Opinion
NO. 01-19-00354-CR
08-27-2020
BRODRICK BELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 184th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1515315
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Brodrick Bell of the offense of capital murder. Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the trial court automatically assessed appellant's punishment at imprisonment for life without parole. In three points of error, appellant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by not including an accomplice witness instruction in the jury charge; and (3) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(7) (stating that person commits offense of capital murder if he murders more than one person during same criminal transaction).
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
On March 20, 2019, Demarquise Edwards, his girlfriend Kiara Jackson, and his friend Terrell Paynes, were murdered inside Edwards's apartment in the Arbor Court apartment complex. Edwards's body was found on the kitchen floor, Paynes's body was found in the living room near the front door, and Kiara's body was found in a back bedroom. All three bodies had at least two gunshot wounds.
Because Kiara Jackson and another witness share the same surname, we will refer to her by her full name. The other complainants and witnesses will be referred by their surnames.
Houston Police Department Homicide Sergeant Chris Cegielski testified that HPD did not have any solid leads in the case until they started receiving anonymous tips through Crime Stoppers a few days after the murders. Among other information, the tips identified Celvin Brooks and appellant as having been involved in the murders and provided information regarding Brooks's Facebook page, which included a photograph of Brooks, appellant, and Kevoughn Fields. Callers also alleged that Andra Coleman was an associate of Edwards, Brooks, and appellant.
The tipster referred to appellant by his nickname, "John Gotti."
Sergeant Cegielski interviewed Brooks on March 29, 2015. During this interview, Brooks provided a saliva sample and consented to a search of his cell phone records. Through the cell records, Cegielski was able to place Brooks's cell phone at the Arbor Court apartments around the time of the shootings. Although Brooks claimed that Oren Jenkins could provide him with an alibi, Jenkins's and Brooks's statements to police were inconsistent. Brooks eventually admitted to police that he had been driving around the area looking for someone to rob when the murders occurred.
Over the next several months, Cegielski interviewed several other people, including Brooks's cousin, Dequan Jackson, Andra Coleman, Dontay Bradley, and Raveen Jones, and conducted a follow-up interview with Brooks. Although Jackson and Coleman were initially uncooperative, they eventually told the police what they knew about the offense. Appellant, Brooks, and Fields were subsequently arrested and charged with the murders of Edwards, Paynes, and Kiera Jackson.
At trial, Coleman testified that he was living at the Arbor Court apartments in March 2015 with his girlfriend, Raveen Jones, their child, and Jones's teenage cousin, Dontay Bradley. Coleman testified that he and Bradley were close and would do anything for one another. Coleman testified that he knew Edwards because he had sold guns to him. According to Coleman, Edwards was known as the "drink man" because he sold promethazine, or codeine syrup.
Coleman testified that he and Jones saw appellant, Brooks, and Fields in a gray truck driving around the Arbor Court parking lot two days before the murders. Coleman thought it was unusual because the three men had never been to the Arbor Court apartments before.
Coleman testified that he was walking to his car the day of the murders when he encountered appellant, Brooks, and Fields in the parking lot. The three men, who were dressed in all black and wearing gloves, were standing beside the same gray truck Coleman had seen them driving around in two days before. The men called Coleman over to talk to them. One of them asked Coleman what he knew about Edwards, "the drink man," because they were going to rob him. The men appeared excited and were acting like they were "fixing to go in." Coleman told them that he had sold guns to Edwards in the past and cautioned them that trying to rob Edwards was a "suicide mission" because Edwards was heavily armed.
After speaking with appellant, Brooks, and Fields, Coleman drove his car, a tan, late-model Buick, and parked on the street outside the pedestrian gate to meet a customer who was buying marijuana. By this time, appellant, Brooks, and Fields had gotten into their truck and parked it behind Coleman's car. After he completed the drug transaction, Coleman drove back into the apartment's parking lot and parked near the front office. Coleman testified that he was sitting in his car with Bradley when he heard several gunshots, and he saw appellant, Brooks, and Fields running back to their truck a few seconds after the shooting stopped.
Coleman testified that he spoke with appellant at the Haverstock Apartments a few days after the murders and that appellant told him "how everything went down." Specifically, appellant told Coleman that when they knocked on the door to Edwards's apartment that night, a man, who was later identified as Paynes, opened the door. Appellant shot Paynes and then he, Brooks, and Fields ran inside the apartment. Appellant told Coleman that he shot Edwards in the kitchen, and that a woman in the apartment was also shot, but he did not identify her shooter. The three men took money and drugs with them when they left Edwards's apartment.
At the time of appellant's trial, Coleman had pleaded guilty to two federal aggravated robbery charges and one charge of abetting the use of a firearm during commission of a violent crime and was awaiting sentencing. Coleman testified that he had initially refused to talk to the police about the murders, but he changed his mind because he believed that the federal prosecutors would tell the federal judge that he had cooperated with the murder case and he would get a lighter sentence. He admitted that he had three prior felony convictions for which he had served two years in the penitentiary. On cross-examination, Coleman admitted that he had originally told police that a man named Jamall was with appellant, Brooks, and Fields and that Jamall had been driving the getaway vehicle. Coleman explained that he did not mention Jamall during his direct examination because Jamall had not been charged in the case and he had not been asked to identify the truck's driver. Coleman admitted that he had also told the police that Fields had told him that Fields's cousin, "G," had "put a lick on" Edwards.
Jackson, Brooks's cousin and appellant's friend, testified that he went to Fields's girlfriend's apartment the day after the shooting where he saw appellant, Brooks, Fields, and others excitedly "[p]artying" and "flashing" lots of money. He also saw several bottles of codeine syrup on the kitchen counter and a chrome .45 handgun. Jackson testified that when he and Brooks left the party to buy cigarettes, he asked Brooks where the drugs and money in the apartment had come from. Brooks told Jackson that he, appellant, and Fields's cousin, "G" had gone to an apartment in the Arbor Court complex the night before to "hit a lick," which Jackson testified means to rob someone. According to Jackson, Brooks told him that when the group arrived at the apartment, he and appellant went inside and they both started shooting. Brooks stated that he shot and killed someone in the back room while appellant was "shooting over the counter" at someone else in the kitchen. After the shootings, the three men left the apartment with the money, a chrome .45 caliber handgun, and several bottles of codeine syrup. Jackson and Brooks then returned to the party where Jackson was photographed flashing a large amount of cash and standing next to appellant. Jackson testified that although appellant initially refused to talk to him about what had happened the night before, appellant eventually admitted that he had shot at Edwards several times over a kitchen counter, striking Edwards in the head and body.
Jackson testified that he had been charged with two aggravated robberies and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. In exchange for his testimony against appellant, the State had agreed to dismiss one of the aggravated robberies and the unauthorized use charge and cap his punishment for the remaining aggravated robbery charge at twenty-five years rather than life.
The HPD officer who analyzed Jackson's and Brooks's cell phone records testified that Brooks's cell phone received multiple calls from Jackson's phone between 9:59 p.m. and 10:41 p.m. the night of the murders, and that Brooks was in the vicinity of the Arbor Court apartments when the calls occurred.
Raveen Jones testified that she saw appellant, Brooks, and Fields standing outside a four-door, white or silver pickup truck in the Arbor Court parking lot two days before the murder. The next day, she saw Brooks walking near the complex's pedestrian gate and towards Edwards's apartment building. She also observed the same white or silver truck parked on the street just beyond the gate. Jones explained that she had never seen appellant, Brooks, or Fields at Arbor Court before March 18, 2015, and that she never saw them there again after March 20, 2015—the date of the offense. Jones was not at home the evening of the murders.
Jones testified that Edwards lived in her apartment complex, but she did not socialize with him and she did not know that Edwards was a drug dealer until after his death. Jones testified that she also did not know that Coleman sold firearms or that he had done business with Edwards. She testified that Coleman had been convicted in federal court for an aggravated robbery that was committed a few days after the murders.
Jones's cousin, Bradley, testified that he and Coleman talked to appellant, Brooks, and Fields in the parking lot of the Arbor Court apartment complex the night of the murders. According to Bradley, the men were dressed all in black and sitting in a dark green truck. Bradley testified that he spoke briefly with the men, but he soon walked back to his apartment because he did not like the "vibe" the trio was giving off and he did not feel comfortable around them. Bradley testified that Coleman returned to the apartment and joined him and his brother who were in the living room playing video games. Bradley later heard a lot of gunshots and walked out onto the balcony to see what was happening while Coleman and his brother stayed inside. Bradley testified that he saw appellant, Brooks, and Fields run down the stairs leading to Edwards's apartment, exit through the pedestrian gate, and drive away in the truck. He testified that Brooks, the shortest man, ran out first, followed by appellant, who had the darkest complexion. Fields, the tallest man in the group, followed a few minutes afterwards. Bradley testified that Coleman remained inside the apartment after the gunshots were fired, and he did not walk out onto the balcony. Bradley testified that he was close to Coleman and thought of him like a big brother or father-figure.
Duke Catalon testified that he dropped his girlfriend off at the Arbor Court apartments on March 20, 2019. As he was leaving, he stopped to talk to Paynes in the parking lot. Paynes, who had been driving Edwards's car, had accidently locked himself out of the vehicle. Catalon went to an auto parts store to buy a tool to help Paynes unlock the car and Edwards was in the parking lot when he returned. Catalon left shortly thereafter to run an errand. When he returned to the apartment complex around 10:15 p.m. to pick up his girlfriend, Catalon saw two black men standing near a brown car parked near the apartment complex's front office. The men were looking in the direction of Edwards's apartment building. Catalon texted Paynes, but Paynes did not respond. He then tried to contact Edwards, but he did not respond either. Catalon then called "Smoke," who was a mutual friend of Paynes's, and told him what had happened. As he walked towards Edwards's apartment, Catalon heard a loud noise that was possibly a gunshot, and he saw someone in a white t-shirt run out from behind Edwards's apartment building and towards a white four-door pickup truck parked outside the pedestrian entrance. When Smoke arrived on the scene, he went into Edwards's apartment and then informed Catalon that everyone inside the apartment was dead.
Photographs and a video taken by an HPD crime scene investigator documented that there was no sign of forced entry, the first victim was found in the living room, the second victim was found in a bedroom, and the third victim was in the kitchen. The investigators also retrieved from the apartment several shell casings of different caliber, bullet fragments, and illegal narcotics.
The assistant medical examiner who performed the autopsies for the three victims testified that Paynes had been shot twice in the head, Kiera Jackson had been shot in the nose and leg, and Edwards had six gunshot wounds, including one that went through his vertebrae and spinal cord and bruised his heart. She also testified that projectile fragments were retrieved from all three bodies.
The jury charge, which included an instruction on law of the parties, authorized the jury to find appellant guilty of capital murder either as the principal actor or as a party to the criminal transaction. The jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense of capital murder and because the State did not seek the death penalty, appellant's punishment was automatically assessed at imprisonment for life. This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first point of error, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction because it fails to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review an appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Our review includes all of the evidence introduced, whether it be properly or improperly admitted. See Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating courts consider admissible and inadmissible evidence presented at trial when conducting sufficiency analysis).
"The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses." Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). As the sole factfinder, the jury may reasonably infer facts from the evidence presented, credit the witnesses it chooses, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. See Canfield v. State, 429 S.W.3d 54, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). We afford almost complete deference to the jury's determinations of credibility. See id. (citing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). In the event of conflicting evidence, we presume the jury resolved conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Canfield, 429 S.W.3d at 65.
The State may prove a defendant's identity and criminal culpability by either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that evidence. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The absence of direct evidence is not dispositive of the issue of guilt; rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient. See Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599.
The jury charge authorized the jurors to find appellant guilty of capital murder—as either a principal actor or as a party—if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that, on or about March 20, 2015, in Harris County, Texas: (1) during the same criminal transaction, appellant intentionally caused the deaths of Kiara Jackson, Edwards, and Paynes by shooting them with a firearm; or (2) Brooks or Fields, during the same criminal transaction, intentionally caused the deaths of Kiara Jackson, Edwards, and Paynes by shooting them with a firearm, and appellant—with intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense—solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Brooks or Fields to commit the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1) & 19.03(a)(7)(A); see also id. § 7.02(a)(2). Appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to establishing his identity as one of the perpetrators.
B. Analysis
There is direct and circumstantial evidence in the record establishing appellant's identity as one of the shooters, including appellant's own statements to Jackson and Coleman about his role in the triple homicide and witness testimony placing appellant at the scene. Specifically, Bradley and Coleman testified that they spoke with appellant, Brooks, and Fields at the Arbor Court apartments the night of the murders. According to Bradley and Coleman, the men were dressed in all black, and either standing beside or sitting inside a truck. Coleman testified that one of the men told him that they were going to rob Edwards and asked Coleman if he knew anything about him. According to Coleman, appellant and his companions appeared excited and were acting like they were ready to execute their plan.
Coleman testified that he later heard several gunshots coming from the direction of the pedestrian gate and he saw appellant, Brooks, and Fields run to their truck and drive away. Bradley, who had also heard the gunshots, testified that he saw appellant and the others run down the stairs leading to Edwards's apartment, exit the pedestrian gate, and drive away in their truck. Coleman also testified that appellant told him a few days later that he shot Paynes after he opened the apartment door and then ran inside and shot Edwards in the kitchen.
Jackson testified that he partied with appellant, Brooks, Fields, and others the day after the murders and that Brooks and appellant told him about their involvement in the crimes. Specifically, appellant told Jackson that he shot at Edwards several times over a counter, striking Edwards in the head and body. Brooks, who admitted to Jackson that he had shot and killed someone in a back room, told Jackson that appellant shot several times over a counter and killed someone in the kitchen.
Appellant argues there is insufficient evidence establishing his identity as one of the perpetrators because most of the evidence linking him to the offense is from the "highly suspect testimony" of Coleman and Jackson, two convicted felons who did not cooperate with the police initially but decided to testify against him in exchange for leniency in the resolution of their pending aggravated offenses. Jackson had also admitted to lying to the police when he was initially questioned about the murders. The jury, however, was aware of Jackson's and Coleman's criminal history, their degree of cooperation with law enforcement in this case, and the circumstances that led to them testifying against appellant, and it was able to consider these factors when evaluating each witness's credibility and the weight to give their testimony. See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525.
Appellant further contends that Jackson's and Coleman's testimony regarding his involvement in the murders is further undermined by the fact that their testimony conflicts with the trial testimony of other witnesses, including Bradley, as well as Jackson's and Coleman's previous testimony and their statements to police. Although there was conflicting testimony regarding other details of the offense, most notably whether Fields, Garrett/G, or Jamall, was involved in the shooting, Coleman, Jackson, and Bradley consistently identified appellant as one of the perpetrators. Coleman's and Jackson's testimony regarding the locations of the bodies and the number of gunshot wounds, as reported by appellant and Brooks, is also consistent with physical evidence. We further note that Coleman's testimony that he and Bradley were sitting in his car, near the apartment complex's front office shortly before the shootings occurred and that he could see the pedestrian gate, which was located in the same direction as Edwards's apartment, is consistent with Catalon's testimony that, minutes before the shootings, he saw two black men standing near a car parked near the apartment complex's front office which matched the description of Coleman's car, and that both men had been looking in the direction of Edwards's apartment building. As the sole factfinder, it was the jury's role to assess Jackson's and Coleman's credibility, as well as that of all the other witnesses, and to decide what weight to give to their testimony. See id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and deferring to the jury's decisions regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, we cannot say that no rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19.
We overrule appellant's first point of error.
Accomplice Testimony
In his second point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by not including an accomplice-witness instruction for Jackson.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.14 requires a trial court to prepare a jury charge which includes and accurately describes all the law applicable to the case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14. When an accomplice testifies, the trial court must give the jurors an accomplice-witness instruction to advise them that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime based only on the testimony of an accomplice; rather, the accomplice-witness's testimony must be corroborated with other evidence that tends to connect the defendant to the offense committed. See id. (requiring trial court to instruct jury on all law applicable to case); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14 (accomplice-witness corroboration requirement).
A proper accomplice-witness instruction informs the jury either that a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, or that he may be an accomplice as a matter of fact. Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The evidence in each case determines which instruction the trial court must give, if any. Zamora, 411 S.W.3d at 510. A witness is an accomplice as a matter of law when: (1) "the witness has been charged with the same offense as the defendant or a lesser-included offense"; (2) "the State charges a witness with the same offense as the defendant or a lesser-included offense of that offense, but dismisses the charges in exchange for the witness's testimony against the defendant"; or (3) "the evidence is uncontradicted or so one-sided that no reasonable juror could conclude that the witness was not an accomplice." Ash v. State, 533 S.W.3d 878, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
When the evidence establishes that a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial court must affirmatively instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice and that his testimony must be corroborated. Zamora, 411 S.W.3d at 510 (citing Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14 (requiring corroboration of accomplice-witness testimony). If, however, the evidence concerning the witness's complicity is conflicting, inconclusive, unclear, or shows merely that the witness may have been an accomplice, the issue should be submitted to the jury to decide whether the witness was an accomplice as a matter of fact. Ash, 533 S.W.3d at 884; Zamora, 411 S.W.3d at 510.
A defendant is only entitled to an accomplice-witness instruction if the issue is raised by the evidence. See Cocke, 201 S.W.3d at 748. "Whether an accomplice-witness instruction is justified, therefore, requires a case-specific and fact-specific inquiry." Id. A defendant is not entitled to an accomplice-witness instruction if the evidence is clear that the witness is neither an accomplice as a matter of law nor as a matter of fact. See id.
An "accomplice" is a person who participates with the defendant before, during, or after the commission of the crime and acts with the requisite culpable mental state in doing so. Id. at 747. "Participation requires an affirmative act that promotes the commission of the offense with which the defendant is charged." Id.; see also Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). "Mere presence at a crime scene does not make an individual an accomplice, nor is an individual an accomplice merely because he has knowledge about a crime and fails to disclose that knowledge." Cocke, 201 S.W.3d at 748.
B. Analysis
Appellant, who does not dispute that Jackson was not an accomplice as a matter of law, argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-fact instruction because "there was compelling circumstantial evidence supporting a finding that Jackson was complicit in the crime." Specifically, appellant points to evidence that Jackson initially lied to the police about his whereabouts the night of the shooting; when Jackson eventually cooperated with law enforcement, he told them that "G" had committed the crime with appellant and Brooks, not Fields; Jackson's cell phone records place his phone near the vicinity of Arbor Court apartments hours before the murders; Jackson and Brooks were communicating by phone before, during, and immediately after the shootings were believed to have taken place; and, on the day after the murders, Jackson partied with appellant, Brooks, and Fields, and was photographed holding a large quantity of cash and smiling with appellant.
Neither this evidence, nor any other evidence in the record, suggests that Jackson, acting with the required culpable mental state, actively participated before, during, or after the commission of the capital murders or that Jackson acted in a manner to promote the capital murders. At most, the phone calls between Jackson and Brooks suggest that Jackson may have known about the murders. See Cocke, 201 S.W.3d at 748 (stating person is not "an accomplice merely because he has knowledge about a crime and fails to disclose that knowledge"). Similarly, evidence that Jackson partied with appellant, Brooks, and Fields the day after the murders and that Jackson lied to the police and did not cooperate with law enforcement until a year after the murders is also not evidence that Jackson participated in the capital murders and possessed the requisite mental state. Knowing about a crime and failing to disclose information about that crime does not, on its own, make that the person an accomplice. See id.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to submit an accomplice-witness instruction because the evidence did not raise the issue. See id.
We overrule appellant's second point of error.
Admission of Hearsay
In his third point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting Jackson's testimony regarding statements allegedly made by Brooks. The State argues that the trial court properly overruled appellant's hearsay objection to this portion of Jackson's testimony because Brooks's comments are admissible pursuant to the exception to the general rule against hearsay for statements against interest. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(24).
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). If the trial court's decision was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, it must be upheld. Winegarner v. State, 235 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This is so because "'trial courts . . . are usually in the best position to make the call on whether certain evidence should be admitted or excluded.'" Id. (quoting Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
Generally, the hearsay rule excludes any out-of-court statements offered by a party at trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d) (defining hearsay); TEX. R. EVID. 802 (admissibility of hearsay); Walter v. State, 267 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). One of the exceptions to the hearsay rule allows the admission of statements made against the declarant's interest. TEX. R. EVID. 803(24). This exception permits admission of a statement that:
(a) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability or to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace; andId. The rationale behind admitting these types of statements "stems from the commonsense notion that people ordinarily do not say things that are damaging to themselves unless they believe they are true." Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890. "[A] reasonable person would not normally claim that he committed a crime, unless it were true." Id.
(b) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.
Rule 803(24) sets out a two-step foundation requirement for admissibility of hearsay statements. Id.; see also Coleman v. State, 428 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). First, the trial court must determine whether the statement, considering all of the circumstances, subjects the declarant to criminal liability and whether the declarant realized this when he made the statement. Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890-91. Second, the trial court must then determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances exist that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Id. at 891.
Collateral "blame-sharing" statements that implicate both the declarant and others may also be admissible under Rule 803(24) if corroborating circumstances clearly indicate their trustworthiness. Id. at 896. However, "blame-shifting" statements that implicate another person but minimize the declarant's culpability are not admissible under this rule, absent extraordinary circumstances. Id.; see also Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding statements inadmissible under Rule 803(24) because statements were "not so equally against both [the declarant's] and [the defendant's] interests as [to] reach this level of reliability"). "The determination of whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate trustworthiness lies within the trial court's discretion." Mason v. State, 416 S.W.3d 720, 734 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd) (citing Cunningham v. State, 877 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
B. Analysis
We first consider whether the statements admitted by the trial court subject Brooks to criminal liability and whether he recognized that at the time he made the statements. See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 890-81. Jackson testified that he went to an apartment the day after the shooting where he saw appellant, Brooks, Fields, and others excitedly "[p]artying" and "flashing" lots of money. He also saw several bottles of codeine syrup and a chrome .45 handgun. Jackson testified that when he and Brooks left the party to buy cigarettes, he asked Brooks where the drugs and money in the apartment had come from. Brooks told Jackson that he, appellant, and "G" had gone to an apartment in the Arbor Court complex the night before to rob someone. According to Jackson, Brooks told him that when the group arrived at the apartment, he and appellant went inside and they both started shooting. Brooks admitted that he shot and killed someone in the back room while appellant was "shooting over the counter" at someone else in the kitchen. After the shootings, the three men left the apartment with the money, a chrome .45 caliber handgun, and several bottles of codeine syrup.
Brooks's statements to Jackson that he and appellant killed two people during the commission of an armed robbery subject Brooks to criminal liability for capital murder as a party to the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a)(2), 19.03(a)(7). Although he claimed that appellant killed one of the victims, Brooks did not attempt to minimize his culpability for the capital offense or shift the blame to appellant. Rather, Brooks's statements implicate him and appellant equally in the commission of the offense. See Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 899 ("[O]ut-of-court statements from a co-defendant that are against the declarant's penal interest but also inculpate the defendant are viewed with some suspicion. That suspicion is lessened when the speaker makes no distinction between his conduct and that of the defendant—where there is absolute equality."). The trial court also could have reasonably concluded from these facts that Brooks recognized at the time he spoke with Jackson that his admission that he and appellant had shot and killed two people in the course of an armed robbery was against his penal interest. See Coleman, 428 S.W.3d at 160 (holding trial court could conclude that defendant knew that telling his girlfriend he had participated in murder was against his penal interest). In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Brooks's statements subjected him to criminal liability and that Brooks recognized this fact at the time he made the statements to Jackson.
The record does not reflect that Brooks told Jackson about Paynes, the third victim.
A person commits the offense of capital murder if he murders more than one person during the same criminal transaction. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(7). "A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." Id. § 7.01(a). A person is criminally responsible for another's conduct when he acts "with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense" and "solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense." Id. § 7.02(a)(2).
We now must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that there were sufficient corroborating circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of Brooks's statements to Jackson. The record includes physical evidence and testimony from multiple witnesses from which the trial court could have reasonably determined that there were sufficient corroborating circumstances. Specifically, Edwards's and Kiera Jackson's bodies were found where Brooks claimed the shootings took place, in the kitchen and the back bedroom of Edwards's apartment, respectively, and Brooks's cell phone records place him in the area of Arbor Court apartments when the murders occurred.
Jackson's testimony that he saw several bottles of codeine syrup, the chrome .45 gun, and unusually large amounts of cash in the apartment where appellant, Brooks, Fields, and others were partying the day after the murders, and the photograph of Jackson and appellant that was taken at the party in which Jackson is displaying a large amount of cash, also corroborate Brooks's statements that he, appellant, and G took these items with them when they left Edwards's apartment after the shootings.
Brooks's statements are also corroborated by statements that appellant made to Coleman and Jackson. Coleman testified that appellant told him a few days after the murders that he and his co-defendants had gone to Edwards's apartment and knocked on the door. According to appellant, he shot the man who opened the door, and then ran inside and shot Edwards in the kitchen. A woman in the apartment was also shot during the incident. Appellant also told Coleman that they took money and drugs when they left the apartment. Jackson's testimony that appellant told him the day after the shooting that he had shot Edwards "in his head and in the body several times," and "over the counter" because Edwards kept moving, also corroborates Brooks's statements.
Coleman's and Bradley's testimony regarding their interactions with appellant, Brooks, and Fields the night of the murders and their observations also corroborate Brooks's testimony. Specifically, Coleman and Bradley testified that they spoke with appellant, Brooks, and Fields at the Arbor Court apartments the night of the murders. According to both witnesses, the three men were dressed in all black, and either standing beside or sitting inside a truck. Coleman saw the men running from Edwards's apartment building after the shooting and fleeing the scene in a truck. Coleman also testified that when he was talking to appellant, Brooks, and Fields before the murders, one of them asked him what he knew about Edwards, the "Drink Man," and told Coleman that they were going to rob him.
After reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably have determined that there were corroborating circumstances that provided evidence of the trustworthiness of Brooks's statements.
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Brooks's statements to Jackson.
We overrule appellant's third point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Russell Lloyd
Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Lloyd and Countiss. Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).