Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-330
10-26-2023
JOHN BERTOLETTE, Plaintiff v. GEORGE LITTLE, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21) be granted with leave to amend.
II. Report
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff John Bertolette commenced this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 6, 2023. (ECF No. 4). He subsequently filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15) after he was granted leave to do so. He asserts claims related to his condition of confinement under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and violations of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Amended Complaint names these defendants in both their individual and official capacities: George Little, the former Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”); Laurel Harry, the current Secretary of the DOC; Tabb Bickell, the Executive Deputy Secretary for Institution Operations (“EDSI”); Trevor Wingard, the Western Regional Deputy Secretary (“RDS”) of the DOC; Michael Zaken, Superintendent of Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI Greene”); S. Buzas, Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management (“DSFM”) at SCI Greene; M. Dialesandro, Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services (“DSCS”) at SCI Greene; M. Malanoski, Major of Unit Management at SCI Greene; M. Switzer, Major of the Guard at SCI Greene; C. Swartz, Corrections Classification Program Manager (“CCPM”) at SCI Greene; J. McClelland, Corrections Classification Treatment Manager (“CCIM”) at SCI Greene; and D. Coulehan, Unit Manager of L-Block at SCI Greene (collectively “Defendants”).
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss which has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 21, 22, 27).
B. Relevant Factual Background
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at SCI Greene but previously was housed at SCI Houtzdale. (ECF No. 15 ¶ 1.) On July 20, 2018, Plaintiff was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI Houtzdale following a misconduct he received for walking off his work detail. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff attended a disciplinary hearing for this conduct as a result of which he was sentenced to serve 270 days in Disciplinary Custody (“DC”) status. (Id. ¶ 22.)After finishing his sentence on April 11, 2019, Plaintiff was kept in the RHU on Administrative Custody (“AC”) status in solitary confinement and was placed on the DOC's Restricted Release List (“RRL”). (Id. ¶ 23.) “Around the beginning of 2020,” he was informed that “then-Secretary of the Pa. DOC, John Wetzel, had ‘signed-off' on his RRL placement, officially placing Plaintiff on indefinite status.” (Id. ¶ 24.)
Footnotes 1 and 2 of Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) explain the DOC policies and procedures about inmates housed in the RHU: DC-ADM 801 (Disciplinary Custody or “DC”) and DC-ADM 802 (Administrative Custody or “AC”). Plaintiff likewise cites and discusses these and other DOC policies in his Complaint. See, e.g., ECF No. 15. ¶¶ 32, 40, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 78, 85, 86, 101, 106, 113 and 114. As a result, the Court takes judicial notice of these policies and procedures. These policies are publicly available at: https://www.cor.pa.gov/About% .
Plaintiff was transferred to SCI Greene on November 9, 2020. (ECF No. 15 ¶ 25.) When he arrived there, he was placed in the RHU on AC Status and continued to be listed on the RRL. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 26.) According to Plaintiff, the RRL is a state of administrative custody where an inmate is held in solitary confinement in the RHU and is subject to restrictions on his ability to interact with anyone, including staff members, other inmates or outside visitors. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff asserts that by being placed on the RRL, his movements were “severely restricted,” and he was provided with “almost no educational or rehabilitative programming [or] no meaningful or constructive use of his time.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff also claims that his “status as an RRL inmate is not for any disciplinary or penological reason, but is solely for administrative purposes, although the restrictions imposed are no different than those which the DOC imposes for punitive purposes.” (Id. ¶ 29.)
The Amended Complaint sets forth Plaintiff's understanding of when and how the RRL was created, as well as the policies and process for review of a RRL prisoner's solitary confinement. (See ECF No. 15 ¶¶ 29-38.) As alleged in the Amended Complaint, when the DOC created the policy and process for an inmate's placement, continuation on, or removal from RRL status, the final authority on these issues rested with the Secretary of the DOC. (Id. ¶ 31.) That policy has since changed so that the final authority on whether an inmate will be placed or removed from the RRL list now rests with the EDSI. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here is no appellate process for the RRL, nor any other legitimate way for an inmate to challenge his RRL status or secure his release from this status.” (Id. ¶ 35). He also claims that DOC officials do not “allow an inmate to advocate on his behalf, express his views, or otherwise contest his placement on the RRL.” (Id. ¶ 36.)
On July 8, 2021, Plaintiff was enrolled in the DOC's Intensive Management Unit (“IMU”), a 6-phase step-down program for RRL inmates that affords them with an opportunity to work their way towards re-integration into the prison's general population. (ECF No. 15 ¶¶ 39-59.) He contends that the “IMU policies... were... enforced by defendant Little... and... by defendants Harry, Bickell [and] Wingard.” (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff challenges the length of the program and alleges that even if he completes the program, release into the general prison population is not guaranteed. (Id. ¶¶ 53-58.)
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Little, Harry, Bickell and Wingard denied him due process by enforcing policies that do not allow him to “challenge his RRL status in any legitimate way.” (Id. ¶¶ 64, 122.) He admits that he received occasional 90-day reviews of his AC status on the RRL but they are “perfunctory in nature.” (Id. ¶ 67.) He also asserts that he received reviews of his RRL status “towards the end of 2020 or the beginning of 2021” and again on October 31, 2022, but never had an opportunity to advocate for himself during such reviews. (Id. ¶¶ 71, 73-75, 78.) Plaintiff further alleges that he has been “misconduct free” for two-and-a-half years. (Id. ¶¶ 77, 120.)
Plaintiff also asserts a number of specific complaints about his conditions of confinement in the RHU, including: (1) “24/7 illumination of his cell”; (2) eating meals alone in his cell; (3) confinement to a “7x12 foot space with is encumbered by a bed, a desk, and a toilet, for an average of 22 hours a day”; (4) denial of “normal” human interactions; (5) denial of “physical contact with his family for 5 years”; (6) mandatory strip and body cavity searches “every time he leaves his cell”; (7) denial of access to “all educational, rehabilitative, and vocational programming.including programming that is required for him to meet parole eligibility”; (8) denial of religious services; (9) being housed with mentally ill inmates “who exhibit loud and disruptive behavior, yelling and banging at all hours of the day and night,” all of which behaviors are supposed to be prohibited but are allowed by DOC staff “to grind up” Plaintiff and other inmates; and (10) “extreme noise.” (ECF No. 15 ¶ 89.) Plaintiff claims he has been held in solitary confinement for “nearly 5 years” for no apparent reason and has been denied a meaningful opportunity to challenge his solitary confinement and RRL status; has not been provided information about the basis for the decisions about his continued placement there; has not been given a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and has not been advised what is necessary to be released. (Id. ¶¶ 60-84.) He alleges that “as a result of defendant Little, Harry, Bickel and Wingard's.. .enforcement of policies [related to RRL status] and the IMU.. .these defendants have inflicted cruel and unusual punishment upon the plaintiff that have caused him to suffer serious harm.” (Id. ¶¶ 85, 114, 130, 134.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants are aware of the long-term effects of solitary confinement and the damages he has suffered. (Id. ¶¶ 92, 94-99, 134.)
C. Legal Standard
“Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). “This requires a plaintiff to plead “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible,” thus enabling “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). While the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations ... a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
As noted by the Third Circuit in Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011), a 12(b)(6) inquiry includes identifying the elements of a claim, disregarding any allegations that are no more than conclusions and then reviewing the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint to evaluate whether the elements of the claim are sufficiently alleged. If a claim “is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts generally consider only the complaint, attached exhibits and matters of public record. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).
D. Discussion
Plaintiff's claims are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts, which if proven, would establish: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the person depriving him of the right acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations ommitted); Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations ommitted).
1. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he ws denied procedural due process with respect to his placement and retention on the RRL in AC status. Plaintiff also alleges that to the extent his RRL status was periodically reviewed, the reviews were perfunctory and had a pre-ordained outcome that he would remain on RRL status indefinitely.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's due process claim. They first argue that with respect to his claim about his RRL status, “he has failed to plead that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest with respect to placement or maintenance on the RRL.” In addition, they assert that his due process claim about his AC status should be dismissed because he received “all the process he is due.” (ECF No. 22 at 5-10.)
The due process analysis begins with determining whether the liberty interest asserted is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Montanez v. Sec'y Dep't Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 482-483 (3d Cir. 2014). If it is a protected interest, the court must then determine what process is necessary to protect it. Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775-783 (3d Cir. 2010). If the interest is not protected, no process is necessary. Thus, as a threshold matter, Plaintiff must plead facts that, if true, establish that he had a protected liberty interest. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that when assserting a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must plead deprivation of a liberty interest to survive a motion to dismiss).
Prisoners do not have the same liberty interests as others. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). Incarceration “brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation on many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by considerations underlying our penal system.” Id. (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Lab. Union, Inc., 433 U.S.119, 125 (1977)). “To rise to the level of a liberty interest, the right alleged must confer ‘freedom from restraint which.. .imposes atypical and signficant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Williams v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 599 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703,708 (3d Cir. 1997)).
No bright line defines where the duration of segregation becomes atypical. Williams, 848 F.3d at 561-562. An inmate sentenced to thirty days in disciplinary confinement does not endure atypical hardship. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486; see also Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-484) (holding that inmates in disciplinary hearings are not entitled to procedural due process because the resulting sanctions do not affect a protected liberty interest). Courts have also held that inmates held in AC for fifteen months do not endure atypical hardship. Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708.
As it relates to Plaintiff's initial placement on the RRL at SCI Houtzdale, there are no allegations that any of Defendants had any role in the placement or its continuation while he was housed there, and so there is no basis for their liability. Moreover, as to his initial placement on AC status on the RRL at SCI Greene after his transfer there in November 2020, this decision does not itself trigger any due process rights as it did not “entail any atypical and significant hardships on [him] beyond the fact of confinement itself.” Bramble v. Wetzel, 2022 WL 55021, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (citing Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002)); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff claims that his initial placement on AC status on the RRL at SCI Greene violated his due process rights, this claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff acknowledges that after he was transferred to SCI Greene in November 2020, an initial RRL review process was initiated “toward the end of 2020 or the beginning of 2021.” (ECF 15, ¶ 71.) He alleges that he was not reviewed again until October 31, 2022, which is contrary to the annual review required in ADM-802. (Id. ¶ 78.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was not provided notice of review of his RRL status or the reasons for his continued RRL placement. (Id. ¶¶ 67, 77.) And, he alleges, he has been given no opportunity to challenge or appeal his RRL status.
Depriving an incarcerated individual of liberty requires due process protection only if it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship. . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). “In determining if a protected liberty interest exists, the court must consider: (1) the duration of the. . .confinement [at issue]; and (2) whether the conditions of confinement were signficantly more restrictive than those imposed upon other inmates in solitary confinement.” Huertas v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 533 Fed.Appx. 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000).
According to DC-ADM 802, Section 4 B, some inmates on AC status are placed on the RRL so that the Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations participates in any decision to release the inmate to the general population. Thus, under DOC policy, the only distinction between an inmate on AC status and an AC inmate placed on the RRL is the procedure for releasing him to the general population. Id. Significantly, as Defendants note, because placement on the RRL only changes the identity of decision-maker who can release an inmate to general population, placement on the RRL does not by itself impact a protected liberty interest, and therefore, does not trigger due process concerns. Bowen v. Ryan, 248 Fed.Appx. 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Nifas v. Beard, 2009 WL 3241871, at *14 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (“placement on the RRL could not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest at all because at most, it accomplishes only a change in the identity of the decision maker as to whether Plaintiff should be released from the AC or not.”), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 374 Fed.Appx. 241 (3d Cir. 2010).
Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff's claims are based on his placement on the RRL, he has failed to show that he has been deprived of a liberty interest. Therefore, his due process claim related to his placement on the RRL at SCI Greene should be denied with prejudice as to all Defendants.
Plaintiff's due process claim must be analyzed in connection with his continued placement on AC status since arriving at SCI Greene in November 2020. There is no liberty interest created directly by the Fourteenth Amendment that prevents an inmate from being placed on AC status. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Stephany v. Wagner, 835 F.2d 497, 499 (3d Cir. 1987) (“the Due Process Clause does not give a prisoner a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population”).
The Court will assume for purposes of this analysis that being placed in the RHU on AC status for four years can implicate a liberty interest. That said, based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has received adequate due process as to his AC status. As the Third Circuit has held, due process requirements are met by a periodic review of inmates who are indefinitely confined to administrative custody. Shoats, 213 F.3d at 147; Nifas, 374 Fed.Appx. at 244-45; Washington-El v. Beard, 562 Fed.Appx. 61 (3d Cir. 2014). Plaintiff admits that he receives a Program Review Committee (PRC) review every 90 days regarding his AC status under DC-ADM 802. He alleges that he has been able to raise mental and physical health concerns several times. Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges that these reviews are “perfunctory” and not in compliance with various aspects of ADM 802 (ECF No. 15 ¶ 67), any failure to comply with prison policies or discuss certain issues does not amount to a denial of the required minimal due process. See Shoats, 213 F.3d at 147; United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d. Cir. 1981). As noted by the Third Circuit, “the fact that Pennsylvania regulations provide for hearings after transfer to administrative custody is not relevant to a determination of whether federal procedural due process is required.” Griffin, 112 F.3d at 709 n.3. In addition, even if one or more of the Defendants deviated from the procedures in the DOC's policies, this did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional right to procedural due process.
Finally, Plaintiff acknowledges that he has been enrolled in the IMU program designed to provide a pathway to an inmate's return to general population. While Plaintiff critiques this program and notes that it is not a guarantee that an inmate will be released to the general population, as Defendants note, no inmate is guaranteed a specific placement in a correctional institution.
That leaves the issue of whether Plaintiff has been denied due process because he has remained on the RRL without the ability to appeal or challenge his status. He alleges that as a result of policies that were “developed, promulgated, approved, implemented, upheld and enforced,” he has no avenue for review or challenge of his RRL status. Thus, he asserts, the conditions and duration of his confinement have caused him atypical and significant hardship. According to the allegations of the Complaint, he has been in solitary confinement at SCI Greene since 2020, his RRL status is ongoing and among other things, he has been denied access to “nearly all” educational, rehabilitative and vocational programming, eats his meals alone, is denied almost all “sensory input,” and is subject to mandatory strip searches whenever he leaves his cell. (ECF No. 15 ¶ 89.) Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of his confinement are more restrictive than those imposed on other inmates in the “regular” RHU or on AC status.
On the issue of signficant hardship, the court must consider the nature of the prison conditions in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, including “access to open air activites without strip searches, regular access to windows and natural light; daily access to showers; and the right to more frequent vistis where contact is permitted.” Williams, 848 F.3d at 563. The court also may examine access to group religious services, job and vocational programs, group sports and telephone calls; human contact with individuals other than prison staff; the ability to qualify for parole; the hours a day confined to the cell; and whether the inmate eats meals alone. Id. at 562-664. In Williams, a signficant hardship was found to exist where an inmate was confined to his cell for twenty-two to twenty-four hours a day indefinitely, ate his meals alone in his cell, was “placed inside a small locked cage during much of the limited time he was allowed to leave his cell and...was subject to invasive strip searches each time he left his cell for exercise.” Id. at 563.
Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff's allegations might support an inference that his continuation on the RRL without the ability to challenge his status implicates a liberty interest because the conditions are more restrictive and involve atypical hardship in comparison to others held in solitary confinement.
Given the implication of a liberty interest, Plaintiff must be given an “informal, nonadversary review,” Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144, during which he is provided with an opportunity to state his position. Plaintiff alleges that he has not been permitted to advocate, express his views or contest his continuation on the RRL. (See ECF No. 15 ¶¶ 60, 63, 67(c),(g) and (h)). Thus, at this stage, he has minimally alleged facts that support a claim that he has not received the process he is due regarding his continuation on the RRL.
At the same time, however, Plaintiff alleges in a blanket and conclusory fashion that all of the Defendants deprived him of due process. He merely pleads that Defendants Little, Harry, Bickell and Wingard “developed, promulgated, approved, implemented, upheld and enforced” policies that offered him no avenue to challenge his RRL status, and makes the same bald conclusions about the remaining defendants at SCI Greene.
In order to impose liability upon a defendant in a § 1983 case, a planitiff must also show that the defendant had personal involvement in the wrongdoing. Williams v. City of York, 967 F.3d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 2020). A plaintiff must allege facts to show that every named defendant was personally involved. Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006). It is insufficient to generally allege that multiple defendants are liable without identifying individual conduct. See Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 Fed.Appx. 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 2015).
Further, an allegation that the defendant was responsible for supervising those involved, without more, is insufficent. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 1988). A supervisor can be liable if they established and maintained a policy, practice or policy that caused the harm. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). Alternatively a supervisor may be liable if he or she participated in the alleged wrongdoing, personally directed others to do so, or, with actual knowledge, acquiesced in the conduct. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). As to the latter, the plaintiff's allegations must describe the defendants' participation in or acquiescence in the wrongful conduct. Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015). Constructive knowledge is not enough; the defendant must have actual knowledge of the conduct. Id.
The Complaint fails to identify the specific allegedly wrongful conduct of each Defendant. The conclusory allegations by Plaintiff do not represent sufficent pleading to establish the personal involvement of any of the named Defendants. Therefore, this claim should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. Any such amendment must specifically plead facts that support the personal involvement of each of the Defendants who are alleged by Plaintiff to have denied him due process.
2. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Claim
While Plaintiff includes a separate claim of Deliberate Indifference in Count 3, the Court will discuss the allegations in it in the context of the Eighth Amendment claim. Deliberate indifference is properly discussed in the context of cruel and unusual punishment and does not represent a separate claim.
Plaintiff alleges that all of the Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment by approving his placement and refusing to remove him from the RRL. (Id. ¶ 85.) Because he is on the RRL, Plaintiff claims, he is housed in the RHU where the conditions constitute solitary confinement. (Id. ¶ 38.) As a result, Plaintiff asserts that he has been “subjected to deprivations and inhume treatment.” (Id. ¶ 89.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed because “he has failed to allege that he was denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” (ECF No. 22 at 11.)
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Cruel and unual punishment is punishment that “violates civilized standards of humanity and decency.” Griffin, 112 F.3d at 709. Prison conditions are cruel and unusual if they deprive inmates of basic human needs, such as food, sanitation and medical care. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347348 (1981).
The Eighth Amendment does not require prisons to be comfortable. Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). As explained by the Third Circuit, because the prohibition “is directed only toward ‘punishment,' it applies only to deprivations that constitute an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, including ‘those that are ‘totally without penological justification.'” Id. at 372 (emphasis in original).
An inmate making a cruel and unusual punishment claim must show that the deprivation was objectively serious and that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Whether the harm is objectively serious is measured by “whether it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993)) (emphasis in original).
Placement in the RHU alone does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Williams v. Armstrong, 566 Fed.Appx. 106, 109 (3d Cir. 2014) (Eighth Amendment applies only when a deprivation results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,”); Griffin, 112 F.3d at 709; Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 1981). Nor does mere placement of an inmate in AC status or on the RRL alone violate the Eighth Amendment. See Bramble, 2022 WL 55021, at *7; Booze v. Wetzel, 2014 WL 65283, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2014).
Plaintiff alleges that he has been in administrative custody with no clear end for the three years that he has been housed at SCI Greene. He asserts, among other things, that he is held in a cell equipped with a light that is illuminated 24 hours a day. (ECF No. 15 ¶ 89.) He claims to be housed with mentally ill inmates who exhibit loud and disruptive behavior at all times of the day and night that is allowed in order to “grind up” Plaintiff. He also experiences “extreme noise.” (Id.) He is denied “sensory input” and “healthy mental stimuli”; has been denied physical contact with his family “for nearly 5 years”; and is denied access to “nearly all educational, rehabilitative, and vocational programming.” (Id.) He claims that these conditions of confinement have caused him a litany of severe mental and physical harm. (Id. ¶ 92.)
Viewing the allegations of the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has pleaded a combination of conditions that taken as a whole, may represent an Eighth Amendment claim. See Gans v. Rozum, 2007 WL 2571527, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2007), aff'd, 267 Fed.Appx. 178 (3d Cir. 2008). Therefore, at this stage, he has adequately pleaded that these deprivations were objectively serious.
At the same time, however, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead facts to support specific conduct that can represents deliberate indifference on the part of any of the Defendants. The Third Circuit has held that prison officials act with deliberate indifference when they “both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. The.. .element of deliberate indifference is subjective, not objective.. .meaning that the offical must actually be aware of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should have been aware.” Mammana, 934 F.3d at 373 (citing Woloszyn v. Cty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2005)). A prison official may act with deliberate indifference if he “had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so.” Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 479 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650-651 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that “all the defendants are well aware of the harmful effects of solitary confinement” and that they all “are aware that plaintiff has experienced severe mental and physical harm as a result of his confinement.” (ECF No. 15 ¶¶ 94, 96.) Plaintiff further alleges that “all the defendants have knowledge and training as to what sorts of confinement can and will, and are proven to cause mental and physical harm to those subjeted to them” and have ignored his pleas to be removed from serious harm even though they have the “authority to take the necessary actions to remove Plaintiff from the RRL, solitary confinement, and the conditions thereof.” (Id. ¶¶ 98, 100.)
As discussed above, however, blanket broad and general allegations that reference all of the Defendants as a group are insufficient to plead the personal involvement of each Defendant named in the Complaint. Plaintiff has thus failed to sufficiently plead facts that may reflect deliberate indifference on the part of any of the Defendants.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed without prejudice and leave to amend in order to allege sufficient facts related to the personal involvement of each of the Defendants.
E. Leave to Amend
When dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court must allow a plaintiff to amend a deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alvin, 227 F.3d at 121.
Because the Court cannot conclude at this time that it would be futile to permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint to cure his deficient pleading, the dismissal of Counts I and II should be without prejudice.
F. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. To the extent that Plaintiff claims in Count I that his placement and continuation on AC status at SCI Greene, his placement on the RRL at SCI Greene or any alleged violations of DOC policies violated his due process rights, such claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. The claim in Count I that Plaintiff's continued placement on the RRL violated his due process rights should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
3. Count II should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend; and
4. Count III should be dismissed with prejudice because “deliberate indifference” is an element of a §1983 claim, not a separate cause of action.
G. Notice
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).