Mendoza v. State

Full title: MARTIN MENDOZA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

Date published: Aug 9, 2017

No. 06-17-00121-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 9, 2017)

Opinion

No. 06-17-00121-CR

08-09-2017

MARTIN MENDOZA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess

On Appeal from the 4th District Court Rusk County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR15-085 Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

In April 2015, a Rusk County grand jury indicted Martin Mendoza for intentionally and knowingly possessing a controlled substance while he was an inmate at the Bradshaw State Jail located in Henderson, Texas.¹ At the time of the indictment through the present date, Mendoza has been serving a sentence in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) prison system. At some point after Mendoza was indicted in Rusk County, officials of that county requested that the TDCJ hold Mendoza following his completion of the sentence he is currently serving so that he may be returned to Rusk County to deal with the April 2015 Rusk County indictment.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.11(d) (West 2016).

On July 29, 2016, Mendoza filed a motion to dismiss the Rusk County indictment in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Rusk County. Additionally, on January 6, 2017, Mendoza filed a "Motion for Speedy Trial under Interstate Agreement on Detainers and U.S. Constitution and Tx. Constitution." Then, on May 5, 2017, the Fourth Judicial District Court entered a written order denying Mendoza's motion to dismiss. Finally, on May 8, 2017, the trial court entered a written order denying Mendoza's motion for a speedy trial.

We have raised the issue of our jurisdiction over this appeal on our own motion, and because we conclude that we are without jurisdiction, we will dismiss the appeal.

As an initial matter, we note that, under the unambiguous terms of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA), that statute is not applicable to the facts of this case. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14 (West 2006). Specifically, the IADA states, in pertinent part,

(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the

continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14(III)(a) (emphasis added). Further, under the IADA, "'State' shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14(II)(a). Thus, for a prisoner in the TDCJ prison system, the IADA would only be implicated if there were pending criminal charges in a state other than Texas. By contrast, Mendoza is both incarcerated in Texas and facing pending criminal charges within Texas, and the IADA is inapplicable.

In the State of Texas, a party may appeal only that which the Texas Legislature has authorized. Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In the absence of legislation authorizing an appeal, appellate courts lack jurisdiction to act. Id. Generally speaking, in the criminal context, the Texas Legislature has only authorized appeals by criminal defendants from written judgments of conviction. See Gutierrez v. State, 307 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ex parte Shumake, 953 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.). There are a few very limited exceptions to this general rule, see Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.), but the trial court's May 5, 2017, and May 8, 2017, orders denying Mendoza's motions do not appear to fall within any of those exceptions. See Ex parte Delbert, 582 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Ordunez v. Bean, 579 S.W.2d 911, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (orig. proceeding) (establishing that order denying motion to dismiss based on speedy trial violation is not reviewable by interlocutory appeal and clarifying that such a challenge should be brought via a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction).

By letter dated July 11, 2017, we notified Mendoza of this potential defect in our jurisdiction and afforded him the opportunity to demonstrate a basis for retaining the appeal on our docket notwithstanding the identified defect. Mendoza filed no response. As the trial court's orders denying Mendoza's motion to dismiss the indictment and his motion for a speedy trial are not appealable via an interlocutory appeal, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Consequently, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Ralph K. Burgess

Justice Date Submitted: August 8, 2017
Date Decided: August 9, 2017 Do Not Publish