Summary
explaining that because plaintiff could not rely on § 405(g) to challenge a later decision to suspend his benefits, "he would need an independent source of jurisdiction"
Summary of this case from Chambers v. Soc. Sec. Admin.Opinion
No. 18-50837
06-28-2019
BRUCE BECKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
Summary Calendar Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:17-CV-892 Before JONES, HIGGINSON, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Bruce Becker brought a suit challenging the Social Security Administration's decision to temporarily suspend his disability benefits. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing Becker's suit because he had failed to satisfy the prerequisites for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court agreed, adopted the recommendation, and dismissed Becker's claims.
The district court, however, did not have the benefit of our recent decision in In re Benjamin, 924 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2019). It therefore understandably concluded Becker was subject to § 405(h)'s channeling and jurisdiction-stripping provisions. But in Benjamin we held that § 405(h) channels only certain kinds of challenges into § 405(g)—namely, "challeng[es to] (1) a disability determination by the Commissioner (2) for which the statute requires a hearing." Id. at 188.
Becker does not appear to challenge an initial benefits determination here, but rather a later decision to suspend his benefits. If so, he would not be subject to § 405(h)'s channeling and stripping provisions. At the same time, that would mean Becker could not rely on § 405(g) to bring his claims; he would need an independent source of jurisdiction.
On remand, the district court should consider whether Becker's claims must be channeled through § 405(g) and (h) in the first instance and, if not, whether it has jurisdiction to consider Becker's claims based on the other alleged sources of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Benjamin, 924 F.3d at 188 (explaining the last sentence in § 405(h) strips federal jurisdiction under only the listed statutory provisions—§§ 1331 and 1346); Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 766 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding "§ 405(h) does not preclude § 1361 jurisdiction").
The judgment is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.