bringing a claim for money damages against Cleaver in this action. See Johnson v. Wireman, 809 Fed. App'x 97, 99 (3d Cir. 2020); Wright v. Sauers, 729 Fed. App'x 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2018); Miller v. Little, Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-01941, 2023 WL 2529553, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2023); Harris v. Eckard, No. 1:15-cv-1411, 2018 WL 672153, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2018).
In his brief in opposition, the plaintiff argues only that he was never properly served with a copy of the grievance officer's initial review response. But Brooking's receipt of the initial response to his grievance is simply immaterial, as the grievance itself failed to request any monetary compensation. His failure to exhaust available remedies is based on a fatal defect in his original, initial grievance, not on a failure to administratively appeal the denial of that grievance by a lower-level prison official.
Accordingly, we recommend that the following proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law be adopted pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. Proposed Findings of Fact
1. The plaintiff, Marcus Dion Brooking, is a state prisoner, currently incarcerated at SCI Coal Township, located in Northumberland County, Pennsylvania. He was previously incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, located in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, until sometime in May 2015, when he was transferred to another state prison.
2. The DOC has established a multi-stage administrative remedy process through which an inmate may seek formal review of an issue related to any aspect of his confinement, set forth in DC-ADM 804.
3. One of the procedural requirements imposed by DC-ADM 804 at the time was the following: “If the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court, the inmate must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance.”
4. Brooking did not request monetary compensation in his initial grievance #565669, dated May 1, 2015.
5. The preprinted inmate grievance form itself explicitly discloses in boldface type that the inmate must “[s]tate all relief that you are seeking.”
B. Proposed Conclusions of Law
6. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner-plaintiff is required to properly exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to bringing a lawsuit challenging prison conditions. See Woodford, at 548 U.S. at 84; Small, 728 F.3d at 269.
7. Brooking failed to properly exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to his § 1983 claim against the remaining defendant, Sgt. Cleaver, alleging Cleaver's deliberate indifference to Brooking's complaints about a severe toothache.
8. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to bringing this action concerning prison conditions.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated April 12, 2023. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.