Opinion
2012-12-19
In the Matter of Mia SMITH, respondent, v. Franck AMEDEE, appellant.
Placidus Aguwa, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant. Elliot Green, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
Placidus Aguwa, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant. Elliot Green, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, SANDRA L. SGROI, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Franck Amedee appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Queens County (Fitzmaurice, J.), dated November 2, 2011, which, after a hearing, and upon a finding that he had committed the family offenses of disorderly conduct, reckless endangerment in the second degree, and harassment in the second degree, directed him, inter alia, to stay away from the petitioner until and including November 2, 2013.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
“The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court” (Matter of Creighton v. Whitmore, 71 A.D.3d 1141, 1141, 898 N.Y.S.2d 585;seeFamily Ct. Act §§ 812, 832; Matter of Kaur v. Singh, 73 A.D.3d 1178, 900 N.Y.S.2d 895), “and that court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to considerable deference on appeal” (Matter of Cruz v. Rodriguez, 96 A.D.3d 838, 838, 946 N.Y.S.2d 480;see Matter of Kaur v. Singh, 73 A.D.3d at 1178, 900 N.Y.S.2d 895;Matter of Creighton v. Whitmore, 71 A.D.3d at 1141, 898 N.Y.S.2d 585). Contrary to the appellant's contention, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence supported the Family Court's determination that he committed acts which constituted the family offenses of disorderly conduct ( seePenal Law § 240.20[1]; Family Ct. Act § 812 [1]; Matter of Pearlman v. Pearlman, 78 A.D.3d 711, 911 N.Y.S.2d 87), reckless endangerment in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 120.20; Family Ct. Act § 812[1]; Matter of Knibbs v. Zeman, 86 A.D.3d 568, 926 N.Y.S.2d 835), and harassment in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 240.26 [1]; Family Ct. Act § 812[1]; Matter of Kaur v. Singh, 73 A.D.3d at 1178, 900 N.Y.S.2d 895), warranting the issuance of an order of protection.
The appellant's remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court.