Opinion
C/A No. 7:19-cv-1077-BHH-JDA
04-16-2019
Latasha Boyd, Plaintiff, v. Bill Diangikes, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Latasha Boyd ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, files this action purportedly to assert a claim for breach of contract under 41 U.S.C. § 6503. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint along with attachments. [Docs. 1; 1-1; 1-2.] Plaintiff sues her landlord, Bill Diangikes ("Defendant"), asserting claims related to the rental of her home and an eviction proceeding initiated by Defendant in the state magistrate's court. [Doc. 1 at 4.] As an attachment to the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a copy of a Rule to Vacate or Show Cause (Eviction) filed by Defendant against Plaintiff in the Spartanburg County Magistrate's Court at case number 2019CV4210102554, along with what appears to be Plaintiff's filings in the state court proceedings. [Doc. 1-1.] According to the Rule to Vacate or Show Cause, Plaintiff was ordered to appear before the Spartanburg County Magistrate's Court on April 12, 2019, for an eviction/ejectment action commenced by Defendant for nonpayment of rent. [Id. at 2-3.] Upon review of the state court documents, it appears that Plaintiff argued in the state court that she should not be evicted because Defendant breached his contract, presumably the lease agreement, with Plaintiff. [Id. at 4.] The Court takes judicial notice that the state magistrate's court ruled in Defendant's favor in the underlying eviction/ejectment action on April 12, 2019. Liberally construing the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim for breach of contract and also seeks to enjoin and/or challenge the state magistrate's court's rulings in the underlying eviction proceedings.
See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search case number 2019cv4210102554) (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, her pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter in her pleadings, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Further, this Court possesses the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint were not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) ("[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.") (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]"); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the 'defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules."); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action purportedly under 41 U.S.C. § 6503, asserting a claim for breach of contract. It appears, however, that Plaintiff's claim arises from a state court eviction proceeding, and the crux of this action is a challenge to that state court proceeding. In any case, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction over her claim.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, "and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears." Id. at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a litigant must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court."). As such, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]"
Generally, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases, referred to as (1) federal question cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As discussed below, the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint do not fall within the scope of either form of this Court's limited jurisdiction.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
First, federal question jurisdiction arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To determine whether a plaintiff's claims "arise under" the laws of the United States, courts typically use the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which focuses on the allegations of the complaint. Prince v. Sears Holdings Corp., 848 F.3d 173, 177 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004)). "In other words, federal question jurisdiction exists 'only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint.'" Burbage v. Richburg, 417 F. Supp. 2d 746, 749 (D.S.C. 2006) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2003)).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that federal question jurisdiction exists over this action because this case involves a breach of contract in violation of 41 U.S.C. § 6503. Pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 6502, section 6503(a) applies only to contracts made by an agency of the United States for manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, or equipment in an amount exceeding $10,000. Because Plaintiff alleges a violation of a lease agreement that does not pertain to the manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, or equipment, and because Defendant is not an agency of the United States, 41 U.S.C. § 6503 is inapplicable to this case. Maddox v. CitiFinancial Mortg. Co., No. 5:18-cv-00041, 2018 WL 1547362, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2018) (explaining that 41 U.S.C. § 6503 "'concerns public contracts made with a United States agency,' and is therefore inapplicable to [a mortgage contract case]") (citing Griffin v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-917-JAG, 2017 WL 2829619, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 30, 2017); Scott v. Chrome Capital, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-2692-CMC-SVH, 2016 WL 7638135, at *7 (D.S.C. July 25, 2016) (explaining that 41 U.S.C. § 6503 is inapplicable to consumer debt contract disputes), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 4430854 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2016). Therefore, 41 U.S.C. § 6503 does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction in this case.
As noted, Plaintiff attached to the Complaint a copy of the state magistrate's court Rule to Vacate and Show Cause Order for an eviction proceeding. It does not appear from the allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff is attempting to remove the state court action to this Court, and Plaintiff has not filed a notice of removal. However, to the extent the instant action could be construed as a removal action from the state magistrate's court, the state court documents attached to the Complaint provide nothing to suggest that the state court proceedings present a federal question to demonstrate federal court subject matter jurisdiction. As such, the eviction action could not have been brought originally in federal court. Any attempt by Plaintiff to raise federal issues pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 6503 simply does not create federal jurisdiction. This is so because "actions in which [state court] defendants merely claim a substantive federal defense to a state-law claim do not raise a federal question." In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 584 (4th Cir. 2006). "The basis of federal question jurisdiction [ ] must appear upon the face of the state court complaint, and it cannot be supplied by reference to the answer or petition." Eure v. NVF Co., 481 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D. N.C. 1979) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)). Accordingly, federal question jurisdiction does not exist in this case to accept removal from the state court to consider Plaintiff's breach of contract claims to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to remove the state court action.
Diversity Jurisdiction
Likewise, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts showing the diversity statute's requirements are satisfied. The diversity statute requires complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Anderson v. Caldwell, No. 3:10-cv-1906-CMC-JRM, 2010 WL 3724752, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3724671 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2010). Complete diversity of the parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). Here, because all of the parties named in this action are citizens of South Carolina [Doc. 1 at 4], complete diversity of the parties is not present. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the amount in controversy requirement is met under the statute. Dismissal of a diversity action for want of jurisdiction is justified where it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the jurisdictional amount. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATION
In light of the forgoing, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims under either federal question or diversity grounds, and, therefore, the Complaint should be dismissed. It is therefore recommended that the Complaint be summarily DISMISSED without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in her Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed with prejudice and without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Fisher v. Walgreens, No. 1:17-cv-00225-MOC-WCM, 2019 WL 1440320, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2019) ("Where an error resulting in dismissal cannot be cured by amendment, dismissal should be with prejudice.") (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015)); Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend pursuant to Goode because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018). Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to enjoin or challenge the state magistrate's court's rulings and proceedings, this Court would still not have jurisdiction and the case would be subject to summary dismissal. See Lockhart v. White, No. 1:18-cv-1229-LO-TCB, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 1, 2018) (summarily dismissing case with prejudice because claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine), aff'd 2019 WL 1239796, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge April 16, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).