Opinion
NO. 01-19-00941-CR
03-10-2020
DEREK A. ANTHONY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 17-DCR-076698
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Derek A. Anthony, attempts to appeal from the trial court's order denying his "Motion to Dismiss [for] Violation of Speedy Trial."
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The right to appeal in criminal cases is conferred by statute, and a party may appeal only from a judgment of conviction or an interlocutory order as authorized by statute. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.02; TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); Ragston v. State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order in a criminal case when jurisdiction has not been expressly granted by statute. See Ragston, 424 S.W.3d at 52; see also State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (explaining appeals "in a criminal case are permitted only when they are specifically authorized by statute"); Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting "an interlocutory appeal is an extraordinary remedy"). When this Court lacks jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. See Mendoza v. State, No. 06-17-00121-CR, 2017 WL 3908216, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 9, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see, e.g., Dunsmore v. State, Nos. 01-14-00251-CR, 01-14-00307-CR, 01-14-00274-CR, 01-14-00306-CR, 2014 WL 4418565, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 9, 2014, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Here, appellant attempts to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order denying his motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. However, an order denying such a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by interlocutory appeal. See Ex parte Delbert, 582 S.W.2d 145, 145-46 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Ordenuz v. Bean, 579 S.W.2d 911, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (orig. proceeding); see also Davis v. State, No. 05-09-01435-CR, 2010 WL 456867, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 9, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("An order denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of a speedy trial violation is not reviewable by interlocutory appeal."). Instead, a challenge to the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy-trial violation may only be brought on appeal from a judgment of conviction. See Ex parte Delbert, 582 S.W.2d at 145-46; Ordenuz, 579 S.W.2d at 913-14; see also In re Connor, No. 09-08-456-CV, 2008 WL 4821631, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 6, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("A direct post-conviction appeal is adequate to address claims concerning the right to a speedy trial."); Duggan v. Routt, No. 01-90-00587-CV, 1990 WL 126631, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 1990, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Landau, and Countiss. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).