Banks v. Opoku

Full title: In the Matter of Tristin BANKS, respondent, v. Kwame OPOKU, appellant.

Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Date published: Aug 7, 2013

109 A.D.3d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)

109 A.D.3d 470

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 5568

Opinion

2013-08-7

In the Matter of Tristin BANKS, respondent, v. Kwame OPOKU, appellant.

Karl E. Bonheim, Riverhead, N.Y., for appellant. Susan A. DeNatale, Bayport, N.Y., for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS

Karl E. Bonheim, Riverhead, N.Y., for appellant. Susan A. DeNatale, Bayport, N.Y., for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JJ.

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Kwame Opoku appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Cheng, J.), dated October 11, 2012, which, after a hearing, and upon a finding that he committed the family offense of disorderly conduct, directed him, inter alia, to stay away from the petitioner and to refrain from harassing the petitioner.

ORDERED that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant's contention, the petitioner established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 832; Matter of Scanziani v. Hairston, 100 A.D.3d 1007, 955 N.Y.S.2d 162), that the appellant, who, inter alia, made verbal threats to the petitioner in the hallway of the Family Court building and physically blocked the petitioner's car from exiting the parking lot of the Family Court, engaged in threatening behavior that recklessly created a risk of causing public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm ( seePenal Law § 240.20; People v. Weaver, 16 N.Y.3d 123, 128–129, 919 N.Y.S.2d 99, 944 N.E.2d 634;see generally Matter of Cassie v. Cassie, –––A.D.3d ––––, 969 N.Y.S.2d 537, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05446 [2d Dept. 2013];cf. Matter of Hasbrouck v. Hasbrouck, 59 A.D.3d 621, 875 N.Y.S.2d 86;Matter of Bartley v. Bartley, 48 A.D.3d 678, 679, 852 N.Y.S.2d 326). Accordingly, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence supported the Family Court's determination that the appellant committed acts which constituted the family offense of disorderly conduct ( seePenal Law § 240.20; Matter of Smith v. Amedee, 101 A.D.3d 1033, 956 N.Y.S.2d 172), warranting the issuance of an order of protection.