Opinion
01-14-2015
In the Matter of BOBBY J.C. (Anonymous). v. Administration for Children's Services, respondent; Faith C. (Anonymous), appellant.
Cheryl Charles–Duval, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow and Julie Steiner of counsel), for respondent. Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Jess Rao of counsel), attorney for the child.
Cheryl Charles–Duval, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow and Julie Steiner of counsel), for respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Jess Rao of counsel), attorney for the child.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Margaret P. McGowan, J.), dated April 2, 2013. The order, after a hearing, inter alia, released the subject child to the custody of the father and directed the entry of an order of protection requiring the mother to stay away from the subject child, except for supervised visitation.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The mother consented to the entry of a finding of neglect pursuant to Family Court Act § 1051 and did not move for leave to withdraw that consent. Accordingly, to the extent that she challenges either the procedure or the factual predicate underlying the finding of neglect, her arguments are not properly before this Court (see Matter of Cora J. [Kenneth J.], 72 A.D.3d 1170, 1171, 898 N.Y.S.2d 336 ).
At a dispositional hearing, the Family Court's disposition must be made "solely on the basis of the best interests of the child" with "no presumption that such interests will be promoted by any particular disposition" ( Family Ct. Act § 631 ; see Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 147–148, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824 ; Matter of Victoria P. [Victor P.], 121 A.D.3d 1006, 1007, 994 N.Y.S.2d 409 ; Matter of Phillips N. [Joy N.], 104 A.D.3d 690, 691, 961 N.Y.S.2d 216, lv. granted sub nom. State of N.Y. v. Anthony N., 24 N.Y.3d 1065, 1 N.Y.S.3d 3, 25 N.E.3d 340, 2014 Slip Op. 93067 [2014] ; Matter of Tiffany A., 242 A.D.2d 709, 712–713, 662 N.Y.S.2d 796 ). "The factors to be considered in making the determination include the parent or caretaker's capacity to properly supervise the child, based on current information and the potential threat of future abuse and neglect" ( Matter of Phillips N. [Joy N.], 104 A.D.3d at 691, 961 N.Y.S.2d 216 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Because "the Family Court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, its determination should be set aside only if it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Roberta W. v. Carlton McK., 112 A.D.3d 729, 730, 977 N.Y.S.2d 279 ; see Matter of Phillips N. [Joy N.], 104 A.D.3d at 691, 961 N.Y.S.2d 216 ; Matter of Stefani C., 61 A.D.3d 681, 876 N.Y.S.2d 501 ).
Here, the credible evidence established that the mother, from whose custody the child had been removed when the mother was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment, had significant mental health problems which interfered with her ability to provide appropriate care for the child and to obtain appropriate services for his severe autism. The evidence also raised concerns that the mother might be subjecting the child to unnecessary medical evaluations and treatments, and an overly restrictive diet. In contrast, once the child was placed in his custody, the father enrolled the child in a school which could provide appropriate special education services, arranged for the child to receive applied behavior analysis therapy, a recognized therapy for autism, and arranged for the child's home health aides to provide services at his home. Accordingly, the Family Court's determination that releasing the child to the custody of the father was in the child's best interests has a sound and substantial basis in the record. Furthermore, in light of the mother's disruptive behavior during visits and her admitted unwillingness or inability to comply with court directives regarding her interactions with the child, the court properly directed that the mother's visitation with the child be supervised.
The mother's remaining contentions are without merit.