Opinion
Civil Action 3:15-cv-02134
09-25-2020
MARCUS DION BROOKING, #LU7017, Plaintiff, v. D.O.C., et al., Defendants.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights action. The plaintiff claims that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, he claims that he began suffering from a severe toothache on the evening of April 28, 2015, but despite alerting prison officials of his pain and discomfort repeatedly, he was denied any medical-dental treatment until the morning of May 1, 2015, at which time he was referred to a dentist for immediate extraction of a “retained root.” The only remaining defendant is Sgt. Cleaver, a correctional officer employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
Sgt. Cleaver has moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. In support, he has filed a statement of material facts, to which he has attached testimonial declarations and documentary evidence in support of his motion. In particular, these materials establish that, although Brooking submitted a prison grievance regarding his deliberate indifference claim against Sgt. Cleaver, he failed to appeal the initial denial of his grievance to the facility superintendent or the chief grievance officer for the state.
Before bringing a § 1983 action concerning prison conditions, a prisoner must first exhaust all available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (“[A]n inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.”). “[I]t is beyond the power of this court . . . to excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement, whether on the ground of futility, inadequacy or any other basis.” Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000).
Moreover, § 1997e(a) requires “proper” exhaustion of administrative remedies, meaning strict compliance with DOC deadlines and other procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89-95 (2006). “A procedural default by the prisoner, either through late or improper filings, bars the prisoner from bringing a claim in federal court unless equitable considerations warrant review of the claim.” McKinney v. Kelchner, No. 1:CV-05-0205, 2007 WL 2852373, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-32 (3d Cir. 2004)). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules'-rules that are defined not by [§ 1997e(a)], but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88) (citation omitted); see also Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Section 1997e(a) does not delineate the procedures prisoners must follow.”). “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not [§ 1997e(a)], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. “The only constraint is that no prison system may establish a requirement inconsistent with the federal policy underlying § 1983 and § 1997e(a).” Strong, 297 F.3d at 649. Thus, it follows that “grievances must contain the sort of information that the administrative system requires.” Strong, 297 F.3d at 649. But,
if prison regulations do not prescribe any particular content for inmate grievances, “a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.... [T]he grievant need not lay out the facts, articulate legal theories, or demand particular relief. All the grievance need do is object intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming.”Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Strong, 297 F.3d at 650).
In adopting DC-ADM 804, the DOC has established a multi-stage administrative remedy process through which an inmate may seek formal review of “problems or other issues arising during the course of their confinement.” (Doc. 34-1, at 8). As we have previously summarized it, “DC-ADM 804 provides a three-tiered grievance process: (1) an initial review by a grievance officer; (2) an appeal to the facility superintendent; and (3) an appeal to the statewide chief grievance officer.” Adams v. Giroux, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-01321, 2016 WL 8229205, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2016). (See also Doc. 34-1, at 12-19, 22-30). DC-ADM 804 sets forth various substantive and procedural requirements for inmate grievances, including requirements that the initial grievance “must include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim,” that it “identify individuals directly involved in the event(s),” that it “specifically state any claims . . . concerning violations of [DOC] directives, regulations, court orders, or other law,” and that it specifically request any “compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.” (Doc. 34-1, at 12).
Here, the defendants have submitted an unsworn declaration by Deborah Alvord, who previously served as the facility grievance coordinator for SCI Camp Hill, where Brooking was incarcerated at the time of the underlying events. (Doc. 34-2.) In her declaration, Alvord attested that, based on a review of DOC and facility records, Brooking submitted Grievance No. 565669 on May 1, 2015, regarding the purported denial of medical treatment for dental pain. (Id. ¶ 12; see also id. attach. A, at 6 (photocopy of grievance).) She further attested that, based on a review of DOC and facility records, an initial review response was issued on May 7, 2015, denying the plaintiff's grievance. (Id. ¶ 13; see also id. attach. B, at 8-10 (printout of initial review response).) Finally, Alvord attested that, based on a review of DOC and facility records, Brooking did not appeal the initial review response to Grievance No. 565669 to the facility superintendent nor to the statewide chief grievance officer. (Id. ¶ 14.)
In response, the plaintiff alleges that he was never served with a copy of the initial review response. He notes that all his personal property was packed up on May 14, 2015, and he was transferred from SCI Camp Hill to SCI Forest on May 15, 2015. He alleges that he did not receive a copy of the initial review response to Grievance No. 565669 at either facility. Based on these representations, we find that the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were available to him.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33) be denied, and that the matter be remanded to the undersigned for consideration of exhaustion in our role as a factfinder under Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018), and Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated September 25, 2020. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.