Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-0498 Section "K" (6).
March 4, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
After considering the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, the record, the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, and plaintiff's Objections received on November 4, 2004, and having conducted a de novo review of those portions of the Report and Recommendations to which objections are made as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court hereby APPROVES the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and ADOPTS it as its opinion in this matter.
(Rec. Doc. No. 2).
Report and Recommendation, (Rec. Doc. No. 7).
Petitioner's Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendations, (Rec. Doc. No. 8).
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Magistrate judges are empowered by statute to preside over certain pretrial matters upon appointment by a district judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 10. A district court evaluating a magistrate judge's recommendation may adopt those portions of the recommendation to which no specific objection is made, as long as those sections are not clearly erroneous. See id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). However, where a party makes "specific, written objections" within 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate's recommendations, the district court must undertake de novo review of those contested aspects of the report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The district judge may then "accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts and procedural history were taken from this Court's review of the State and Federal records.
While on patrol the night of June 17, 1999, Deputy Linden Schmitt of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office Street Crimes Unit observed petitioner, James Baker, slide off the automobile on which he was seated and toss an object into the grass. Deputy Schmitt approached Baker and his companion and found a small plastic bag which appeared to be packaged narcotics, containing numerous foil squares, in the area where the object was thrown. Baker struggled and fled when Deputy Schmitt attempted to place him under arrest, but was thereafter apprehended by two assisting deputies of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office.
Petitioner was charged by bill of indictment with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, heroin, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A) on July 15, 1999. On August 27, 1999, the trial court conducted a hearing and denied Baker's motion to suppress evidence, confession, and identification. After Baker waived his right to a jury trial, the case was tried by the judge, who found him guilty of the lesser charge, possession of heroin, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(C). On October 5, 1999, Baker was sentenced to nine years imprisonment at hard labor. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a multiple offender bill of information. The trial court found the defendant to be a fourth felony offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1 at a multiple offender hearing on December 10, 1999. On January 12, 2000, the trial court vacated the original sentence and sentenced Baker to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii).
See State rec., vol. 1 of 2, pp. 46-99.
See State rec., vol. 1 of 2, pp. 100-214.
See State rec., vol. 1 of 2, p. 120.
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's conviction and life sentence on November 15, 2000, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied petitioner's writ on November 16, 2001. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied post-conviction relief on January 16, 2004. Subsequently, Baker timely filed the instant petition for habeas corpus in Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
State v. Baker, 776 So.2d 1212 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2000).
State v. Baker, 802 So.2d 621 (La. 2001).
State ex rel. Baker v. State, 864 So.2d 623 (La. 2004).
III. ANALYSIS
Magistrate Louis Moore, Jr. recommended that the Court deny Baker's habeas petition. In reviewing petitioner's objections, this Court will address the complaints in the same order employed in the magistrate's Report and Recommendations.
A. Conviction obtained through admission of evidence which was product of illegal search and seizure and, therefore, should have been suppressed
Baker contends that the plastic bag containing foil squares of heroin was uncovered through an illegal search, in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As such, Baker contends that the foil squares of heroin should have been excluded from evidence. Magistrate Moore relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) to reject petitioner's claims. Under Stone, a state prisoner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure was introduced at trial as long as the State provided "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at 481-482, 96 S.Ct. 3046; see also, Davis v. Blackburn, 803 F.2d 1371, 1372 (5th Cir. 1986). Magistrate Moore opined that habeas relief was precluded because Baker had not asserted denial of a full and fair opportunity for litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim.
Petitioner asserts the heroin must be excluded under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See Welch v. Butler, 835 F.2d 92, 95 (5th cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1221, 108 S.Ct. 2877, 101 L.Ed.2d 912 (1988).
The Report and Recommendations further notes that the trial court was presented with and addressed petitioner's motion to suppress. See (Rec. Doc. No. 7).
Petitioner objects to the magistrate's conclusion and claims that his habeas corpus petition did present an argument that his right to a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim was denied. In his Memorandum of Law to support this habeas petition, Baker presents a lengthy argument that the State procured the plastic bag of drugs through an illegal search and seizure. However, the memorandum makes only brief mention of the trial process. The relevant language provides, "[a]fter listening to deputies testimony at petitioner's suppression hearing, the trial judge denied the petitioner's motion to suppress. But more detailed testimony came out at the petitioner's trial." Petitioner then quoted trial testimony of Deputy Schmitt. Even if this language does represent an argument which, in essence, claims the trial court review of the Fourth Amendment issue was inadequate, Baker's objection must fail. The United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit has held:
Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Rec. Doc. No. 2).
Stone's 'full and fair opportunity to litigate' requirement is satisfied if the state affords a defendant an evidentiary hearing to determine the factual basis for his Fourth Amendment challenge and provides an opportunity for meaningful appellate review by a higher state court.Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th Cir. 1978) ( citing O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1213 (5th Cir. 1977)). The record reflects that the Baker's Fourth Amendment Claim was considered by the trial court during an evidentiary hearing and later by the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief.
B. Insufficient Evidence
Baker claims that insufficient evidence was submitted to support his conviction for possession of heroin. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996 (effective April 24, 1996) provides the appropriate standard of review. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) provides that a federal court shall not grant habeas relief to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court unless the State court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Supreme Court set forth the appropriate standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. Jackson held that due process requires a determination of "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2789. As noted by Magistrate Moore, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reviewed petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim under this standard, concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support conviction. The appellate court examined the essential elements of the crime, summarized the State's burden of proof, examined the evidence presented at trial, and concluded "the evidence presented by the state at trial was sufficient under the Jackson standard to support defendant's conviction for possession of heroin." State v. Baker, 776 So.2d 1212, 1216 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2000). After a de novo review of the record, this Court finds that the state court did not unreasonably apply Jackson. Hence, habeas relief is precluded.
Petitioner objects to this reasoning, asserting that this Court must apply state evidentiary law(s) in reviewing his conviction. However, as noted above, a district court must review a state judgment using the standard of review outlined in the AEDPA. Hence, Baker's claim is without merit.
C. Unconstitutionally Determined to be a Fourth Felony Offender
Petitioner asserts that the State unconstitutionally found him to be a fourth felony offender under the Louisiana habitual offender statute. Petitioner argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to identify him as the person convicted of the predicate offenses and thus failed to meet its burden of proof under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1. Specifically, Baker argues that by comparing his present fingerprints with fingerprints on the arrest registers associated with the predicate offenses, the State merely proved that he had been arrested and charged with these offenses. "To prove that a defendant is a habitual offender, the state must establish by competent evidence the prior felony convictions and that defendant is the same person who was convicted of the prior felonies." State v. Smith, 760 So.2d 506, 509 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2000). The magistrate rejected Baker's argument, correctly explaining that violations of state law are irrelevant to the constitutional review of § 2254 habeas claims, and noting that the State had presented ample evidence to prove that Baker had been convicted of three prior felonies. In his written objections, Baker avers that his constitutional rights were violated because the state trial judge failed to strictly adhere to state law.
As noted above, a district court's review of a state prisoner's habeas claim is limited. Under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a court will only grant relief if the state adjudication was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, the magistrate appropriately rejected Baker's argument that his conviction was unconstitutional due to non-compliance with state law. However, this Court has conducted a de novo review of petitioner's claim that insufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction. Applying the test of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d, this Court finds that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Baker was convicted of the predicate offenses. Furthermore, even under Louisiana state law, "testimony comparing a defendant's current fingerprints with those found on prior arrest records is sufficient to prove that the defendant was the person convicted of a prior felony." State v. Baker, 776 So.2d 1212, 1217 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2000) ( citing State v. Hollins, 742 So.2d 671, 684-685 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1999), State v. Bell, 709 So.2d 921, 926 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1998). As noted by the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, ample evidence was submitted by the State to prove that petitioner had three prior felony convictions. Accordingly, Baker's claim must be rejected.
D. Unconstitutionally Excessive Sentence
Petitioner asserts that his sentence under the habitual offender statute is excessive, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Magistrate found that petitioner had failed to rebut the presumed constitutionality of the legislatively imposed sentence, and confirmed that petitioner was subject to a life sentence under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) due to his "violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966(C), which is punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than five years, and because petitioner had three predicate offenses, one of which, being a felon in possession of a firearm. [LSA-R.S. 14:95.1], was punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years." The Report and Recommendations state in footnote that a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm faces a term of imprisonment of ten to fifteen years. Baker objects to the magistrate's dismissal of his claim, arguing that his conviction under LSA-R.S. 14:95.1 should not have been used to enhance his sentence. Baker asserts that when this crime was committed, it carried a sentence of not less than three years nor more than ten, and thus could not be used to constitutionally enhance his sentence.
Report and Recommendation, (Rec. Doc. No. 7).
The sentence in statutory effect at the time the defendant committed the underlying offense is used when applying the Louisiana Habitual Offender Law. State v. Carter, 712 So.2d 701, 712 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1998). The Court notes that petitioner is correct that the previous version of LSA-R.S. 14:95.1 provided for a lesser sentence than is required for enhancing a sentence under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). See S.B. 528, 1995 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1995) (amending sentence). However, a de novo review of the record reveals that the trial court did not err in enhancing Baker's sentence.
When enhancing a defendant's sentence, a court must use the enhancement statute in effect at the time of commission of the offense for which the sentence is being enhanced. Serio v. Stalder, 2003 WL 2238431, *3 (E.D. La. 2003) ( citing State v. Everett, 816 So.2d 1272 (La. 2002). In June, 1999, Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law provided, in relevant part:
If the fourth or subsequent felony or any of the prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) (emphasis added). A plain reading of this statute reveals that if any one of a multiple offender's four felonies meets the listed criteria, a life sentence is statutorily warranted. Because Baker's fourth conviction was for a violation of the Uniform Dangerous Substances Law punishable for more than five years, he was subject to the mandatory life sentence under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii).
LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) was amended in 2001 to provide:
If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14; 2(13), a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.See S.B. 239, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2001) (emphasis added).
A violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966(C) is punishable for a term of four to seven years.
This Court further finds that petitioner's life sentence is not in violation of constitutional law. "For crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative perogative." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2684, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) ( quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1139, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). A federal habeas court will not upset a state sentence within statutory limits unless it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be completely arbitrary and shocking. Bonner v. Henderson, 517 F.2d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Smallwood v. Johnson, 73 F.3d 1343, 1347 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 212, 136 L.Ed.2d 146 (1996) (emphasizing that a federal court will not review a state sentencing without a threshold showing that the sentence is "grossly disproportionate to the offense.") Petitioner has made no such showing. Therefore, petitioner's claim must be dismissed.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254, is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.