Opinion
No. 2020-C-01242
01-12-2021
Jerry R. BAGWELL v. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, et al.
PER CURIAM
In this mesothelioma case, the plaintiffs sued various defendants, alleging the decedent was exposed to asbestos and such exposure caused his death. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs against the decedent's employer, RMC, finding it 75% at fault. CAPCO, a non-party defendant, was found 25% at fault. The jury assigned no fault to Union Carbide Corporation ("UCC") and Montello, Inc., the manufacturer and the distributor of certain asbestos-containing products. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.
The court of appeal initially affirmed relative to liability but reversed on rehearing and granted a new trial, finding the jury verdict internally inconsistent. In response to Interrogatory 1 on the jury verdict form, the jury found the decedent "contracted mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos from the products/activities" of CAPCO and RMC, and "that such exposure was a substantial contributing cause of his mesothelioma." The jury specifically rejected liability on the part of UCC and Montello in response to this inquiry. In later interrogatories, RMC and CAPCO were the only companies found to have caused Bagwell's injury under a negligence theory, and only CAPCO was found liable under a strict products liability theory. The plaintiffs argued the jury reached a logically impossible result by finding RMC 75% at fault for the decedent's exposure to asbestos without assigning fault to the producers of the asbestos products. In finding these responses inconsistent, the court of appeal stated, "the jury was clearly confused in determining that RMC exposed [the decedent] to drilling mud additives, yet simultaneously found no exposure to drilling mud additives used by RMC."
We reverse the grant of a new trial and reinstate the jury's verdict, finding the jury's answers to these interrogatories are not irreconcilable. The court of appeal reasoned that Interrogatory 1 only contemplated the source of the decedent's exposure, not causation. In narrowly interpreting it as such, the court of appeal found the jury could not have logically held RMC liable for exposing the decedent to the asbestos-containing products without also assigning fault to UCC and Montello, whose products were allegedly the source of the exposure. This interpretation fails to properly consider the second question posed in Interrogatory 1: whether the exposure was a "substantial contributing cause" of the decedent's disease. The jury could have reasonably found that even if UCC and Montello's products were the source of exposure, on which we express no opinion, the products were not unreasonably dangerous and did not cause the decedent's mesothelioma. The jury instructions even provided, "[n]ot every asbestos exposure is a substantial contributing factor." Evidence was presented at trial that the manufacturers’ packaging, labeling, and handling was compliant with federal standards. Thus, the jury could have rationally concluded the decedent's injury was caused only by RMC's mishandling of the products, not the products themselves.
The parties dispute the implications of several pre-trial directed verdicts relating to the source of the exposure. The broad language of the directed verdicts leaves some room to conclude that RMC's own products contained asbestos, but, because we find an independent basis for upholding the jury verdict, we assume arguendo that the jury found UCC and Montello's products were the source of the exposure. If this assumption is wrong, such error only acts as additional support for the verdict.
Considering the verdict as a whole, it is evident the jury did not find UCC and Montello caused the decedent's injuries or were otherwise legally at fault. It did not find their products or activities resulted in exposure to asbestos that was a substantial contributing cause of the decedent's mesothelioma. It did not elsewhere check "negligent" or "strictly liable" for these two defendants. RMC was the sole named defendant the jury found negligent, which is consistent with answering "yes" to Interrogatory 1 for RMC. The employer, whose products or activities were found to be the sole substantial contributing cause of the decedent's disease, is also the only defendant assessed with liability and a percentage of fault. Thus, we find the jury verdict is not internally inconsistent.
A verdict based on the interrogatories should not be set aside unless the form prevented the jury from reaching a legally correct verdict. Palacios v. Louisiana & Delta R.R., Inc. , 2005-1168 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 5/3/06), 930 So. 2d 1086, 1091, writ denied, 2006-1909 (La. 11/3/06), 940 So. 2d 665 quoting Chatelain v. Rabalais, 2004-28 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 7/7/04), 877 So. 2d 324, 334 ). An inconsistent verdict, however, must be read as a whole, with the rule that the judgment shall be just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 2164 ; Chambers v. Graybiel, 25,840 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 6/22/94), 639 So. 2d 361, 368 writ denied, 94-1948 (La. 10/28/94), 644 So. 2d 377.
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The court of appeal's opinion issued on rehearing is reversed. The original court of appeal judgment on the merits is reinstated, subject to the parties’ right to seek supervisory review thereof within thirty days of this opinion.